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THOMAS GREENE

The Norms of Epic

GENRE THEORY since the seventeenth century has gained in subtlety and lost in metaphysical security. As distinctions between genres have grown more gradual and complex, the easy neoclassic sense of the necessity or naturalness of genres has faded. The authority of Croce has denied them any validity. But they continue to be fruitfully discussed—fruitfully if less coherently. In the absence of a general theory which assigns to each its function, the individual genres have to find singly their working principles within themselves. Out of the writer's and critic's effort to redefine we have the opportunity to understand the genres more profoundly.

In the case of epic, one can begin by distinguishing heroic poems, poems produced by barely literate, widely separated societies, whose resemblances confer a unity supported by sociology and history. A second group is comprised of poems written in emulation of or, as it were, out of nostalgia for Homer's two heroic poems (and for the poem of his emulator, Virgil). It is easy enough, in most cases, to show which poems in European literature fall into this second group, simply on the basis of obvious, demonstrable devices and conventions. To isolate that group implies no metaphysical assertion.

The student who wants to pass beyond the historian's rule of thumb and to speak more searchingly of genre types must not seem to assert too much. Aware of literature's natural resistance to tidiness, he yet approaches the historian's class with an intuition of norms less obvious and more essential than the superficial conventions, norms which no single poem fully embodies. He knows that a pure epic has never been written. And yet he postulates an epic mode which Homer's emulators approach along with Homer and with the authors of other heroic poems which attain a certain magnitude and value. To describe the mode as he apprehends it is not to insist on its full actualization in any one

poem, nor even to overlook an historical fact—that, as the mode crystallized in literate societies, it tended to choke poetic vitality; that to be perpetuated and renewed, it had to be violated and extended. To describe the mode, then, is not to prescribe, with the naïveté of some Renaissance critics, nor to deny that each successive great artist who worked in it left it a somewhat different thing. Furthermore, the student should not be disposed to quarrel over the classification of individual poems within or without the genre; he knows that works may participate in the mode to varying degrees. But, having recognized all this, he will not forget another historical fact—that the legendary epic ideal was like a spirit that seized and rode great men, haunting and exhausting them, driving them sometimes to misdirect their gifts but also, in some few cases, to surpass them.

The remarks which follow are based on these presuppositions and are written in the hope of isolating some of the epic norms. They are concerned in turn with the imagery, the hero, the structure, and the language of epic.

1.

The first quality of the epic imagination is expansiveness, the impulse to extend its own luminosity in ever-widening circles. It contrasts in this respect with both the comic and the tragic imagination. The comic imagination accepts without cramp the fixity of its horizon; it chooses not to press beyond the street, the drawing room, the public place, the boudoir, which constitute its chosen locale.[1] Tragic space, on the other hand, closes in to hedge and confine. It permits at best fragments of knowledge, clearings of light, islands of felicity. The space beyond the clearings remains shadowy and unknowable. But the epic universe is there to be invaded by the human will and imagination. Epic answers man's need to clear away an area he can apprehend, if not dominate; and commonly this area expands to fill the epic universe, to cover the known world and reach between Heaven and Hell. Epic characteristically refuses to be hemmed in, in time as well as in space; it raids the unknown and colonizes it. It is the imagination's manifesto, proclaiming the range of its grasp, or else it is the dream of the will, indulging its fantasies of power.

Tragedy, on the other hand, dramatizes the isolation of the will, the limits of human apprehension. This is why tragedy commonly uses

[1] I am thinking in particular of writers like Terence, Jonson, Molière, Congreve, Shaw, and even Jane Austen, who seem to me to be more or less "pure" comic artists. Some great comic triumphs (as in Cervantes, some of Shakespeare, Kafka, and Joyce) involve an admixture with other genres (tragedy, romance, epic) and do not exemplify my generalizations.

partial, fragmentary images. If you think of any familiar Shakespearean metaphor or allusion—the player who struts and frets, Hamlet's unweeded garden, Lear's basest beggar—you see them as unsituated, without context and without detail. Each is a brief candle of an impression, which flickers and goes out in the flow of speech.[2] It is compressed, suggestive, unfulfilled; it invites analysis; and it frequently gains resonance from its place in a series of like images scattered through the play. Moreover, the speaker and the image are exterior to each other; we do not think of Hamlet literally moving through the garden, even though it represents metaphorically the world he does move in. All of these qualities of tragic imagery are appropriate to the ultimate unknowability of the tragic universe.

The characteristic imagery of epic is unlike all this; it expands, exfoliates, fulfills itself in harmony with the expansive, emancipated imagination governing it. The epic simile cannot, by definition, be a brief candle of an impression; it is permitted to fill out space in its natural limits, to include not one but many living things, to detail with leisure the various aspects of its selected scene. It is in itself characteristically a miniature, complete action. A scene need not be described exhaustively or meticulously, but we are told all that we want or need to know about it. And this is equally true when the epic poet is at work upon one of the greater images of his poem, upon the landscape of the action. We feel as readers that our eye can move easily over the well-lit space before us, that no occasional shadow will forever baffle our gaze.[3] The darkness of Milton's Hell must remain darkness visible.

It would be useful to think of these greater images, with whatever movement or action they contain, as the unit counters of the epic poet's art. The death agony of Troy as Virgil describes it, with its various episodes, locales, peripeties, its accretion of similes, its moral, historical, symbolic associations—all this intricate but massive block exists in our minds as a single, giant image which cannot easily be pulled apart and to which everything in Virgil's second book contributes. In this epic

[2] It is true that images like these are natural to speech and so fitting for the stage, tragic or not. But if the imagery of a Shakespearean comedy which is truly comic and free of tragic mystery—say, *As You Like It*—is compared with the imagery of the tragedies, the comic images are seen to tend toward a relatively greater solidity and fullness (when at least they are not witticisms). This must remain unproved here. But in any case the fragmentary image is peculiarly effective as a property of tragedy; it is the instrument of an Aeschylus far more than of an Aristophanes.

[3] I take it that this is the distinction Lubbock makes when he speaks of the feeling for Russian landscape in Tolstoy and Dostoevsky. Tolstoy's affinities with epic and Dostoevsky's with tragedy are clear. See Percy Lubbock, *The Craft of Fiction* (New York, 1957), pp. 44-47.

image scenery and symbol merge. Any given detail, any smaller visual unit, has to be related to its place in that larger whole. The whole is what the poet is intent upon and what the reader should be intent upon. Milton's Paradise is such a whole; so is the Ogygia or Phaeacia of the *Odyssey*; so even is Dante's Inferno. But of course the greater image need not be so very huge as these examples; the African harbor which receives Aeneas's storm-weary ships would be a more modest example. There is no term which designates precisely this kind of unit; I shall call it an arch-image. It is distinguished from the fragmentary image of tragedy because it invites, not exegetical expansion, but exploration. And the characters, rather than remaining outside it, are contained by it, help to define it and indeed to comprise it.

The arch-image is inseparable from the action it contains. The experience of whoever moves through it colors the image just as the image controls the experience. The poet may choose to begin an episode by describing an action, and, with the developing narrative and shifting focus, fill in progressively the area about the central figures. That is basically the precedure of Virgil's second book. But more frequently we see the arch-image before we see the experience; this is the case with Milton's Paradise. In either case the real movement of the poem is from one arch-image to another, and its vital force depends greatly upon their richness and flow.

Not all the epic episodes of course need to be contained within arch-images. There are transitional episodes which take place against sketchy, vague backgrounds. I shall have more to say about this below. Here let it suffice to observe that episodes can be described as "strong image" or "weak image" according to their visual intensity. The poet must decide how much intensity each episode needs, when to strengthen and when to relax the imagistic impression. An excess of either extreme is deadly. But, within the broad spectrum of feasible choice, one may study the poet's imagistic style, as it were, through his successive responses to that recurring problem.

2.

The expansiveness of epic is checked finally by a complementary, containing quality which affects not so much or not only the sense of space as the capacity of the hero. It has to do with a kind of austerity. This has been touched upon in three recent books written from very different orientations.

C. M. Bowra, in his *Heroic Poetry,* hypothesizes that the stage of cultural evolution producing such poetry was preceded by a stage producing shamanistic poetry, of which the Finnish *Kalevala* would

be an example. The magician or shaman who is the protagonist succeeds not through physical prowess so much as through hermetic knowledge, magical powers, and initiation into supernatural mysteries. The protagonist of the heroic poem who, according to Bowra, succeeded the shaman, would then have to be seen as an essentially weaker man, gifted at the outset with less formidable capacities, and less likely to control his world, relying as he does chiefly on courage and strength, sometimes intelligence—all merely human qualities.

A second scholar, Gertrude R. Levy, working more intensively than Bowra with a smaller number of texts, argues that the action of several ancient epics was based on immeasurably older myths and rituals of the Near and Middle East. In her study, *The Sword from the Rock,* Miss Levy attempts to show that the action of the human hero follows a pattern originally ascribed to divine protagonists, a pattern which descended over a period of centuries and even millenia—from the god to the demigod to the exceptional man. I do not know whether Miss Levy would feel that Bowra's hypothesis conflicts with her own.

In any case, we find a third writer interested in laying the basis for a "scientific" criticism, who sees the epic analogously as a post-mythical genre. Northrop Frye, in *Anatomy of Criticism,* places the epic in the category of high mimetic which follows, logically and chronologically, upon the categories of myth and romance. The hero of myth is a god; the hero of romance is superior to other men and to his environment, superior not in kind as a god is but in degree. Romance is the realm of the marvelous, the magical, and the monstrous. The epic would seem to fall just over the line in high mimetic; I imagine Mr. Frye would agree that epic commonly treats this line somewhat carelessly. The hero of high mimetic "is superior in degree to other men but not to his natural environment . . . He has authority, passions, and powers of expression far greater than ours, but what he does is subject both to social criticism and to the order of nature."[4]

All these writers thus view the epic not as an attempt to inflate the hero's naturally meager capacities but as rather the opposite, in terms of its historical development—as a diminishing of his capacities to approximate more closely those we know. The epic represents a sacrifice, in the name of reason or realism or something else, of the pleasure of pure fantasy. The hero encounters a new sort of resistance and reaches the limitations of his being. He is denied something, particularly those

[4] C. M. Bowra, *Heroic Poetry* (London, 1952); G. R. Levy, *The Sword from the Rock* (New York, 1953); Northrop Frye, *Anatomy of Criticism* (Princeton, 1957), pp. 33-34.

things which would render him a god. He acquires an austerity which is peculiarly human.

This shift from shamanistic or mythical to human, with the concurrent sacrifice it entails, is reflected in the oldest heroic poem we possess, indeed one of the oldest literary texts we possess—the Babylonian epic of Gilgamesh. It survives in several different versions in different languages; the oldest version may be nearly as far anterior to Homer as Homer is to us. It concerns a hero who is explicitly and repeatedly compared to a god: "like to a double of Anu's own self"; "two thirds of him are divine, and one third of him human." In the opening episodes Gilgamesh's exploits resemble in valor and magnitude those of many other heroes, although he is aided by his companion Enkidu. Enkidu's death marks the poem's turning point; the remainder is concerned with Gilgamesh's persistent but unsuccessful search for immortality. Confronted for the first time by the truth of death, he is haunted by its anguish and, spurning the *carpe diem* counsel of the beautiful goddess Siduri, is driven upon a futile quest for a means to mitigate his humanity. But he is left at the end with only the anguished despair of that one-third of himself which is not divine. He has discovered the austerity of the mortal. With that discovery the epic becomes possible.

The epic is the poem which replaces divine worship with human awe, awe for the act which is prodigious but yet human. It is the City of Man not of God, which Tasso evokes in the last sentence of his discourse, as the final metaphoric evocation of the genre he loved most; he saw the epic as "alcuna nobilissima città piena di magnifiche, e di reali abitazioni, ed ornata di templi, e di palazzi, e d'altre fabbriche reali, e maravigliose."[5] The last word of the quotation, which is the last word of his discourse, deliberately placed there, lays stress upon that quality of *maraviglia,* awe, which Tasso with so many other critics postulated as the basic response to epic poetry. Epic awe, as distinguished from religious or mythical awe, springs from the circumstance that a man can commit an extraordinary act while still remaining limited. It does not matter that, in practice, the poet describes occasionally heroic action which is beyond human powers, if the hero is understood to be subject to ignorance or foolhardiness and above all to death.

Man in his middle state shares his mortality with animals, and with the gods he shares the right to bear a name, an individual name, as animals do not. The right to a name means that a man can commit acts which vary qualitatively from another man's acts. A man's name

[5] Torquato Tasso, *Discorsi del Poema Eroico,* in *Prose,* ed. Mazzali (Naples, 1959), p. 729.

is very important in heroic poetry; it becomes equal to the sum of his accomplishments. It is always assumed that a man's action is knowable and is known, and is known to be *his*. (Hence the importance of the heroic poet within his own world.) It is important that every combatant who is killed in the *Iliad* have a name, for the name is an index to the victor's accomplishment. A hero wears his victims' names like scalps and his own name is aggrandized by theirs. The epic tries to define the relation between the hero's name and his death.

Epic narrative then is a series of adjustments between the hero's capacities and his limitations. His life as a hero is devoted to informing his name with meaning. Because, unlike an animal, he can accomplish a distinctive, personal thing, and, unlike a god, he has no past accomplishments, the hero must discover and demonstrate at the outset what meaning his name may have. He is impelled to act, and action among men is agonistic; it plunges him into a contest of *arete, virtus*, capacity, a struggle to impose his being on his world. He can do this by demonstrating his control over a piece of his world—by subduing another man or a monster, or by pitting himself victoriously against some natural hazard of his environment. To remain a hero he must continue to demonstrate control, and so his career imitates the expansiveness of the epic imagination. But at the end of that movement there lies, implicitly or explicitly, with greater or lesser force, the sense of limit.

It follows from this that tragedy is not incompatible with epic, that on the contrary tragic elements complement and fulfill it. They become explicit when the sense of limit yields to a tragic contraction of capacity and control. In those epics (such as the *Iliad* and *Beowulf*) where the arch-images are few and the amplitude in time and space is restricted, one finds the statement of epic accomplishment to be most heavily qualified by tragic limitations. But these poems simply weight more heavily one member of the dialectical struggle which is always involved in epic narrative. Comedy, with its classical acquiescence to limits, is much less compatible with epic because it evades that struggle.

The conclusion imposes some stable equilibrium, some final adjustment or definition. In *Beowulf* the hero's control reaches its widest point about two-thirds through the poem, and then, with the supravention of his death and his people's probable military collapse, his control is reduced to nothing. But his name will remain, perpetuated by the barrow raised in his honor. The three conceptions of Beowulf's name or his honor, his power, and his death are related to each other ironically, and constitute the elements from which the deeply tragic conclusion is forged. This represents one extreme kind of equilibrium; at the other

extreme might be placed the equilibrium of the *Odyssey,* which anticipates a remote and easy death balanced against a glorious name and a degree of control—though certainly not total control—over the known world. The hero learns—and the reader with him—wherein lies his power and to what degree, and wherein lie his limitations and to what degree. The conclusion formalizes these discoveries.

If Dante's *Commedia* does not altogether satisfy one's sense of what an epic is, the reason may lie in the protagonist's failure to acquire or lose power over his world; he acquires it only over himself. Subjective conquest may complement the objective in epic, but cannot replace it. In a sense Dante's universe does not permit an individual to acquire power because for him all power belongs to God.

In certain Renaissance epics, like Spenser's, the landscape which is contested can be taken to represent the hero's own soul. It might be argued that Spenser's story is essentially Dante's story—as it could certainly be argued of Spenser's follower, Phineas Fletcher, whose *Purple Island* is based on nothing more than a very simple psychomachia. To the degree that Spenser frees himself from the simplifications of the crudest allegory, to the degree that he evokes a world exterior to the hero whose existence is imaginatively compelling, he participates in the epic.

The subject of all epic poetry might thus be said to be politics, but a politics not limited to society, a politics embracing the natural and the fabulous worlds, embracing even the moral or spiritual worlds they sometimes shadow forth, and involving ultimately the divine. The implications expand to suggest, if not frankly to assert, a cosmic power struggle. The heroic act assumes its highest prestige by its divine authorization—the authorization which became symbolized with increasing frequency in the Renaissance by the literal descent of the angelic messenger to the hero, to direct or counsel him.

So far I may seem to suppose that a given poem contained a single hero; but of course the epic is not always so simple. One may set against a poem like *Beowulf,* whose hero we scarcely lose sight of once he is introduced, the more complex *Chanson de Roland,* where two complementary heroes are brilliantly balanced. It might be said that the whole poem belongs essentially to Roland, even though a considerable part of the action occurs after his death; Charlemagne's victory would thus be read as a response to Roland's defeat. This is a defensible reading but so is the contrary—that the poem belongs essentially to Charlemagne, with whom it begins and ends, and that Roland's defeat should be seen as a peripety in his liege's larger, cir-

cumscribing career. Both readings are legitimate; to the degree that they conflict, the poem could be called complex. But the complexity is still limited by the circumstance that the power of the two heroes is directed toward controlling the same world under the same authority. Epic becomes truly complex when, as in the *Iliad,* the political goals of the multiple heroes are opposed. Here the City becomes divided against itself and some tragic outcome is likely.

Not many epics resemble the *Iliad* in this respect. The *Gerusalemme liberata* resembles the *Song of Roland,* assigning the Charlemagne role to Goffredo and the Roland role to Rinaldo, Tancredi, and others. In many poems the older, wiser, less active figure is withdrawn to a second plane, leaving the foreground to the younger Roland figure or figures; thus it is in Ariosto, and in *Beowulf,* where two men, Hrothgar and Hygelac, divide the Charlemagne role. Beowulf's tragedy is explicable in a sense by his attempt at the conclusion to play both roles. So also the tragedy of Aeneas, if tragedy is the right term to represent the sense of loss, privation, and denial which underlies his ostensible accomplishments. I think one might even consider the characters of *Paradise Lost* in terms of this duality; Adam's action as protagonist is circumscribed by the wisdom and criticism of God and His angels, to whom Adam must render an account just as Beowulf does to Hygelac. Charlemagne in the *Song of Roland* is also a kind of surrogate for God and so to a degree is Tasso's Goffredo. Another reason for the *Iliad's* structural complexity lies in the hostility between its Roland and Charlemagne figures.

The distinction, where it exists, between the director and executor of action, reflects the twofold concern of politics—the establishment of control through violence and the right use of control in government. The focus in epic is upon violence rather than administration, but the violence needs some frame of ulterior meaning. The Charlemagne figure is there to ensure, among other things, that the violence should not be betrayed by its consequences. Action is most fully realized through changes of institutions or regimes which extend its consequences throughout society and throughout time. Thus the epic is the great poem of beginnings and endings. The *Aeneid* is typical, beginning with an ending and ending with a beginning.

3.

The distinction between violence and its consequences, execution and direction, subduing and administering, is made in another fashion also—by the very structure of epic, which is likely to seem to much looser than it is. This distinction can best be understood perhaps

through a comparison with novelistic structure. Lubbock recognizes two kinds of narration in the novel: the *panoramic,* which surveys plot development from above, as it were, over a length of time, and the *scenic,* which descends to a given incident at a given hour and place. Of these two procedures, epic depends very little upon the panoramic. It hurries through whatever transitional material is necessary with some embarrassment and evident eagerness to be done with it. What it wants to give us is a series of specific scenes. But the scenes themselves tend to fall generally into two kinds, one of which assumes some of the functions of panoramic narration in the novel.

The first kind of scene or episode lays stress upon activity and movement; it contains the *agon,* the struggle between capacity and limitation, and whatever other vital cruxes of the narrative are to be presented. It is not only high keyed emotively, but, since imagistic intensity in the epic tends to accompany emotive intensity, it is the more brilliant and showy; it is always a strong-image episode. It contains the crises in which violence occurs, *arete* is tested, the deed is accomplished, the terror confronted, the name enhanced. It tends to focus upon the Roland figure. The second kind of episode depends primarily on dialogue, though dialogue is a misleading term, for epic avoids the abruptness of stichomythia just as it avoids all other abruptness. Speech in the epic is ampler and more formal than common speech; it is the vehicle by which the political and symbolic associations of an action or image are commonly revealed, and by which they are situated in an historical context. It is concerned with the significance and consequences of the violence. It is commonly a weak-image episode although it need not be. It tends to focus on the Charlemagne figure.

There are no terms in English ready to hand to distinguish these two kinds of episodes. The best terms I know are those used by Aristotle to distinguish not between episodes but between kinds of epic or tragic poems—the terms "pathetic" and "ethical." *Pathetikos,* of course, did not have the sentimental associations of the English word; it was cognate with *pathos* which meant simply "what happens," either as a given incident or as experience in a broader sense. It could but did not always involve the element of misfortune or suffering. "Ethical" (*ethikos* from *ethos*) characterized a poem, lower keyed emotively, which laid stress on character and manners. I shall use these terms to designate the two kinds of epic episode I have distinguished above, although this usage modifies slightly their usage in Aristotle, Longinus, and Quintilian. The first kind of episode will be called pathetic and the second ethical.

The ethical episode takes to itself most of the functions of panoramic narration in the novel. Through the speech of the well-informed character (well-informed through accident, wisdom, or divinity), we are given that sense of the passage of time which action needs to assume its full resonance; we are moved backward and forward in history, through reminiscence and prophecy, with the same free expansiveness with which we are moved in space. It does not matter if the visual background of the dialogue remains sketchy and vague; what we learn from it is useful only for the fuller apprehension of the major action of the pathetic scenes. It is a necessary link; because of it, the great scenes will be more dramatic, profounder, richer in symbolic suggestiveness. It is striking that the ethical episode is used so consistently in preference to simple exposition. It would appear that the poet insists on some sort of scene capable of visualization, however vague, remaining before the reader's eyes. But when historical perspective needs particular emphasis, then the ethical presentation is dropped and some other means of heightened visualization is found. This may be the pageant vision of the future such as Anchises shows Aeneas, Michael shows Adam, and Melissa shows Bradamante. Or it may be the work of art representing remote events—the conventional bas-reliefs, woven hangings, or decorated shields.

Some balance between action as spectacle, as *geste*, as object of awe, and action as political event seems necessary to epic. When the balance tips too far either way, the poem participates so much the less in the epic mode. When one reads Lucan one is struck immediately by his overriding interest in the historical and moral meanings of the action he narrates—narrates rather than describes. He is neglectful of spectacle, of visual immediacy; he tells you very little about the landscape around Pharsalus. His central characters are directors, not executors of violence. He is fond of speeches which concern military or diplomatic issues and he narrates frequently in a panoramic, novelistic fashion. He must have felt himself to be doing something halfway between what Virgil had done and what versifiers of history like Ennius had done. To compensate for his imaginative aridity, he had to fall back on sensationalism. We may contrast with him a writer of romance like Boiardo bent on charming an audience into hearing his tale, a tale which depends on atmosphere, gesture, the marvelous, and narrative entanglement. Between these two extremes lies the epic, opposing the melodrama to which both tend with its own dramatic firmness.

But both extremes are represented in epic by the alternation of ethical and pathetic episodes. Perhaps more examples would clarify

the distinction. Books II and III of *Paradise Lost* are based on a balance of ethical and pathetic. The demonic council in Pandemonium is ethical; Satan's flight through chaos is pathetic. The exchange of speeches in Heaven is ethical, preceded as it is by only a brief evocation of setting. But when the exchange has concluded, the great archimage of Heaven is more fully evoked; with the angelic adoration and hymn Milton passes to the pathetic which will govern the rest of Book II, including Satan's descent through the planetary spheres to earth. The speeches in the opening episodes of both books contain perspectives of the future: in Book II, the demonic, tentative, illusory perspectives; in Book III, the true perspective. In each book they serve to provide moral and historical frames for the action of the latter part of the book as well as for the rest of the poem. Similarly, the pathetic episode opening Book II of Tasso's poem—the episode of Sophronia and Olindo—balances the ethical second half, which brings together the Egyptian ambassadors with Goffredo.

In Book I of the *Aeneid* we are given two major pathetic episodes at the opening and the close, the tempest and the banquet at Dido's palace, images which mark the general movement of the book from exposure to security or pseudo security. The tempest is followed by the paler image of landing; the banquet is preceded by the paler image of Dido dispensing laws at the temple. Connecting and interpreting these four images is a wealth of ethical episode; once the panoramic introduction has been terminated (not even here, however, without the accent of a human voice, the poet's voice, speaking in the first person), we are given Juno's speech, which looks backward and forward, and the ensuing scene with Aeolus, which helps to inform the ensuing tempest with moral meanings. Later the great central scene between Venus and Jupiter will provide a much broader historical, almost eschatological, perspective, Jupiter's famous prophecy answering and balancing Venus' review of the past. The subsequent meeting of Venus and Aeneas provides another perspective into the past, now into Dido's past; Ilioneus' account of his men's fortunes serves the same purpose, while Venus' exchange with Eros turns us about to the future again, facing us toward Book IV. That book will move from ethical to pathetic, from dialogue to spectacle and agony.

4.

One can observe the care with which the great epic poets fitted together their pieces of narrative, following laws which have more to do with tonality and feeling than with causation or chronology. But the ultimate epic quality is less susceptible of analysis—the quality of

heroic energy, the superabundant vitality which charges character and image and action alike. Without it the most carefully plotted work is as dust and ashes. It is a quality of the imagination which imparts life to men and things through words, the quality possessed pre-eminently by the poet of the *Iliad*. One senses in Achilles the measureless reserves of living power, the inexhaustible capacity for fury—equally when he is active or at rest. To create that sense is the work of the epic imagination, and it must be done without apparent effort; it must be done with language which is unstrained. To achieve it, to create a character possessed of heroic energy, is to obviate "personality" as an artistic end—as it is obviated in Virgil's Turnus, in Ariosto's Orlando and Rodomonte, in Tasso's Argante. But you feel that energy equally, if more subtly, in landscape; it is in this:

> As when Heaven's Fire
> Hath scath'd the Forest Oaks, or Mountain Pines,
> With singed top thir stately growth though bare
> Stands on the blasted Heath.

but it is not in this:

> Even the wild heath displays her purple dyes
> And 'midst the desert fruitful fields arise,
> That crowned with tufted trees and springing corn,
> Like verdant isles the sable waste adorn.[6]

The energy of epic communicates a kind of excitement which is like the basic human excitement of living bodily in a physical world. It draws upon sexual springs to invigorate the imagination. It animates the City of Man with that electric dynamism the ancients thought was divine or demonic and the Renaissance thought was ancient. It dramatizes the fact of death. Upon it depends, really, the humanistic awe, the *maraviglia,* for that which quickens the self but surpasses the self. This energy is not highly prized today. But without a proper sense of it, the epic will always seem to readers a little puffy, flatulent, overblown, and dull.

The language which imparts epic energy must be itself in some sense alive. The living impulse of heroic verse stems from a discovery about language which must have been made very early in human history—the discovery that language can do more than denote, that it can possess, exorcise, invoke, bind with a spell, that it has magical, demonic properties transcending its concern with statement. One wonders whether the fearful, demonic god in words was discovered with joy or terror. In any case, the demon is there in all the primitive compositions

[6] *Paradise Lost,* I, 612-615; Pope's *Windsor Forest,* lines 25-28.

we know. The heroic poet made use of him, and with time he learned to restrain him, to set him customary limits of meter and syntax and formula. But happily he never tamed the demon altogether, as rhetoricians of later ages wanted to do. The creature who possesses and binds is at work still within the poet's marvelous chant. That for the poet is the fundamental task—to tether the creature but not to hobble him.

Heroic verse lives with the life of that demon. But, as heroic becomes epic, as the demon is caught upon the written page, his wildness is threatened; he must have recourse to a new cunning. The formula is liable to lose its energy. So there occurs a shift from the poetry of the expected to the poetry of the unexpected. Now the demonic life is more frequently smothered; but, when it is quickened again, its life is more various, through scarcely more free, than before.

This is the first quality of epic language—the living impulse which imparts energy to men and things. But of course this impulse is not limited to the epic. There is a second quality, inherent in the feeling proper to epic. Its language must become, in whatever way the poet finds, the language of awe; it must itself register awe and it must invite the audience to awe. It must remind the audience that the story told is no ordinary story, concerning no ordinary men; it must withdraw into its heroic remoteness, with its own uncommon rhythms and diction and tropes. It cannot permit itself the abandon of lyric poetry, or its slender grace, or its coloring of personality. It must remain the expression of the ritual community, the collective City. The language must emulate the weight of the story with its own austere solemnity. This is the quality of language which rhetoricians came to call or assimilate with the "high style," which, like so much in epic, lent itself to imitative debasement. But of course it is really very difficult to imitate. Once the epic has passed out of the preliterate, formulaic stage of the heroic poem, the poetry of the expected, every new work poses afresh the problem of a fitting heroic language.

In his language as in other things, the poet stands implicitly midway between the hero and his audience. He is the amphibian, the mediator, the messenger, the guide, who is inspired and inspires in turn. He is the knower of the names, the speaker to those who cannot speak of high things. But he is not the actor; he, like the audience, has only heard of those things. He can say "we" to embrace himself and the audience, but never himself and the hero.

Hwaet, we Gar-Dena in geardagum
Þeodcyninga þrym gefrunon...

Lo! we have heard of the past glory of Danish kings . . .

And in the old poems he joins his audience in a common anonymity.

These remarks pretend neither to completeness nor, for the most part, to originality; in such a discussion there can be no real claim to either. But when a genre falls into relative neglect, as the epic has fallen, its potential audience begins to forget how to read it. And that forgetfulness leads to more neglect. Today there are ten readers of Sophocles or Molière to one of Virgil or Ariosto. The charm of lyric poetry, in particular, has precluded a sensitivity to bulkier, imperfect work. Marvell, with his fine, aristocratic precision, has become more attractive than Milton. This is perhaps as it had to be. But one must deplore such passionate exclusive preferences if they lead us to forget the very experience which Ariosto and Virgil and Milton afford, so that we no longer know what to expect of them or what questions to ask about them. I have here tried to recall what questions are to be asked about epic poems.

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Milton's *Paradise Lost* And Zoroaster's *Zenda Vesta*

MILTON lived in the seventeenth century A.D., Zoroaster about the tenth century B.C. In time and place and culture, they are poles apart; yet they have a striking affinity of spirit and intellect. Both struggled with the problems of the ultimate, both were primarily poets and seers, and both arrived at very similar metaphysical conclusions. For both, greater than the epic of kings and marshals was the vast epic of cosmic forces and principles; all other epics were mere offshoots, fragmentary manifestations, of the greater epic of the gods. The theme of Milton's *Paradise Lost* is in essence identical with that of Zoroaster's *Zenda Vesta.*

Zoroaster was an Aryan Magus. He was born near the Araxes River, in the vicinity of Mount Ararat, and spent his early life in northeastern Armenia, the highlands of the Tigris and Euphrates. He entered upon his ministry at the age of thirty. He often withdrew from the multitudes and meditated in solitude upon the ways and mysteries of God. Once he went up a mountain and spent thirty days (some traditions say thirty years) on its top, "his soul reaching out for the wondrous words of the firmament." He saw the spirit of Ahura Mazda—the Creator, the Law —wearing "the massy heavens as a garment." Mountaintops were the temples of his worship and the sun the symbol of his light. He says that, every time he climbed to the pure altar of Ahura Mazda, he came back with his soul filled with strange "songs and visions of glory." Between the ages of thirty and forty he had seven revelations, each devoted to one of the attributes of the Godhead.

Being a Magus he was aware of the moral chaos of the old Aryan mythologies and folk religions. The Aryan folk religions were polytheistic; devils and demons, natural forces and elements, such as fire and water, were worshipped as divinities. Zoroaster wanted to purify these religions. He thought that there must be some eternal truth, some unquenchable light in the universe. His Aryan ancestors had a faint glimpse of an eternal moral law that was responsible for the existence of the world. He pondered upon this concept and the concept "became a burning flame within him." One day he came down from a mountaintop, where he had "gazed at the stars and at the rising sun for days," and proclaimed:

> I will now tell you who are assembled here the wise saying of Mazda, the praises of Ahura, and the hymns of the good spirit, the sublime truth which I see arising out of these sacred flames.
>
> Now the two primal spirits, who revealed themselves in vision as Twins, are the Better and the Bad in thought, word and action, and between these two the wise ones chose aright, the foolish not so.
>
> And when these twain Spirits came together in the beginning they established Life and Not-Life, and that at the last the Worst Existence shall be to the followers of the Lie, but the Best Thought to him that follows Right.
>
> Of these twain Spirits he that followed the Lie chose doing the worst things; the holiest Spirit chose Right, he clothes him with the massy heavens as a garment. So likewise they that are fain to please Ahura Mazda by dutiful actions.
>
> Between these twain the demons also chose not aright, for infatuation came upon them as they took counsel together, so that they chose the Worst Thought. Then they rushed together to violence, that they might enfeeble the world of man.[1]

What Zoroaster saw was a vision of good and evil as twin principles of life. When he proclaimed his new teachings, he met with sacerdotal opposition. Then he turned his steps toward eastern Iran, where his faith prevailed, and subsequently reacted with success upon the West and became the state religion of the Persian Empire up to the time of the Mohammedan invasion of Persia in the seventh century A.D. But his success was at the cost of his life. He was killed at the altar at Balkh by the enemies of his new religion.

After Zoroaster's death, his faith spread rapidly. The Persian kings became staunch devotees of Zoroastrianism, and their rule was not only political but also religious. Their empire extended from the Ganges River to the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, including Palestine. In 586 B.C. the Jews were carried into captivity to Babylon, where they stayed for half a century. While in captivity they became acquainted with "The law of the Medes and Persians which altereth not." Actually this law was the one universal law of Ahura Mazda (God) "that never

[1] *Yasna*, XXX, 3-6.

changes." It was a moral law, which served as a common point of contact between an emergent Judaism and an established Zoroastrianism. Both religions taught that God was a spirit, and both denounced graven images. There were other points of contact between the two religions, in particular, the doctrine of evil.

> There is no question that the Post-exilic Judaism had a doctrine rather markedly different from the Pre-exilic. In the latest books of the Old Testament there emerges a being called the adversary (Satan), who ultimately came to occupy a position remarkably like that of Angra Mainyu, enemy spirit. In Zoroaster's teaching, and in that of the second Isaiah, the One God is the Creator of light and darkness alike. Later generations made physical evil the work of a fiend. By the envy of the devil death entered into the world, says the *Wisdom of Solomon;* and similarly Angra Mainyu is conspicuously the author of death in the system of the Magi. In both systems The Enemy has a host of demons serving under him, and in both the fight between Good and Evil is to end in the destruction of the latter.[2]

Some higher critics of Judaism have replaced the name Pharisee with Parsi, a follower of Zoroaster, and have traced the claims of that Hebrew sect to superior sanctity, its aloofness and cleanliness, its belief in the continuance of life after death and in future rewards and punishments, to the religion with which the Jews had come in contact during the Babylonian captivity.

There can be no doubt that the dualistic philosophy of Zoroaster made a permanent imprint upon Jewish thought, and that this dualistic philosophy also influenced Christianity. The existence of evil, sin as a separate negative principle, was an accepted and established fact in Judaism. The whole Jewish nation waited for the Messiah to come and deliver them from evil. With the coming of Christ, the struggle between evil and good entered a new phase. The Jews, for doctrinal and national reasons, rejected the Messiah, but the struggle continued. Christ, the embodiment of moral law, came to purge the world from the evil deeds of Satan, who in the form of a serpent had tempted Adam and Eve and made them breach God's moral law.

> Of Man's First Disobedience and the Fruit
> Of that Forbidden Tree, whose mortal taste
> Brought Death unto the World, and all our woe,
> With loss of *Eden*, till one greater Man
> Restore us, and regain the blissful Seat . . .[3]

The relation of *Paradise Lost* to Zoroastrian dualism sharply underlines some of the most interesting development of the ethical evolution of Western man. The chief sources of *Paradise Lost,* besides the classics

[2] *The Treasure of the Magi,* p. 69.
[3] *Paradise Lost,* I, 1-5.

and Italian literature, are the Old Testament and the New Testament, and the tremendous mass of tradition and commentary they have inspired. The fascinating parallels between *Zenda Vesta* and *Paradise Lost* owe much to the ancient influence of Zoroastrian dualism on the development of Judeo-Christian thought and myth, but something also to the ways in which two men, millenia apart, intuitively dramatized the struggle between good and evil in human affairs.

For Milton God was the most unquestionable reality. God stands in the center of Milton's creation in the same sense as He stands in the center of His own. Every good idea, scene, character, incident, and action emanates from Him and converges into Him, whether He is at the heart of *Paradise Lost* or at the heart of the universe. Everything in the universe revolves around, and has its being in, Him. *Paradise Lost* is the mirror of the universe and its great architect. For Milton the *raison d'être* of all visible and invisible worlds, of all sentient beings, of all positive principles, concepts, laws, and forces is God. He is the alpha and omega; He is the great mover. God is reason; nothing happens without His knowledge and will. He is the master planner and everything moves, though not in a mechanistic predetermined way, to fulfill His grand divine plan. But something happened in Heaven—not unknown to Him—that disturbed His plan, at least temporarily. Having been convinced of His premises, Milton invokes the aid of his God:

> That to the highth of this great Argument
> I may assert Eternal Providence,
> And justify the ways of God to men.[4]

Zoroaster's conception of the deity is the same as that of Milton. Dio Chrysostom, Plutarch's contemporary, declares that "neither Homer nor Hesiod sang of the chariot and horses of Zeus so worthily as Zoroaster, of whom the Persians tell that, out of love to wisdom and righteousness, he withdrew himself from men and lived in solitude upon a mountain." In one Ahura Zoroaster concentrated the whole of the divine character, and conferred upon it the epithet of Mazdao, "The Wise." Ahura Mazda, the Wise Lord, is the primaeval spiritual being, the all-father, who was existent before ever the world arose. From Him the world has emanated, and its course is governed by His foreseeing eye. His guiding spirit is the Holy Spirit, as in Christianity.

For Zoroaster, too, God is the key of all things. He is not only the master architect of the universe but also its master operator. All things begin with Him and end with Him. First and foremost, He is the creator not only of the material universe but of all spiritual existences as well.

[4] *Paradise Lost*, I, 24-26.

The Vendidad[5] speaks of him as "the Creator and most Beneficent of all things," conferring His blessings upon all other beings in the universe.

"Oh, Spitama Zoroaster, I created the stars, the moon, the sun and red-burning fire, the dogs, the birds and the five kinds of animals; but, better and greater than all, created I the righteous *man* . . ."

Then Zoroaster said: "Reveal thou unto me the name of thine, that is greatest, best, fairest, most effective, most fiend-smiting, best healing, that destroyeth the malice of demons and men . . ."

Ahura Mazda (God) replied unto him saying, "My first name is He of whom questions are asked, Oh holy Zoroaster!

"My second name is the Giver of Herds.

"My third name is the Strong One.

"My fourth name is Perfect Holiness.

"My fifth name is All Good Things created by Mazda, the offspring of the Holy Principle."

"My sixth name is Understanding.

"My seventh name is He that possesseth understanding.

"My eighth name is Knowledge.

"My ninth name is He that possesseth knowledge.

"My tenth name is Blessing.

"My eleventh name is He that causeth blessing.

"My twelfth name is Ahura (the Eternal).

"My thirteenth name is the Most Beneficent.

"My fourteenth name is He in whom there is no harm.

"My fifteenth name is the Unconquerable.

"My sixteenth name is He that maketh the true account.

"My seventeenth name is the All-Seeing.

"My eighteenth name is Healing.

"My ninteenth name is Creator.

"My twentieth name is Mazda (Light)."[6]

How did evil originate and enter the world? Once it began, what was its logical consequence and the final outcome? Milton tells us that God, being reason, created all things in accordance with reason. He did not want to make His creation a mere will-less machine. As King of Kings He created His ethereal powers, His archangels and angels free. He wanted their adoration and obedience on the basis of their free volition; He wanted them to act in accordance with a principle of self-determination and free choice. This made them responsible creatures, free agents, partners in the work and fulfillment of His eternal plan.

Raphael sitting in Adam's bower tells him how evil originated. By an "imperial summons," all the empyreal host of angels and archangels were called to celebrate a solemn occasion.

[5] *Fargard*, XVIII, I, 13.
[6] *Ormazd Yast*, V, 7.

Hear, all ye Angels [God declares],
Thrones, Dominations, Princedoms, Virtues, Powers,
Hear my Decree, which unrevok't shall stand.
This day I have begot whom I declare
My only Son, and on this holy Hill
Him have anointed, whom ye now behold
At my right hand; your Head I him appoint;
And by my Self have sworn to him shall bow
All knees in Heav'n, and shall confess him Lord.[7]

God appointed the Son as His viceregent, charged with the high mission of fulfilling His Father's plan. The Lord God of hosts demands obedience and veneration from all for the Messiah. "Him who disobeys me disobeys." Whoever dares to disobey and break the divine law shall be "cast in utter darkness, deep engulfed without redemption."

So spake th' Omnipotent, and with his words
All seem'd well pleased, all seem'd but were not all.

All rejoiced, danced mystic dances, and sang hymns and celebrated, but not so . . .

Satan, so call him now, his former name
Is heard no more in Heav'n; he of the first,
If not the first Arch-Angel great in Power,
In favor and preëminence, yet fraught
With envy against the Son of God, that day
Honor'd by his great Father, and proclaim'd
Messiah King anointed, could not bear
Through pride that sight, and thought himself impair'd.
Deep malice thence conceiving and disdain,
Soon as midnight brought on the dusky hour
Friendliest to sleep and silence, he resolv'd
With all his Legions to dislodge, and leave
Unworshipt, unobey'd the Throne supreme . . .[8]

Satan thus revolting against the authority of God, against the supreme law of the universe, is defeated by the Messiah in open warfare and is cast out of Heaven into Hell. Once committed to an act of violence, once the law is breached, there is no redemption for him. He has to submit to the inexorable law of evil in him. Pride, envy, revenge obsess him. He cannot retreat; he cannot beg forgiveness of his maker; he cannot obtain salvation. He is doomed. Once having challenged divine justice, he must continue to fight it to the bitter end.

According to Zoroaster, in the beginning evil "rose from the abyss." Just at the "timeless beginning" when the spirit of Ahura Mazda began

[7] *Paradise Lost*, V, 600-608.
[8] *Ibid.*, V, 658-670.

unfolding itself in the creation of good things, Ahriman, the Evil One, rushed out of the womb of the abysmal darkness and tried to destroy the light and creatures of Ahura Mazda. The good spirit of Ahura Mazda struck him a mighty blow and hurled him into the darkness of Hell.[9] But he did not stay there very long; he rose again and started his "counter-creation." Since then the struggle has been continuing. The history of this conflict is the history, the epic, of this world and universe.

Zoroaster says in *Yasna,* XLV, 2: "I will speak of the two spirits of the beginning of the world, of whom the holier thus spake, of the enemy: 'Our thoughts, our teachings, our wills, our beliefs, our words, our deeds, our consciences, our very souls do not agree.'" In *Zenda Vesta* he declares:

> Thereupon came Ahriman, who is all death, and he counter-created the *Serpent* in the river, a work of the demons . . . Thereupon came Ahriman, who is all death, and he counter-created sin . . . and the sin of unbelief . . . He created tears and wailing. He counter-created the sin of pride. He counter-created a sin for which there is no atonement, the unnatural sin. He counter-created *winter and cold* in paradise. As the Evil Spirit rushed in, the earth shook and the masses of the mountains were made upon the earth.

But the idea that evil is a tool and itself unreal as a permanent principle is also Zoroastrian, and is often found in *Zenda Vesta.* The Epistles of Manushihar (II, 2) set forth the way in which Ahriman, the father of lies, deceives the elect:

> Responsible for the malice and annoyance of unjust kinds which are encountering us, is the fiend of great strength, who is observing, seductive, astute in evil, eager for causing annihilation and full of deceit, so that it is possible for him to render doubtful, when himself so deceived, even him who is most a listener to essential righteousness, most desirous of steadfast truth, most performing proper religious customs, most acquainted with good ideas, most amazingly careful of his soul, most approved in the most wounding, hell-brought conflict, and most at home in truth of all kinds, and to show him a semblance of reality in unreality, and of unreality in reality.

In *Paradise Lost,* after Satan and his host of fellow angels have been banished from Heaven, God sent His Son to create a new universe. He created Adam and Eve to populate the new world. Innocent mankind was to take the place of the fallen angels. He created them in the same fashion as He had created his heavenly beings:

> I made him just and right,
> Sufficient to have stood, though free to fall.
> Such I created all th' Ethereal Powers
> And Spirits, both them who stood and them who fail'd.[10]

[9] *Yasna,* XXX, 3.
[10] *Paradise Lost,* III, 98-101.

In both cases, in Heaven as well as on earth, God had set a condition in order to allow His creatures to use their judgment as free agents. He had endowed them with reason and free will; He wanted the manifestation of these divine gifts when the test came. In one case His law was complete obedience to the leadership of His Son; in the second case His law was that Adam and Eve should not taste the symbolic apple of the Tree of Knowledge. The import of His decree was twofold: that order in the universe could be possible only through law and reason; that only through compliance to law could divine justice prevail and His ultimate plan be fulfilled.

Satan, however, had his own counterplans and schemes. In the council of Pandemonium he delegated himself to the task of ruining God's plan. At the gates of Hell he met his own incestuous offspring—Death. Had it not been for the intervention of Sin, who claimed to be Satan's daughter, sprung from him, a fierce battle would have ensued. Sin opened the gates of Hell for her father. Satan, after passing through many orbs, descended into the Garden of Eden. He entered into the form of a serpent and tempted Eve to taste the fruit of the forbidden tree. Adam too, blinded by Eve's love and "aspiring to Godhead," tasted the fatal apple. By this disobedience Adam and Eve broke God's law and doomed themselves and their progeny, all mankind. But Adam's sin was different from Satan's sin.

Milton distinguishes between the guilt of Satan and Adam. Since Satan fell self-tempted, and since in his crime no element of good entered, his sin was unpardonable. Adam, on the contrary, sinned in part through the fault of another, and his action sprang from desires in themselves not altogether base. Hence Adam's sin was not beyond forgiveness. The poet's main intent seems to be to accept as fact the existence of evil, and to disclose concretely, after the fashion of poetry, its inevitable consequences.[11]

In the same way, according to the Zoroastrian account of creation, Ahura Mazda creates a new universe in six days. He creates a paradise and sets in it the "crown of his creation—the righteous man." Of the creations of Ahura Mazda in the world, the first was the sky; the second, water; the third, soil; the fourth, plants; the fifth, animals; the sixth, mankind.[12] The closeness to the creation as set forth in Genesis is remarkable, particularly the earthly paradise and its first inhabitants.

"The first of the good lands and countries which I, Ahura Mazda, created, was the Airyana Vaego beside the Vanghue Daitya . . . " The Vanghue Daitya has been identified by some scholars as the Tigris

[11] E. N. S. Thompson, *Essays on Milton*, p. 184.
[12] I, 25, 26.

River. Into this early paradise, Ahura Mazda introduced mankind in the persons of Mashya and Mashyoi, concerning whom the Bundahis gives the most circumstantial account:

> God (Ahura Mazda) spake to Mashya and Mashyoi, saying "You are man, you are the ancestry of the world, and you are created perfect in devotion by me. Perform devotedly the duty of the law, think good thoughts, speak good words, do good deeds, and worship no demons."
>
> Both of them first thought this, that each of them should please the other, as each was a mate for the other, and the first deed done by them was this, when they went out, they cleansed themselves thoroughly; and the first words spoken by them were these, that Ahura Mazda created the water and the earth, the plants and the animals, the stars, moon and sun, and all prosperity, the source and nature of which are from the manifestation of righteousness.
>
> And, afterwards, antagonism rushed into their minds, and their minds were thoroughly corrupted, and they exclaimed that the Evil Spirit created the water and the earth, the plants and the animals and the other things named above. That false speech was spoken through the will of the demons, and the Evil Spirit possessed himself of his first enjoyment from them. Through that false speech they became wicked and their souls are in hell until the future redemption [i.e., until the victory of Ahura Mazda, the Good Spirit, over the Ahriman, the Evil Spirit].

Another very interesting parallel between *Paradise Lost* and *Zenda Vesta* is the alignment of forces. In Milton's epic on one side stand God, Christ, the Holy Spirit, and their lieutenants: Gabriel, Michael, Uriel, Raphael, Abdiel, Ithuriel, Uzziel, Zophiel, Zephon, each symbolizing a principle or a moral virtue. Christ, his archangels, and innumerable hosts of angels constitute one army, the army of right. On the other side stand Lucifer, Beelzebub, Moloch, Mammon, Beliel, Astroth, Thammus, Dagon, Rimmon, Azazel, Osiris, Isis, Orus, each symbolizing or representing an evil force or trait. Lucifer, his fallen archangels and lieutenants and fallen angels, constitute the army of wrong. The epic conflict is between these two forces.

Similarly, in *Zenda Vesta,* on one side stand Ahura Mazda (God, the Eternal Light), and the Holy Spirit, Vohu Manah (the Good Mind), Asha (Right), Khshatra (Dominion), Aramaiti (Piety), Haurvetat (Well-Being), Ameretat (Immortality). Ahura Mazda and Holy Spirit with their archangels and hosts of good spirits are the army of right. On the other side stand Ahriman (Devil, Prince of Darkness), Druj (False Appearance), Akem (Evil), Dush-Khshathra (Pusillanimity), Taromaiti (False Pretense), Avetat (Misery), Merethyn (Annihilation). Ahriman and his archdemons with their hosts of demons and evil spirits are the army of wrong. Again the epic conflict is between these two forces.

In conception and in martial alignment, in the struggle and in its

result, *Paradise Lost* and *Zenda Vesta* are exactly the same. Satan, motivated by envy and ambition, revolts against God's authority and wages war. At one point of the conflict it appears that he and his legions may win. In the ebb and flow of the battle, there ensues a kind of temporary stalemate. Then in the name of God and divine law the Messiah and His legions charge and win the war in Heaven. In the same way Ahura Mazda and Ahriman enter into conflict in Heaven. In the first encounter Ahriman and his demons seem to have the upper hand. Then Ahura Mazda (in some accounts his Holy Spirit) sallies forth and delivers a telling blow with a flaming sword. Ahriman wilts and staggers under the blow, but rises and launches a counterattack. The fortunes of war hang in the balance. For a while it appears that neither side will be able to win. Finally Ahura Mazda defeats Ahriman and his demons and banishes them to Hell. Later Ahriman rises out of Hell and renews the conflict on the earth. Again there is a stalemate. The contending forces establish an equilibrium. From that time on the universe becomes like a mighty balance, holding in its scales an absolutely equal quantity of two opposite states. However, in the *Zenda Vesta* as in *Paradise Lost,* the final outcome is implied.

The Lucifer of *Paradise Lost,* too, rises from Hell and invades the earth. This time his struggle is not with the indestructible powers of Heaven, but with the forewarned innocence of Adam and Eve. He does not want to resort to physical violence, as he did in Heaven, and annihilate them. He resorts to deceit. If he destroys the first parents of mankind and their paradise, he will have no place to continue his machinations against God and his creation. Through lies and misrepresentations he hoodwinks his victims and wins an initial success. For a while he is flushed with victory, and rushes back to Pandemonium to proclaim his triumph to his lieutenants and legions.

However, deep in his being he had already perceived the signs of his degradation. Every evil act shrinks his stature, and at the same time helps to enhance the case of goodness. The seed of his destruction is within himself; evil breeds evil and eventually is bound to engulf him. He is caught within his own self-created chains; he has no escape from the inexorable law of justice. This truth hits him with dramatic force when, returning to Pandemonium to boast of his victory, suddenly all his legions turn to serpents and monsters and, instead of applauding him, hiss at him in mockery. Suddenly Hell blooms with Trees of Knowledge laden with fruit; but, when the fallen angels reach out to quench their thirst, the apples turn to bitter ashes in their parched mouths.

In *Zenda Vesta,* too, Ahriman, instead of resorting to open warfare against man on earth, employs subterfuge. He takes on the form of a lizard and tries to gnaw life out of the Tree of Life, but he fails, because the tree is guarded and saved by an archangel. Through Druj (Spirit of Falsehood) he tries to enter Mashya's and Mashyoi's minds. He whispers into their souls that the claims of Ahura Mazda are false, that there is another spirit more powerful than Ahura Mazda, that for everything that Ahura Mazda can create Ahriman can countercreate a better one. He tells them that, if they follow Ahriman, he will create for them anything they desire. Then, whatever he whispers in Mashya's ear, he whispers its opposite in Mashyoi's ear. He achieves his purpose; he produces conflict and chaos in their minds. Once their minds are corrupted, they denounce and accuse each other, like Adam and Eve, and denounce Ahura Mazda, their creator. They say that paradise and everything in it was created by Ahriman. In their minds they reverse the entire scheme of creation. They become hells within themselves, though still in paradise. Their souls sink into darkness. Possessed by Druj, they are driven out of paradise and wander in the wilderness for fifty years until the Holy Spirit brings light into their souls. Then God's voice awakes in them, and they feel the desire to cooperate with Ahura Mazda and create. They live as husband and wife and begin to fill the earth. But Ahriman still persists in frustrating their good intentions, still determined to continue the struggle against Ahura Mazda.

Adam and Eve, like Mashya and Mashyoi, also become hells in themselves after yielding to the whisperings of Satan and testing the forbidden fruit. They acquire the knowledge of good and evil. And these principles, being diametrically opposite states, create conflict within and dissension without. Adam and Eve turn against themselves and against each other. Their lives become unbearable. They weep and beg for light to find their way out of spiritual chaos.

The Son of God descends and judges them in accordance with the justice of divine law. The penalty for breaking the first law of God was twofold. First, since the law of reason was in accord with the inherent law of their being, the breach automatically brought about discord within their nature. Second, since there was distemper of sin in their nature, they could not live in harmony with the perfect harmony of paradise, God's Kingdom. As Jesus declared, "The Kingdom of God is within you." They have to leave the realm of harmony, and live in a world which is like their own inner world.

And yet, since divine law is by its nature good, benevolent, and creative, the judge who represented and embodied that law cannot de-

feat His own meaning and purpose by refusing to give Adam a chance to work his salvation. God is compassionate toward him. He had created Adam after His own image; He suffers with him. He offers him and his companion raiment to cover their sense of guilt.

Michael is sent to execute the verdict of divine justice and drive Adam and Eve out of paradise. However, in order to give him a better insight into the unfolding panorama of the divine plan, the angel takes Adam to the top of a mountain and sets before him in vision what will happen to the world. The whole history of mankind before the flood is set before his eyes. In scene after scene he is shown dual manifestations of evil and good. Realizing the justice and merciful majesty of His creator, Adam accepts his responsibility. He identifies himself once again with the moral law of the universe, and, through hope, faith, labor, and love, submits himself to the redeeming power of truth. As the protagonist of the great epic of life, he takes his cross and with resolute steps marches toward the light of God's salvation. As in paradise, so outside paradise, he declares:

> Henceforth I learn, that to obey is best,
> And love with fear the only God, to walk
> As in his presence, ever to observe
> His providence, and on him sole depend.
> Merciful over all his works, with good
> Still overcoming evil, and by small
> Accomplishing great things—by things deem'd weak
> Subverting worldly strong, and worldly wise
> By simply meek; that suffering for Truth's sake
> Is fortitude to highest victory,
> And to the faithful Death the Gate of life;
> Taught this by his example whom I now
> Acknowledge my Redeemer ever blest.[13]

The doctrine of Zoroaster pertaining to the salvation of man is essentially the same.

> In the soul of man is the object of War. Man is the creation of Ahura Mazda, who therefore has right to call him to account. But Ahura Mazda *created him free* in his determination and in his actions; therefore, he is accessible to the influences of the evil powers. Man takes part in this conflict by all his life and activity in the world. By a true confession of faith, by every good deed, word and thought, by continually keeping pure his body and his soul, he impairs the power of Satan and strengthens the might of goodness, and establishes a claim for reward upon Ahura Mazda; by a false confession, by every evil deed, word and thought and defilement, he increases the evil and renders services to Satan.

For Milton and Zoroaster, life cannot be a fortuitous event or acci-

[13] *Paradise Lost*, XII, 561-573.

dent. It functions and has its being in accordance with discernible laws of order and reason. The material world of our senses and the mental and spiritual world of our reason are the manifestations of a creative reason. This overall governing reason would be meaningless if it did not have a purpose, a plan. Purpose implies value. There can be only two major values, as far as the object of a plan is concerned: one which is conducive to its fulfillment and one which is detrimental to its fulfillment—a positive value and a negative value. What is positive is good, what is negative is bad. There exist two essential principles in the universe; the principle of good and the principle of evil. For both Milton and Zoroaster these are unquestionable realities.

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Madame de Genlis In England

THE TRANSLATION of *Émile* into English, first by William Kenrick (1763) and then by Thomas Nugent (1763), was the occasion of much controversy among the writers of courtesy books. Those who admired the principles and methods of Rousseau in the education of Émile tended to become the nucleus of a more radical school of thought in opposition to those for whom Rousseau was a symbol of error and subversive principles.

To be a disciple of Rousseau in the latter years of the eighteenth century was to run the risk of being called unprincipled, the victim of ill-directed sensibility, or an enemy of morality and religion. As the French Revolution began to threaten the peace of mind of conservative opinion in England, it became increasingly apparent that sympathy for Jacobinism almost invariably followed a previous "softening up" in the school of Rousseau. Yet both *Émile* and *La Nouvelle Héloïse* had a very wide reading public in England. Of the two hundred and eighteen catalogues of late eighteenth-century private libraries examined by Professor R. S. Crane in the British Museum, twenty-four contained *Émile*.[1] Between 1751 and 1796 there were sixty-one editions[2] in English of various works of Rousseau. No other foreigner except Voltaire had as large a reading public in England.

However revolutionary *Émile* may have appeared to the late eighteenth-century reader, it included one theme on which Rousseau was

[1] For further details see R. S. Crane, "The Diffusion of Voltaire's Writings in England, 1750-1800," *MP*, XX, 261-274, and James H. Warner, "A Bibliography of Eighteenth Century English Editions of J.-J. Rousseau, with Notes on the Early Diffusions of his Writings," *PQ*, XIII, 225-247.

[2] See James H. Warner, *loc. cit.*, p. 232.

in complete agreement with English conservative opinion, namely, the inequality of the sexes. Rousseau's Sophia was attractive, submissive, tainted with a number of charming and easily forgivable defects, obedient, and always ready to take advice. She did not exist as an independent personality. Her only function was to be a future wife for Émile, and her education was an elaborate preparation for the day when she would please him, become his wife, and sink her life into his. She was pious, for piety would be needed when she became a mother; weak-willed, she was mistress of the art of ruling her husband by the power of her beauty. This portrait was assured of an enthusiastic reception, as we may judge from the reviews of Book V of *Émile* in the *Critical Review* and the *Monthly Review*.[3]

But Book V was not the whole of the work; there was much else that the critical reader would have to stomach before reaching the conventional portrait of Sophia. Moreover, Rousseau's Sophia followed closely on a much more questionable heroine, delineated by the same pen and offered as a model for imitation. *La Nouvelle Héloïse* was considered one of the most dangerous books of its time, with a heroine calculated to transcend the standards of chastity and female modesty. "He exhibits a virtuous woman," wrote Mrs. Hannah More, "the victim not of temptation, but of reason—not of vice, but of sentiment—not of passion, but of conviction; and strikes at the very root of honour, by elevating a crime into a principle."[4] George III, himself, after reading *La Nouvelle Héloïse,* considered Rousseau a monster of almost Voltairean dimensions, and Fanny Burney, who recorded the monarch's views, felt impelled by modesty to admit that she could not proffer an opinion on an author she "had read too little." Dr. Burney had once vowed that the unfortunate Mr. Twiss "shall never see a *table-cloth* in his house again, or be invited ever more to the tea table" for having asked his daughter if she had read "Rousseau's Eloise."[5]

Lost in this mist of moral indignation, the character of Sophia was neglected by all save enthusiastic converts to Rousseau's doctrines. Among these, with the notable exception of Thomas Day, there grew up a mildly feminist attitude towards the education of women which culminated in Mary Wollstonecraft's famous *Vindication.* There is a sense in which Rousseau's own doctrines were used by his most enthusiastic disciples to contradict his own ideas on female education.

[3] *Critical Review,* XV (1763), 21 ff. and *Monthly Review,* XXVII (1762), *passim.*

[4] Hannah More, "Strictures on the Modern System of Female Education," in *Works* (London, 1834), III, 29.

[5] *The Early Diary of Frances Burney,* ed. A. R. Ellis (London, 1907), I, 299-302.

The failure of Rousseau to capture the imagination of the English reading public on the question of the education of a lady, especially after the moral indignation caused by *La Nouvelle Héloïse*, left a vacuum which was not entirely filled by English writers of courtesy books. There was still a mysterious thirst for French books, a thirst which betrayed a fundamental ambivalence in the attitude towards most things French. Although the prevailing opinion was that anything which came out of France should be viewed with distrust, especially if it were to influence that most delicate of subjects, education, the works of Madame de Genlis were welcomed in England with an enthusiasm which almost eclipsed the reception given to Voltaire and Rousseau. The reasons for her extraordinary popularity are difficult to assess; but, tentatively, one might distinguish three dominating factors.

First, the objections which could be raised against the writings of a French author were based, in the main, on two principal fears, the fear of libertinism and the fear of Roman Catholic indoctrination. The fear of libertinism had been apparently justified in the extraordinary success of Chesterfield's *Letters* and of Rousseau's *La Nouvelle Héloïse*. Chesterfield with his "French" ideas was principally a corrupter of gentlemen, but the danger of Rousseau was that he made his appeal directly to women. As Joyce Hemlow has justly remarked in a most illuminating essay:

> It required now only the fallacious identification of Right Feeling, that variant of "the candle of the Lord," with the sensual passions themselves, and the additional suggestions that the aim of education was happiness and that the depth of a passion was its justification, to cause the combined forces of all the moralists in the world of courtesy to denounce Rousseau and his works.[6]

In other words, the "libertinism" preached by Rousseau to the female heart was made doubly dangerous because of the fact that it was preached so solemnly and consecrated as a substitute for sensibility. Furthermore, both *Émile* and *La Nouvelle Héloïse* were written on the assumption that original sin does not exist and this was a direct threat to Christian principles, Anglican or Catholic.

In this situation, it was a welcome change to discover a French writer who, while adopting the paraphernalia of Rousseau's educational methods, attacked the principles of Rousseau, as it were, on his own grounds. Madame de Genlis' *Adèle et Théodore, ou Lettres sur l'Éducation* (1782) was a complete courtesy book in four volumes,

[6] Joyce Hemlow, "Fanny Burney and the Courtesy Books," *PMLA*, LXV (1950), 744.

combining orthodox principles with Rousseau's new methods of education. The nearest parallel to *Adèle et Théodore* in England was Thomas Day's *Sanford and Merton* (1783-1789), where both the principles and the method were closely copied from Rousseau.[7] Madame de Genlis' strictures on Rousseau's doctrines, in a book which followed the highly popular model of *Émile,* satisfied a need. Her preface to *Adèle et Théodore* was particularly attractive to the English moralist, for she accused Rousseau of being an "auteur sans principes," who had talent, genius, "qualités attachantes" on account of which it was important to "préserver les jeunes mères de famille, auxquelles [elle a] consacré cet ouvrage, d'un enthousiasme dangereux, qui ne pourrait que les égarer." Many of the acceptable ideas in *Émile* came from Locke or "l'immortel Fénelon," and she proposed to restore to them the glory which had been usurped by Rousseau. The fear of Catholic indoctrination was allayed by the promises of so vital an undertaking. A Catholic assumption of original sin was better than the Rousseau-inspired writings which had penetrated into the very sanctuary of polite education.

Another reason for Madame de Genlis' popularity in England was the novelty of her educational methods. One of her departures from the methods of Rousseau was to make the acting of short morality plays an integral part of education. This had been advocated by Fénelon and practiced in Madame de Maintenon's school for impoverished young gentlewomen at St. Cyr; but nobody in the eighteenth century,[8] before Madame de Genlis, had actually written new morality plays adapted to the needs of a young lady's polite education. Her *Théâtre à l'usage des jeunes personnes* (4 vols., Paris, 1779-1780) was originally intended for children of both sexes, but its success in England was due to the fact that it was considered particularly suited to the education of young ladies. Mrs. Montagu recommended it to her nieces,[9] and the *Critical Review* hailed its first translation into English with the title *Theatre of Education,* as "such as may be peculiarly serviceable to young women, whom they were principally calculated to instruct."[10]

[7] In an essay on Mrs. Sherwood, L. B. Lang drew attention to the fact that "the theory of education set forth by Mrs. Sherwood in *The Fairchild Family* is very much the same as that inculcated by Madame de Genlis in *Adèle et Théodore,* and depends not only on the complete isolation of the children but also on the fact that they are the one and only care of all about them." "The Fairchild Family and their Creator," *Longman's Magazine,* Apr. 1893, p. 579.

[8] Except Hannah More, whose *Search after Happiness,* a pastoral drama for young ladies, appeared on May 10, 1773 (second impression, Aug. 1773).

[9] John Doran, *A Lady of the Last Century (Mrs. Elizabeth Montagu): Illustrated in Her Unpublished Letters* (London, 1873), p. 310.

[10] *Critical Review,* LIII (1781), 39; cf. also *Monthly Review,* Aug. 1781.

The prejudice against the effects of acting on the female character appears to have been dispelled in the case of the *Theatre of Education*; the moral lessons which it was thought capable of inculcating were too precious to be wasted. Here were comedies, with a difference. The preface to Volume I drew attention to this difference:

> Great difficulties were to be surmounted in making them interesting without the aid of intrigue, violent passions, the contrast of virtues and vices; in short, when the Author had laid it down as a rule, not to allow a male character to appear, nor a single sentence to be uttered, which was not of itself a lesson, or did not lead to some instruction.[11]

The dramatic formulation of "la morale mise en action" was not new in France; but English pedagogues had never gone beyond the didactic tale to illustrate morality. Apart from its impact on the imagination of young actors and audiences alike, the *Theatre of Education* could teach young ladies poise and the social ease which stopped short of coquettishness.

A third reason for Madame de Genlis' popularity in England rested on a misapprehension. Madame de Genlis was believed to be herself a pattern of all the virtues she attributed to her Baronne d'Almane (in *Adèle et Théodore*).[12] The truth about Madame de Genlis would not have been acceptable to the more delicate consciences of her most enthusiastic supporters in England. Although everything she wrote was remarkable for its moral tone, her private life was no different from that of any shrewd and, on occasion, frivolous social climber at Versailles. The daughter of impoverished provincial gentlefolk, she owed her education to the generosity of her mother's rich lover. She soon found a place at court, helped by the qualities of her wit and her proficiency on the harp. The next step was marriage to the Comte de Genlis in the teeth of his family's most violent opposition. The rather weak husband having been discreetly set aside, a liaison with the Duc de Chartres (later "Philippe Égalité") assisted her in obtaining the

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[11] From the 1781 English edition, Vol. I, "Preface of the Editor," pp. 3-4. The exclusion of male characters was not observed in the subsequent three volumes. Madame de Genlis' work inspired a popular collection entitled *Dramatic Pieces calculated to exemplify the Mode of Conduct which will render young Ladies, both amiable and happy, when their School Education is completed* (1786). Clara Reeve stated in the preface to *The Progress of Romance* (Colchester, 1785) that her use of the dialogue form was inspired by the *Theatre of Education*.

[12] That *Adèle et Théodore* was regarded as a *roman à clef* is evident in the acute displeasure which it caused Madame de Montesson and Madame de la Reyinère, who accused Madame de Genlis of satirizing them in the characters of Madame de Surville and Madame d'Olcy. See *L' Intermédiaire des Chercheurs et Curieux*, Jan. 25 and Feb. 25, 1874, where a skeleton key is attempted.

post of *gouverneur* to his children, although this post had always been filled by a man. In spite of her humiliation, the Duchesse de Chartres allowed Madame de Genlis to gain an almost undisputed ascendancy over her own children. The lampoonists of the day unleashed their jealous satire on a liaison which was said to have produced Madame de Genlis' mysterious adopted daughter, Paméla. She shocked the court by taking the young princes and princesses under her care to a meeting of the General Assembly, where she forced them to pin tricolor cocades to their hats and shout slogans calling for a constitutional monarchy. Hounded out of France by the Revolution, she wandered over Europe with her wards, changing her residence continually. Unable to return to Paris, where her husband had been guillotined, unable to seek refuge among the royalists, who resented the presence in their midst of Philippe Egalité's discarded mistress, she was saved only by Napoleon's seizure of power. Then followed a brief period of peace when the Emperor allower her to occupy an apartment in the Arsenal; but his favor was lost through intrigue, and she lived on in poverty until Louis-Philippe ascended the throne of France and assured his old governess of a lonely but financially secure old age.

Her chequered career had absolutely no effect on her writings. The Genlis known to the English public was the Genlis of *Adèle et Théodore,* a woman whose common sense was matched only by her piety—the one moralist during the last years of the Ancien Régime who condemned the way of life of her social equals (while practicing it herself), and who was also the most formidable enemy of the *philosophes.* She was seen as the upholder of religious principles (in *La Religion Considéré comme l'unique base du bonheur et de la véritable philosophie,* 1787), as the most articulate opponent of Rousseau's educational theories (in *Adèle et Théodore,* 1782), as the sharp critic of conventual education for women (in *Discours sur la suppression des couvents de religieuses,* 1791), as the inventor of a novel method of moral education (in *Théâtre à l'usage des jeunes personnes,* 1780)—in short as one who, but for the accident of birth, might have played a leading role in the English evangelical revival.

These proper sentiments were given even more credence when Madame de Genlis paid her first visit to England in 1785. Fanny Burney recounted enthusiastically[13] how she had spent a whole morning with Madame de Genlis and found her "the sweetest as well as most accomplished Frenchwoman." Subsequently, Fanny Burney's disil-

[13] *Diary and Letters of Madame d'Arblay,* ed. Charlotte Barrett (London, 1893), II, 3.

lusioned lament was a measure of the high regard in which she had held Madame de Genlis: "What a woful change from the elegant, amiable, high-bred, Madame de Genlis I knew six years ago!—the apparent pattern of female perfection in manners, conversation and delicacy."[14] In her embarrassment, Fanny Burney had to seek the advice of Mrs. Delany and Queen Charlotte herself, to decide what to do about Madame de Genlis' repeated attempts to get into touch with her. The Queen had already been "almost tormented" into giving the lady a private audience, and her advice was not to answer Madame de Genlis' letters.

Horace Walpole did not fall quite so easily under Madame de Genlis' spell. Writing to the Countess of Upper Ossory on July 4, 1785, he admitted a preconceived dislike for her:

> I will read no more of Rousseau; his *Confessions* disgusted me beyond any book I ever opened. His hen, the schoolmistress, Madame de Genlis, the newspapers say, is arrived in London. I nauseate her too; the eggs of education that both he and she laid could not be hatched till the chickens would be ready to die of old age.

And yet his skepticism was soon overcome when he met Madame de Genlis. He invited her to luncheon and was charmed with her company. By all accounts Madame de Genlis' first visit to England (1785) must have confirmed the impression made by her literary output. Queen Charlotte gave her permission to send her works to the Royal Library as they appeared in French and continued to receive them even after 1791, when her admiration had grown considerably cooler.[15] An earlier

[14] *Ibid.*, III, 408. An English doctor's degree is said to have been conferred upon Madame de Genlis some time in 1785; see I. A. Taylor, *Life of Lord Edward Fitzgerald* (London, 1903), p. 123, and Jean Harmand, *Madame de Genlis* (Paris, 1912), p. 86. I have not been able to discover any evidence for this curious assertion, which betrays considerable ignorance of the English universities in the eighteenth century. Further evidence of the good impression made by Madame de Genlis can be found in a letter from the Hon. Mrs. Boscawen to Mrs. Delany dated July 14, 1785: "We heard that Madam de Genlis was a very genteel, agreeable woman, much approv'd by all, not handsome, but of good figure, and her manners easy, *without* the least affectation. She is going to Oxford, Bath, and I believe to Bristol to visit our friend Mrs. H. More." Lady Llanover, ed., *The Autobiography and Correspondence of Mary Granville, Mrs. Delaney*, 2nd series (London, 1862), III, 262.

[15] See *A Catalogue of the Genuine Library, Prints and Books of An Illustrious Personage, Lately Deceased, Which Will be Sold by Auction, on Wednesday, 9th June, 1819, and the Following Days. By Mr. Christie, at his Rooms in Pall-Mall* (London, 1819). The various works of Madame de Genlis are scattered all through the catalogue; the following list of items is, I think, complete: 386, 847, 936, 1122, 1123, 1124, 1125, 1126, 1139, 1152, 1686, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291. It is a fact of some interest that Queen Charlotte did not own a single English translation of any of Madame de Genlis' works.

admirer was Edward Gibbon, who in 1777 was prepared to travel a hundred miles to London to receive Madame de Genlis, had she come to London that winter.[16]

The turning point in Madame de Genlis' popularity came in 1791, when she fled to England, taking Mademoiselle Adélaïde with her. After a fortnight in London, she moved to Bath, and then to Bury in Suffolk, where she rented a cottage and lived in retirement until the end of the summer of 1792. At first she was allowed to live in peace, though the rising fury of the émigrés, who blamed the Orleans party for all their misfortunes, caused her some alarm. She sent a frantic appeal to Charles James Fox for assistance and protection, alleging that she had received anonymous letters containing threats of assassination: "I am uneasy, sick, unhappy and surrounded by the most dreadful snares of the fraud [*sic*] and wickedness!"[17] Her frantic attempts to renew ties with old acquaintances were unsuccessful and she found herself drifting into the Whig circles which she had ignored on her first visit to England. Fox, John Hurford Stone, and, among the émigrés, only Talleyrand became her friends. Sheridan, who had just become a widower, fell madly in love with Paméla, who rejected his advances in favour of Fox's unfortunate cousin, Lord Edward Fitzgerald.

Part of Madame de Genlis' panic was due to the fact that Philippe Égalité had sent a number of urgent messages demanding the return of his daughter to Paris lest she be blacklisted as an émigrée.[18] His precautions were in vain, for the Commune blacklisted both Mademoiselle Adélaïde and Madame de Genlis despite their precipitate return to Paris, and they found themselves once again on the road, trying to reach the Swiss frontier before the Revolutionary armies could overtake them. Until Napoleon's rise to power, they wandered from place to place as their presence became a source of embarrassment to those who gave them refuge.[19]

Although the truth about Madame de Genlis was not known in England until the time of her second visit (1791), when her political views

[16] *The Letters of Edward Gibbon*, ed. J. E. Norton (London, 1956), II, 170. A number of friendly but unimportant letters were exchanged between Madame de Genlis and Gibbon in 1779. There is no further trace of their friendship, except the fact that he was presented with or purchased a copy of her *Théâtre de Societé* (Paris, 1781). See *The Library of Edward Gibbon* (London, 1940), p. 80.

[17] Quoted in I. A. Taylor, *Life of Edward Fitzgerald* (London, 1903), p. 126. I have not been able to trace this letter.

[18] See Jean Harmand, *Madame de Genlis, sa vie intime et politique, 1746-1830* (Paris, 1912), for a detailed account of her second visit to England (Part III, ch. V, *passim*).

[19] Two good lives of Madame de Genlis are Jean Harmand, *op. cit.*, and

and her liaison with the Duke of Orléans were publicized by the French émigré circles in England, the reception of her works was never, at any time, totally uncritical.

An English translation of the *Théâtre à l'usage des jeunes personnes* (Paris, 1779-80) was published in four volumes in 1780-81 by T. Cadell and P. Elmsley, London.[20] The English title, *Theatre of Education,* was calculated to dispel any misgivings concerning the moral tone of a literary production which came from France. The first volume was devoted entirely to the education of young ladies. The reviewer for the *London Magazine* was pleased with this volume and recommended it to the perusal of young ladies, for

> ... in playing these pieces several advantages may be found; such as impressing excellent principles upon their minds, exercising their memories, forming their pronunciation, and giving them a graceful pleasing manner. It is evident, that most of these benefits are not to be obtained by learning detached pieces in prose or verse...[21]

Another advantage remarked on by the reviewer was the fact that none of the plays exceeded two acts or needed more than three young actresses, so that they could easily be performed in private families. The obvious disadvantage of encouraging the vanity of a young lady through performance on a public stage would thus be avoided.

The following three volumes, which appeared in 1781, presented plays designed for both sexes, but with a preponderance of female characters.[22] Volume III, however, consisted of plays with male parts only, calculated to inspire young gentlemen of rank with noble and

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Honoré Bonhomme, *La Comtesse de Genlis, sa vie, son œuvre, sa mort* (Paris, 1885). Jean Harmand (alias Mlle Schwerer) is the best source of information. In 1926 *The Educational Ideas and Activities of Madame la Comtesse de Genlis, with Special Reference to her Work 'Adèle et Théodore'* by William Kerby was published in Paris. It was originally a thesis presented for the diploma of fellow of the College of Preceptors. This is the only book in English on Madame de Genlis mentioned in the *Cambridge Bibliography of English Literature.* Yet Jean Harmand's book was translated into English and published in 1913 under the title, *A Keeper of Royal Secrets.* William Kerby's book is a very bad unacknowledged translation of the last fifty pages of Jean Harmand's book, introducing a summary of the 1783 English translation of *Adèle et Théodore.*

[20] Apparently on the basis of a statement by Arthur Rogers, London book dealer, from whom the Bodleian Library copy was purchased, the Bodleian catalogue attributes this translation to Thomas Holcroft. The title is not included in Captain Colby's *Bibliography of Thomas Holcroft* (New York, 1922). A second edition, "embellished with a portrait," also appeared in 1781. A new translation was published in 1787; this was evidently the work of more than one person, since mention is made in the preface of "the translators."

[21] *London Magazine,* XLIX (Dec. 1780), 569.

[22] Especially Vol. II.

liberal sentiments.[23] One play was intended particularly for young princes—*Vathek, a Comedy,* a dramatic expression of Madame de Genlis' views on the education of princes.[24] The fourth volume, with plays for characters of both sexes, was

> intended solely for the education of the children of Shopkeepers and Mechanics; but people even of a lower rank, may find useful instruction in it: the lady's maid, young milliners, mantua-makers, and shop-women, will here see a particular detail of their duties.[25]

The originality of this purpose was remarked on by the reviewers for the *London Magazine* and the *Monthly Review*;[26] almost all the works on education up to that time had been intended for the higher ranks of society. In a sense, Madame de Genlis was paving the way for Mrs. Trimmer and Priscilla Wakefield.

Theatre of Education established Madame de Genlis' reputation as a writer of lofty moral purpose who had discovered the secret of instructing through pleasure. Her next work, however, was given a more critical reception.

Adèle et Théodore; ou Lettres sur l'Education (1782) first appeared in an English translation in 1783,

> undertaken by some Ladies, who through misfortunes, too common at this time, are reduced from ease and opulence, to the necessity of applying, to the support of life, those accomplishments which were given to them in their youth, for the amusement and embellishment of it.[27]

This translation went into a second edition, "carefully corrected and amended," in 1784; there was a third edition in 1788 and a fourth in 1796. No complete English editions of *Adelaide and Theodore* appear to have been printed after 1796; but extracts from the work, such as the story of Cecilia, the beautiful nun, and the story of the Duchess of C—, were often reprinted. An earlier translation had been started by Maria Edgeworth at her father's suggestion. A portion of the manuscript was in fact corrected by R. L. Edgeworth and one volume completed when the 1783 translation appeared, which ended Maria Edgeworth's efforts in this direction. Thomas Day, who had disapproved of

[23] *The Children's Ball, or The Duel; The Traveller; The False Friends; The Judge; Vathek, a Comedy.*

[24] See *Adelaide and Theodore,* III, 292 note. Letter LXV (vol. III) was intended by Madame de Genlis as a summary of the views she expressed in *Vathek.*

[25] IV, ii.

[26] *London Magazine,* L (Mar. 1781), 141; *Monthly Review,* LXIV, 259.

[27] Preface to *Adelaide and Theodore; or, Letters on Education,* 2nd ed. (London, 1784), Vol. I.

Maria's literary pursuits on principle, was greatly pleased by this suspension of her work.[28]

Although *Adelaide and Theodore* contained a number of attacks on the ideas of Rousseau and tributes to the ideas of Fénelon, it was regarded with some suspicion by English reviewers as a sort of watered-down Rousseauism. The main objection, according to Enfield, writing in the *Monthly Review,* was that

> it supposes the parents to devote themselves entirely to their children, and to submit to a kind of seclusion from the world which is seldom either eligible or practicable; and, at the same time, requires, that they be possessed of intellectual and moral endowments, in a degree which falls to the lot of few individuals.[29]

The reviewer for the *Gentleman's Magazine* was particularly critical concerning the education of Adelaide. It was an education, contended the reviewer, which made extraordinary demands on a young lady. First, it encouraged Adelaide to resort to falsehood and deception, as she saw these practiced so blatantly around her; then it demanded that she be so docile, sweet-tempered, and virtuous that no conceivable young lady could possibly follow her example. Add to this the profusion of romantic tales and the rather careless references to conjugal infidelity interspersed in the narrative, and no one could wonder at the confusion of ideas and principles which would inevitably result in the mind of any virtuous young English lady reading this work by herself.[30] These objections did not, in the eyes of the reviewer, detract from the fundamental worth of Madame de Genlis' doctrines; they simply indicated that *Adelaide and Theodore* was a book more suited to the parents of young ladies than to the young ladies themselves. At best, it was almost impossible to adopt Madame de Genlis' theories, even pruned of all that was immodest or vicious in them, "as high rank and great misfortune are absolutely necessary for the extensive and very liberal plans here given."[31]

Two other translations of *Adelaide and Theodore,* which appeared serially in periodicals, were attempts to introduce this work to the English reading public with all the objectionable passages left out. They were both undertaken quite independently of the 1783 version.

In June 1782 the *Universal Magazine* published the first installment of a serialized *Adela and Theodore; or Letters on Education* with no

[28] Bertha Coolidge Slade, in *Maria Edgeworth, 1767-1849: A Bibliographical Tribute* (London, 1937), p. 11, assumes that the published translation was by Thomas Holcroft.

[29] *Monthly Review,* LXX, 338.

[30] *Gentleman's Magazine,* LIII (pt. 2), 860 and 946, *passim.*

[31] *Ibid.,* p. 947.

acknowledgement of Madame de Genlis' authorship. The style of this translation was more colloquial than that undertaken by the group of impoverished ladies, and its grammar and syntax less faulty. This may be explained by the fact that the *Universal Magazine* was, according to its subtitle, designed to be "Instructive and Entertaining to Gentry, Merchants, Farmers and Tradesmen," a section of the reading public which had not been so specifically catered to in the past.

The *Lady's Magazine* for May 1785 produced the first installment[32] of another version entitled *Adelaide and Theodore: or, Letters on Education,* with a lengthy preface stating the reasons for offering a new translation. Apparently unaware of the version serialized in the *Universal Magazine,* this new translator limited himself to a consideration of the translation in book form. At first, he declared, the French original appeared to him full of "things so abhorrent from our notions and manners" that he abandoned the design of translating it himself and hoped that no one else would undertake this task. When a translation appeared, unexpurgated and not really fit to be put into the hands of innocent young ladies, and when it became obvious that this translation was being widely read, he felt it incumbent upon him to produce his own version of the celebrated work.

> This new version [he wrote], has been attempted, in which every particular of a suspicious nature is thrown out: all superfluities retrenched; a number of thoughts that may seem false in the original set in a true and conspicuous light; the whole digested in such manner, that nothing can seem defective, nor any omission give cause for its being regretted. The book, therefore, in its present condition, may be safely pronounced to be the best of its kind existing. It goes over a large ground of matter, sips honey from every flower, is accurate in its discussions, new in its manner, cannot create in any part disgust, being equally useful and pleasing, and in the whole tends greatly to form and perfect the moral character.[33]

This expurgated *Adelaide and Theodore* was probably not completed, and no part of it was published outside the pages of the *Lady's Magazine.*

In spite of the various objections raised against the moral tone of certain passages in *Adelaide and Theodore,* there was no checking the indiscriminate distribution of this work, both complete and in extracts. *The Beauties of Genlis* (Perth, 1787) reached a third edition (Dub-

[32] In Apr. 1789 the *Lady's Magazine* publication of *Adelaide and Theodore* ends abruptly with Letter LXXIV (which corresponds to Letter I, Vol. III of the original) in spite of the note, "to be continued," at the end of the letter (p. 189). Of the portion covered, twenty-seven letters were omitted.

[33] *Lady's Magazine,* XVI (1785), 249-250.

lin)[34] in 1791. It contained "The History of Cecilia, the Beautiful Nun," "The History of the Dutchess of C—," and "The History of Saint André," all taken from the unexpurgated translation of *Adèle et Théodore*. For those who could read French the original text was often reprinted in London and Dublin. The various editions, both of the English and of the French text, were frequently revised and corrected. The grammar of the English first edition is improved in the second and third editions, and many of the changes follow changes in the original text by Madame de Genlis herself.

Queen Charlotte in conversation with Fanny Burney and Mrs. Delany is reported to have observed the changes. She asked Fanny Burney,

> Oh! (looking pleased) have you read the last edition of her *Adèle?*"
>
> —No, Ma'am.
>
> —Well, it is much improved; for, the passage, you know, Mrs. Delany, of the untruth, is all altered; fifteen pages are quite new, and she has altered it very prettily. She has sent it to me. She always sends me her works; she did it a long while ago, when I did not know there was such a lady as Madame de Genlis. You have not seen *Adèle* then?
>
> —No, ma'am.[35]

Queen Charlotte must have read two editions, at least, of *Adèle et Théodore,* since she was able to observe changes in the text. Fanny Burney must have taken the queen's hint, for she read the book carefully and took the trouble to copy extracts from it into her notebooks. Dr. Joyce Hemlow, who has had access to five volumes of Fanny Burney's notebooks preserved in the Berg Collection of the New York Public Library, writes:

> If Fanny Burney's selections from *Adèle et Théodore* preserved in a holograph "Extract Book," indicate what she found most valuable in the work, then that must have been the graduated reading lists which Madame de Genlis inserted from time to time.[36]

There is no evidence, however, of the recommendation of *Adelaide and Theodore* as a book to be read by young ladies. In Clara Reeve's reading list, appended to *The Progress of Romance* (1785), only the *Theatre of Education* and *Tales of the Castle* are included in the list for young ladies; but *Adelaide and Theodore* is described by "Euph-

[34] This edition, printed by Bernard Dornin, is dedicated to the "Dutchess of Leinster," who was the mother of the unfortunate Lord Edward Fitzgerald, Madame de Genlis' son-in-law.

[35] *Diary and Letters of Madame D'Arblay (1778-1840)*, ed. Austin Dobson (London, 1904), II, 345-346.

[36] Joyce Hemlow, "Fanny Burney and the Courtesy Books," *PMLA*, LXV (1950), 746.

asia" as "a school for Parents, Guardians and Preceptors."[37] Erasmus Darwin's recommendation of works of Madame de Genlis is also limited to the *Theatre of Education* and the *Tales of the Castle*.[38] For the Rev. John Bennett, whose reading list in *Letters to a Young Lady* (1789) extended to a hundred items, only *The Theatre of Education* is recommended; and Maria and R. L. Edgeworth, in *Practical Education* (1798), although they refer quite often to the works of Madame de Genlis, do not recommend a single book of hers for the perusal of young ladies.

Madame de Genlis' most popular work in England was her *Veillées du Château* (Paris 1784), which was published in an English translation by Thomas Holcroft in 1785. There were eight editions of the *Tales of the Castle* through 1806,[39] and many of the stories were reprinted in various collections and periodicals. The reviewers were unanimous in their praise of this work.[40] Its plan was simple: A lady lives in a castle with her three children. When they are good she rewards them by telling them stories. Her narrative is often interrupted by questions from her young listeners, who are eager to find out the meaning of any word they do not understand. By this device of interruptions Madame de Genlis finds it possible to introduce a few simple lessons in the rudiments of history and science.

Some years later, Mary Wollstonecraft was to reproach Madame de Genlis for propaganda in *Tales of the Castle* for the Roman Catholic Church, and for asserting "that a polite young lady has not time to be in love" and that she should accept any suitor chosen for her by her parents.[41] Yet not even Madame de Genlis' increasingly bad reputation could stem the tide of this book's popularity.

Encouraged by the success of *Tales of the Castle,* Holcroft produced a translation of Madame de Genlis' *Sacred Dramas* (London, 1785). It is rather surprising that Holcroft, an avowed atheist, should have translated these short plays; but hackwork was a lucrative occupation for any man of letters in those days.

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[37] *The Progress of Romance* (Colchester, 1785), II, 99.

[38] *Plan for the Conduct of Female Education in Boarding Schools* (Derby, 1797), sec. XIV: "Polite Literature."

[39] Colby in his *Bibliography of Thomas Holcroft* (p. 47) states that he has seen an edition, five volumes in two, designated as the "ninth edition": "Btattleborough [*sic*]: Published by William Fessenden, 1813." There was a publisher of such a name in Brattleboro, Vermont, from 1803 until his death in 1815.

[40] E.g., *Monthly Review,* LXXIII (Aug. 1785), 92; *European Magazine,* VII (Jan. 1785), 42; announcement in *Universal Magazine,* LXXV (Dec. 1784), 378; *Critical Review,* LIX (Feb. 1785), 99.

[41] Mary Wollstonecraft, *A Vindication of the Rights of Women with Strictures on Political and Moral Subjects* (London, 1792), ch. V, sec. 6, *passim.*

Sacred Dramas was not as well received as *Tales of the Castle.* Enfield, writing in the *Monthly Review,* complained that this new translation was made redundant by the fact that Hannah More had already produced a far superior *Sacred Dramas* in 1782, "executed with much judgment and taste, and adorned with all the graces of simple and elegant verse."[42] The *English Review* was no more flattering, pointing out that one of Madame de Genlis' dramas, *The Death of Adam,* "is only an imitation of a drama on the same subject by Mr. Klopstock," and that "Mr. Holcroft's wish to 'assure a majesty and tone distinct from the original,' has too frequently introduced Miltonic inversions, which do not meet our approbation in prose."[43]

Particularly popular in England were Madame de Genlis' ideas on conventual education and her emphasis on the teaching of practical subjects which would prepare the young lady for her duties as wife and mother.

The main force of the attack against the convent came from the *philosophes* in France; but in England it was also typical of the thinking of very pious believers.[44] It was awkward for both the believers and the *philosophes* to find themselves in such close agreement. But when Madame de Genlis (otherwise so staunch in her defense of the church that she earned the ironical title of "mère de l'Église") joined in the outcry against conventual education, it became possible for the late eighteenth-century Anglican moralists to feel that their allies were not all in the atheist camp. In fact, Madame de Genlis' criticism of the convent, coupled with a strict adherence to religious principles, placed her, if unwillingly, at the very center of the Protestant tradition.

The story of Cecilia in *Adelaide and Theodore* was designed to give a pathetic picture of the forced vocation to which so many younger daughters were made to submit, in order to increase the dowries of elder daughters. Cecilia was compelled to take the veil in spite of her being in love, and it was only many years later that her father's remorse released her from her enforced imprisonment. This denunciation of a particularly vicious practice was received in England as yet another proof of the evil effects of monastic institutions. The story of Cecilia was retained in all the different versions of *Adelaide and Theodore*

[42] *Monthly Review,* LXXV (1786), 397.

[43] *English Review* VIII (1786), 39. *Sacred Dramas* received brief but favorable reviews in the *Town and Country Magazine,* XVIII (1786), 487, and the *Universal Magazine,* LXXVIII (1786), 223.

[44] Anna Laetitia Barbauld's essay "On Monastic Institutions" was, quite exceptionally, apologetic, without departing from a strict anti-Roman Catholicism. *The Works of Anna Laetita Barbauld, with a memoir by Lucy Aikin* (London, 1825), II, 195 ff.

and was frequently included by itself in small miscellaneous collections of moral and instructive pieces.

Another accusation against conventual life was that of vicious corruption. Plays were frequently written on this theme before and during the French Revolution,[45] with emphasis on moral and sexual vices contaminating the atmosphere of French convents. Madame de Genlis avoided the theme of sexual aberration but did not hesitate to deal with moral vices. The one-act play, *Cecilia; or, the Sacrifice of Friendship,* in Volume I of the *Theatre of Education* is a biting satire on moral vice in a convent. It portrays an abbess attempting to persuade her rich pupils to take the veil, by means of flattery and the frequent offering of sweets! In her impatience to gain control over an unsuspecting victim, she would even wish to reduce the novitate to six months. But Cecilia's sister comes to withdraw her from the convent and tells her that she has inherited a large fortune. A battle of wits then ensues between the abbess and Cecilia's sister, who insists that Cecilia can serve God better by active charity than by seclusion in the convent.

A third point raised by Madame de Genlis in *Cecilia; or, the Sacrifice of Friendship* was that the instruction given in convents was antiquated and entirely inadequate as a preparation for life in the world. Cecilia remarks that the nuns are ignorant and incapable. She is bored by the silly chitchat in the refectory, which could only lead to the most unbridled frivolity once the pupil left the convent (if she were not condemned to remain there for the rest of her life). In later life a most dangerous consequence of this type of secluded education was the breathless and greedy attempt to compensate for the boredom and idleness of childhood by indulging in the most extreme forms of worldly dissoluteness.

So far Madame de Genlis was in agreement with the *philosophes*; but, when the National Assembly decreed the suppression of convents in February 1790, she wrote a *Discours sur la suppression des couvens de religieuses et l'education publique des Femmes* (Paris, 1791), in which she warmly opposed the principles of the decree. Much was wrong with the convents, she argued, but this did not mean that those who have a vocation should be denied the cloistered communal life. There was room for reform, but anything more drastic would be interfering in the spiritual freedom of the devout Catholic. The *Discours* was not translated into English. Her suggestions for the reformation of conventual education were inspired by true reverence for the

[45] See Edmond Estève "Le Théâtre 'monacal' sous la Révolution," *RHL*, XXIV (1917), 177-222.

traditions of the church and by the more practical consideration that there were no secular schools in France for female education and that the National Assembly's decree made no provision for an alternative system.[46] She proposed the introduction of a regular system of class instruction, the replacement of ignorant teachers by capable ones, even from the laity if necessary, and the revision of the entire curriculum so that it would include gymnastics, modern languages, and subjects of practical relevance to a young lady's life after school. Her constructive criticism of the convent came too late; in the social upheaval of the French Revolution, any defence of monastic institutions was tantamount to treason.

The *Discours* had little or no impact outside France; but Madame de Genlis' suggestions for the practical education of young ladies gained some influence in England when they were embodied into her next work, *Leçons d'une gouvernante à ses élèves* (Paris 1791). This was immediately translated in three volumes as *Lessons of a Governess to her Pupils* (London, 1792). Although the book was criticized at the time for its rather long-winded attempt at self-justification by Madame de Genlis regarding her relations with the Orléans family, it contained also a detailed program of education drawn partly from her experiences with the Orléans children and partly from her own imagination. Her plan was based to some extent on that of Saint-Cyr. The emphasis was on religious instruction, which could be supplemented by some elements of uncontroversial ethics. The young lady should study history, geography, mythology, law, and the rudiments of medicine and chemistry. In the arts she should be adept without becoming a "virtuoso." Drawing was to be limited to the drawing of flowers, music to singing and the harp, and embroidery to simple cross-stitches for the illustration of Biblical scenes. Since the purpose of such an education was to equip young ladies for their duties as wives and mothers, household management was to be taught in the most natural way, by making the young ladies cook their own meals, serve at table, and sew their own dresses. A proper balanced diet was to be devised for each person and gymnastics were to be a daily practice for young ladies, with exercises varying according to the needs of the individuals. Madame de Genlis' full and detailed account of games and gymnastics suggested for young ladies was often reprinted in England in pamphlet form and included in the various anthologies on female education.

[46] Even Napoleon did not include female education among his numerous schemes. More than twelve hundred monasteries and convents were re-established during the First Empire on the one condition that they should not require irrevocable vows.

The reputation of Madame de Genlis in England was never very high after 1791, in spite of the fact that most of her works were published in translation well on into the nineteenth century.[47] R. L. Edgeworth remained an enthusiastic reader until the end of his life; but his daughter, Maria, never liked Madame de Genlis' works, and found their author particularly unpleasant on the only two occasions when she met her. Jane Austen was a keen reader of *Les Veillées du Château*, but, she complained in a letter to Cassandra Austen dated January 7, 1807:

> *Alphonsine* did not do. We were disgusted in twenty pages, as, independent of a bad translation, it has indelicacies which disgrace a pen hitherto so pure; and we changed our evening amusement.[48]

By then, Madame de Genlis had become an author one read for the sake of amusement, or for the slightly guilty thrill of reading a French novel, but no longer for the improvement of female morality.

University of Cairo, U. A. R.

[47] The publisher of most of these later translations was Henry Colburn.

[48] *Jane Austen's Letters to her Sister Cassandra and Others*, ed. R. W. Chapman, 2nd ed. (London, 1952), p. 173.

DUSHAN BRESKY

Schiller's Debt to Montesquieu and Adam Ferguson

MONTESQUIEU is one of the main sources for Schiller's political views. Most critics accept without question his direct influence on Schiller's early plays and on *Don Carlos* in particular, because of the tenth letter on *Don Carlos,* which appeared in December 1788 in *Der Teutsche Merkur:* " . . . so sind deswegen einige nicht ganz unwichtige Ideen . . . für . . . den redlichen Finder nicht verloren, den es vielleicht nicht unangenehm überraschen wird, Bemerkungen, deren er sich aus seinem Montesquieu erinnert, in einem Trauerspiel angewandt . . . zu sehen."

This acknowledgement by Schiller himself has led critics to link *Don Carlos* with Montesquieu. Edmond Eggli concludes that "the enlightened liberalism of Marquis Posa was inspired by Montesquieu."[1] Albert Kontz gives a rough outline of Schiller's sources in Montesquieu.[2] W. C. Lieder in the introduction to his edition of *Don Carlos* (p. 29) and Heinrich Düntzer in his *Schiller's Don Karlos* (pp. 240, 241) find that Schiller expressed Montesquieu's political ideas in the dialogue between Philip and Posa, especially in the famous scene between the king and the marquis (III, 10.) R. Ayrault, quoting the same passage, says that the tragedy contains many allusions which would be obscure for a reader not familiar with Montesquieu.[3]

[1] *Schiller et le romantisme français* (Paris, 1927), I, 33.

[2] Albert Kontz, *Les Drames de la jeunesse de Schiller* (Paris, 1899), p. 436.

[3] A. Ayrault, "Schiller et Montesquieu: sur la genèse du *Don Carlos,*" *Études Germaniques,* III (1948), 233-240. "Le 'Don Carlos' est à tel point pénétré de ces 'remarques' qu'il en résulte des obscurités et des ambiguïtés de détail presque in-

That Schiller did not read *L'Esprit des lois* until about a year after the completion of *Don Carlos* is ignored by all these critics except Eggli. Eggli mentions that Schiller read and studied Montesquieu especially toward the end of 1788 and quotes the December 4, 1788 letter to Lotte (Caroline) in which Schiller expresses his enthusiasm for *L'Esprit des lois;*[4] yet his awareness of the regularity of events does not seem to alter his conclusions.

The fact is that Schiller did not become absorbed in "his Montesquieu" until the time he wrote the tenth letter on *Don Carlos* in December 1788, that is, about a year and a half after he completed the tragedy. Had he read *L'Esprit des lois* at the time he wrote *Don Carlos,* the French *chef-d'œuvre* would not have burst upon him in 1788. Of course, this does not imply that Montesquieu's political ideas were completely unknown to Schiller while he was writing *Don Carlos.* It shows only that he read them in the original for the first time when he wrote Lotte about his adventures in political science.

Reinhard Buchwald and Theo Piana indicate that Adam Ferguson channeled Montesquieu's ideas into Schiller's work before he discovered the Frenchman in the original. There are two statements referring to Montesquieu in Buchwald's *Schiller.*[5] In the first volume Buchwald says that Schiller found a whole political system in Ferguson's *Institutions,* based mainly on Montesquieu's doctrines, and points out that Schiller was more indebted to Montesquieu than to any other political writer, but only after 1788 (I, 257). Yet this assertion is contradicted to a certain extent in the second volume of the work in which Buchwald describes the genesis of *Don Carlos:*

> Zwei ideale Forderungen gehören zusammen: der heroische Mensch ... und ein glaubensvoller Einsatz für einen Staat, worin eine glückliche Menschheit in Freiheit erblüht. Diese Gedanken hatte Schiller schon in den "Räubern" verkündet, jetz griff er sie auf, angeregt offenbar durch ein unmittelbares Studium von Montesquieu's Hauptwerk, den "Betrachtungen über die Ursachen der Größe der Römer and ihren Verfall" [1734], deren Ideen er früher bereits mittelbar bei Ferguson kennen gelernt hatte. Beides hängt mit den Wandlungen zusammen, die der "Fiesko" während des Herbstes 1783 ... [II, 50].

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surmountables à qui ne connait pas Montesquieu,—ainsi ces vers de Posa, dans sa grande scène avec Philippe II: 'J'aime l'humanité et, dans les monarchies, je ne peux aimer que moi-même' " (p. 233).

[4] Eggli, *op. cit.,* p. 30: "Schiller lit Montesquieu, et l'étudie particulièrement à la fin de 1788: il en est ravi ... 'L'Esprit des Lois,' écrit-il, 'est compté avec raison parmi les plus précieux trésors de la littérature.' En décembre 1788 il se réjouit de ses loisirs qu'il veut consacrer 'à se le faire bien entrer dans la tête' (mir recht in den Kopf zu prägen)."

[5] Reinhard Buchwald, *Schiller* (Wiesbaden, 1953-54). All references to this work in the present analysis are made to this edition unless otherwise indicated.

On the one hand, we learn that Schiller had been familiar with some of Montesquieu's ideas prior to his reading *L'Esprit des lois* in 1788 from Ferguson's *Institutions of the Moral Philosophy;*[6] on the other hand, we are informed that Schiller already had direct knowledge of Montesquieu's "Hauptwerk," the *Considérations sur les Romains,* at the time he was working on *Don Carlos.*

To this discrepancy Theo Piana adds another element of confusion. In his *Friedrich Schiller, Bild-Urkunden zu seinem Leben und Schaffen*[7] (p. 36), he publishes a facsimile of the title page of the German translation of Ferguson's *Essay on the Civil Society* which appeared in Leipzig in 1768 under the title *Versuch über die Geschichte der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft.*

It seems beyond all doubt that Schiller had read the *Moralphilosophie.* Most biographers mention that Schiller knew Garve's commentary by heart. Yet the *Essay* is a much richer source of Montesquieu's doctrines than the *Institutions,* and includes direct translations of various passages from *L'Esprit des lois.* It is most probable that Schiller, an eager student of political science, knew both works and that both Buchwald and Piana are right but incomplete. We may also assume that Abel, Schiller's teacher, explained to his student passages from both *L'Esprit des lois* and the *Considérations.* Schiller's direct knowledge of Montesquieu before 1788 would seem to be improbable for the reason given above; but, as I have not had access to the original documents, my conclusion on this particular point must remain hypothetical.

If we can accept indirect influence, there is no reason to question Schiller's right to claim Montesquieu as the source of his inspiration before 1788. He was entitled to do so especially because Ferguson himself recognized Montesquieu as his own great master. Ferguson in fact candidly reveals the secrets of his originality, admitting that Montesquieu's ideas permeated what he believed to be his own original thinking and that, in addition to the properly acknowledged quotations, he may have repeated some of his master's observations without crediting him as the source (*Essay,* Basil [*sic*], 1787, p. 100). But, although he imitates the Frenchman, Ferguson does not always say quite the same thing. The outspoken Scottish republican may have kindled as much of the enthusiasm of the young Schwärmer as the brilliant but more reserved master of the Château de la Brède. For this reason especially no analysis of Montesquieu's influence upon the young Schiller

[6] Translated into German by Christian Garve and published with his commentary in Leipzig in 1772 under the title, *Grundsätze der Moralphilosophie.*

[7] Munich, 1957.

should omit reference to its intermediary.[8] Any discovery of specific parallels between Montesquieu and Schiller before 1788 has to be evaluated cautiously and confronted with the Fergusonian version of Montesquieu's definitions of basic governmental forms included in his *Institutions* and in his *Essay*.

If the poet had read all Montesquieu's work, one would have to seek the sources of *Don Carlos* and of *Fiesko von Genua* not only in passages translated or freely integrated in Ferguson's work but also in less known parts of Montesquieu's work. One would have to compare various passages in *Don Carlos* included to add historical or local color to the tragedy with the *Considération sur les richesses de l'Espagne*, a preparatory study to *L'Esprit des lois*. Posa's drive for tolerance in the Spain of the Inquisition could have been provoked by such chapters from Montesquieu as the well-known anthology piece, *Très humble remontrance aux inquisiteurs d'Espagne et de Portugal*. But such material has no relation to the early political plays.

The first relevant manifestation of Posa's political views occurs in Act I, Scene 2.

> Ein Abgeordneter der ganzen Menschheit
> Umarm ich Sie—es sind die flandrischen
> Provinzen, die an Ihrem Halse weinen
> Und feierlich um Rettung Sie bestürmen.
> Gethan ist um Ihr teures Land, wenn Alba,
> Des Fanatismus rauher Henkersknecht,
> Vor Brüssel rückt mit spanischen Gesetzen.[9]

If we eliminate the Schillerian pathos and convert such a statement into an impersonal abstract description of a Draconian regime, the same idea might be put as follows:

> Die Sicherheit des Volks besteht in dem ungestörten Besitz und Gebrauch ihrer Rechte.
>
> Wenn die Rechte des Menschen ungestört seyn sollen: so muß entweder niemand da seyn, der sie angreife; oder es muß eine hinlängliche Macht vorhanden seyn sie zu vertheidigen. Das erste ist bey der jetzigen Beschaffenheit der Menschen nicht zu erwarten; das andre ist der vornehmste Gegenstand politischer Anordnungen [*Moralphilosophie*, Chapter VII, p. 251].

The moral climate, possibly similar to the Spanish terror intro-

[8] Some of Montesquieu's general ideas may have also been brought into Schiller's early intellectual arsenal through Kant and Herder, whose *Idea einer Universalgeschichte von dem kosmopolitischen Standpunkt* and *Ideen zur Geschichte der Philosophie der Menschheit* appeared 1784.

[9] *Don Karlos, Infant von Spanien, Schillers Sämmtliche Schriften*, V. Teil, 2. Band, ed. Hermann Sauppe (Stuttgart, 1869), p. 157. All quotations from *Don Carlos* in this article are taken from this edition.

duced by the Duke of Alba into the Netherlands, may have been described in the German translation of the *Essay* and in *L'Esprit des lois* as follows:

> Despotismus ist eine ausgeartete Monarchie, wo zum Scheine zwar ein Hof und ein Fürst bleibt, sonst aber jeder untergeordnete Stand zu Grunde gehet; wo dem Unterrhan [*sic*] gesaget wird, er habe gar keine Rechte, er könne kein Eigenthum besitzen, noch irgend ein Amt begleiten, das nicht alle Augenblicke auf dem Willen seines Fürsten beruhe. Diese Lehren ... müssen mit der Geißel und mit dem Schwerdte eingeschärfet werden, und werden unter dem Schrecken der Fesseln und des Kerkers am ersten angenommen. Furcht ist daher der Grundsatz ... [p. 106].

> Le pouvoir immense du prince y passe tout entier à ceux à qui il le confie. Des gens capables de s'estimer beaucoup eux-mêmes seroient en état d'y faire des révolutions. Il faut donc que la crainte y abatte tous les courages, et y éteigne jusqu'au moindre sentiment d'ambition.[10]

Both Montesquieu (*ibid.*, Book VIII, Chapters 6-8, pp. 354 ff.) and Ferguson (*Essay*, Parts V, VI, pp. 309 ff.) also describe how the decadence of the moral and social code in a monarchy may lead to despotism.

The quoted passages may have also inspired Posa's criticism of Philip:

> Ershrocken fliehen sie
> Vor dem Gespenste ihrer innern Größe
> Gefallen sich in ihrer Armuth, schmücken
> Mit feiger Weisheit ihre Ketten aus,
> Und Tugend nennt man, sie mit Anstand tragen.
> (Lines 3099-3123)

The picture of a despotic ruler or his lieutenant such as Philip or Alba can be found both in Ferguson and in Montesquieu: Ferguson's villainous and Germanized "Regent, der die Flaggen des Schreckens so frey für andere aufstreckt" (*Versuch*, p. 106) is much closer to the Schillerian pathos than Montesquieu's ironic sketch of a rococo "vizir" to whom the lazy tyrant delegates exclusive power because he does not want to be bothered by the possible antagonism of several ministers with equal authority (*op. cit.*, Book II, Chapter V, p. 249).

Symptomatic of the spirit of the play is Carlos' resentment of the social hierarchy in the Spanish monarchy. In Act I, Scene 9, he refuses to be called "Eure Hoheit." This wish can only be interpreted as advocating equality, which Montesquieu considers one of the most im-

[10] *Œuvres complètes de Montesquieu*, ed. Roger Caillois (Dijon, 1952), II, 258. All quotations from *L'Esprit des lois* in this article are taken from this edition.

portant republican principles, entirely incompatible with the spirit of monarchy. If Posa accepted *Duzen* now, his pride could not bear it if, in the future, Carlos as king should have to abandon his youthful egalitarianism.

> Der Traum ist göttlich.
> Doch wird er nie verfliegen? Ist mein Karl
> Auch seiner so gewiß, den Reitzungen
> Der unumschränkten Majestät zu trotzen? ...
> Don Philipp stirbt. Karl erbt das größte Reich
> Der Christenheit ...
> Und Gott ist heut, wer gestern Mensch noch war.
> (Lines 943-965)

If he later accepts Carlos' offer of brotherhood, which is formally expressed by mutual *Duzen,* he gives his approval to Carlos' republican tastes, at least in the realm of their personal friendship (lines 1007 ff.). But even there Carlos' aversion to using "Eure Hoheit" is not in harmony either with Montesquieu's or Ferguson's notion of a monarchy and Posa feels the same. From their point of view, the monarch's fraternization with his servant would be hardly compatible even with constitutional monarchy.[11] With some justification the freedom-dreamer Posa labels Carlos' taste for unheard-of republicanism, which undermines the essentials of royalist etiquette, "a divine dream."

The ideological core of the play is Scene 10 of Act III, where Posa gains Philip's respect and favor for his courageous, challenging candor. During their memorable conversation, Philip personifies a despotic

[11] *Versuch*, pp. 102-103. "Indessen ist unter solchen Regierungen die Liebe zur Gleichheit am unrechten Orte angebracht ... Der Gegenstand eines jeden Ranges ist Vortritt ... Der Regent hat einen großen Theil seines Ansehens den in das Ohr fallenden Titeln, und der schimmernden Equipage, worinnen er öffentlich erscheinet zu danken. Die ihm untergeordneten Stände machen durch eben dergleichen Darstellung einen Anspruch auf Vorzug, und zeigen dem Volke ... die Wappen ihres Geschlechts oder den Schmuck ihrer Glücksgüter ... Wordurch könnten sich sonst die unzahlbaren Stände von einander unterscheiden, die den Raum zwischen dem Stande des Fürsten und des Bauern ausfüllen?" (p. 102). Montesquieu's contemplation on what to Ferguson seemed to be the dubious glamor of royalist institutions is worded much less specifically and the implied criticism is much subtler. "Le gouvernement monarchique suppose, comme nous avons dit, des prééminences, des rangs, et même une noblesse d'origine. La nature de *l'honneur* est de demander des préférences et des distinctions; il est donc, par la chose même, placé dans ce gouvernement ... L'ambition est pernicieuse dans une république. Elle a de bons effets dans la monarchie ... L'honneur fait mouvoir toutes les parties du corps politique ... Il est vrai que philosophiquement parlant, c'est un honneur faux qui conduit toutes les parties de l'État; mais cet honneur faux est aussi utile au public, que le vrai le seroit aux particuliers qui pourroient l'avoir" (*op. cit.*, p. 257). See also: "Dans les monarchies et les États despotiques, personne n'aspire à l'égalité; cela ne vient pas même dans l'idée; chacun y tend à la supériorité. Les gens des conditions les plus basses ne désirent d'en sortir que pour être les maitres des autres" (p. 275).

prince with Machiavellian wisdom, but with a spark of a romantic and yet enlightened desire to rule with lighter hand and gain the love of his subjects. Posa's position is not so clear. He is considered by R. Ayrault as an undeniable republican and by Lieder as the spokesman of monarchy. Ayrault says:

> Posa allait devenir l'éducateur du jeune prince. Mais fût-il ainsi formé à l'idéal républicain et se trouvât-il en révolte contre son père, le fils du despote ne saurait être le protagoniste absolu d'un tel idéal, c'est-à-dire se confondre avec lui. Posa sera cet homme. Il sera dans 'Don Carlos' l'unique républicain, comme Verrina dans 'Fiesco', avec cette différence qu'en étant républicain Verrina se trouvait en accord avec la tradition et l'esprit de sa cité, alors que dans l'empire espagnol Posa est un étranger, borné à lui-même et sans assises, comme le dit la 2e Lettre sur "Don Carlos": "une grande apparition isolée."[12]

And he quotes Schiller's second letter on *Don Carlos* to prove his point: "les sentiments préférés du Marquis tournent autour de la *vertu républicaine*. Même son sacrifice pour son ami le prouve, car l'aptitude au sacrifice est l'essence de toute *vertu républicaine*."

Ayrault further substantiates his position by citing Posa's, Carlos', and Philip's use of the notion of "virtue," which has the same meaning and function in *Don Carlos* as it has in *L'Esprit des lois*.[13] Ayrault's most persuasive argument for Posa's republicanism is Posa's effort to conceal from the king his and Carlos' plans to do away with despotism in Holland.[14] Yet their main goal is the political defeat of Alba. Their secret plan to seize power in Flanders does not mean that Spain would evacuate the country and hand over the administration to the liberal Flemish aristocracy or even to the people there, but rather that Carlos would become a tolerant and enlightened regent of a liberally ruled or perhaps constitutionalized Netherlands.

Lieder, on the other hand, believes there is enough evidence in the text to claim that "throughout Act III, Scene 10, Posa is pleading, not for a republic, but for the monarchy as opposed to despotism" (*op. cit.*, p. 492). It is quite difficult to sum up the whole dilemma in a mere

[12] *Loc. cit.*, p. 237. Ayrault also quotes the third letter on *Don Carlos* in which Schiller speaks of republican freedom (p. 239).

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 234: "La vertu est essentiellement pour lui l'ensemble de ce que l'on nomme les 'vertus civiques': l'amour de la patrie et des lois, le sens d'égalité et son corrélatif, la frugalité... 'la vertu politique est un renoncement à soi-même.'"

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 240: "Si l'on songe qu'il peut affirmer, en portant la main à son cœur: 'Je serais dangereux pour avoir réfléchi sur moi-même? Je ne le suis pas, sire. Mes désirs ne vont pas plus loin que là,'—et que donc il n'hésite pas à soutenir son action par le mensonge puisqu'il a déjà développé devant Carlos, sur le ton le plus pressant, son projet de le faire partir pour les Flandres contre le volonté du Roi, on pensera qu'il n'est pas moins que Verrina une image intransigeante, bien qu'un instant douloureuse et tourmentée de la 'vertu républicaine.'"

footnote. Yet one would be unwise to refuse Lieder's opinion and accept Ayrault's arguments merely because the latter are expounded at greater length or because Ayrault's several examples to prove his thesis seem more convincing. A more detailed comparison of Posa's ideas, as expressed throughout the famous scene, with the pertinent passages from *L'Esprit des lois* and from Ferguson's works may lead to a modification of both views on Posa's political ideals and the tendency of the play.

Statements such as "Ich kann nicht Fürstendiener seyn" (line 3022) or "Nicht meine Thaten, Der Beifall, den sie finden an dem Thron, Soll meiner Thaten Endzweck seyn. Mir aber hat die Tugend eignen Werth" (lines 3027 ff.) or "Ich liebe die Menschheit, und in Monarchien darf ich niemanden lieben als mich selbst" (lines 3037 ff.) represent beyond any doubt an uncompromising republicanism from Ferguson's and Montesquieu's point of view. Ferguson points out gravely that, no matter how much freedom the monarch may grant his subjects, he has always the power to reduce them to the status of slaves.

In dem Erfolge einer solchen Staatskunst können dem Ansehen nach allerhand gehäßige Verzüge und Bekränkunken, die der monarchischen Regimentsform eigenthümlich sind, aus dem Wege geräumet werden. Doch der Stand der Gleichheit, dem sich die Unterthanen nähern, ist so gut als ein Sklavenstand... [*Versuch*, p. 103].[15]

Montesquieu is no less outspoken. His depiction of the moral and social atmosphere in a constitutional or absolute monarchy and his portrait of the royal servants are devastating.

Dans les monarchies, la politique fait faire les grandes choses avec le moins de vertu qu'elle peut . . . Je sais très bien qu'il n'est pas rare qu'il y ait des princes vertueux; mais je dis que, dans une monarchie, il est très difficile que le peuple le soit... Qu'on lise ce que les historiens de tous les temps ont dit sur la cour des monarques; qu'on se rappelle les conversations des hommes de tous les pays sur le misérable caractère des courtisans: ce ne sont point des choses de spéculation, mais d'une triste expérience. L'ambition dans l'oisiveté, la bassesse dans l'orgueil, le désir de s'enrichir sans travail, l'aversion pour la vérité, la flatterie, la trahison, la perfidie, l'abandon de tous ses engagements, le mépris des devoirs du citoyen, la crainte de la vertu du prince, l'espérance de ses faiblesses et plus que tout cela, le ridicule perpétuel jeté sur la vertu, forment, je crois, le caractère du plus grand

[15] See also *Moralphilosophie*, p. 234: "Die Verbindung der Bürger in freyen Staaten, kommt mehr von der Zuneigung her, die jeder gegen das gemeine Wesen hat, als von der im Staat errichteten Macht, die die Dienste desselben erzwingen könnte.

"In Monarchien, entsteht sie aus der Begierde, nach Ehrenstellen und Würden, um welche sich der einzelne Bürger bewirbt, indem er dem Staate dient.

"In despotischen Staaten entsteht sie ganz aus der Gewalt, die gerüstet ist, die Dienste des Volkes zu erzwingen."

nombre des courtisans, marqué dans tous les lieux et dans tous les temps. [*op. cit.*, Book III, Chapter V, pp. 255-256].

Taking into account Schiller's text and its ideological sources, we have to agree with Ayrault's conclusion. On the other hand, Posa's final words are inconsistent with the beginning of his confession, because they imply beyond any doubt a hope of constitutional monarchy:

> Sanftere
> Jahrhunderte verdrängen Philip's Zeiten;
> Die bringen mildre Weisheit; Bürgerglück
> Wird dann versöhnt mit Fürstengröße wandeln,
> Der karge Staat mit seinen Kindern geitzen,
> Und die Notwendigkeit wird menschlich seyn.
> (Lines 3150-55)
>
> ... Der Bürger
> Sey wiederum, was er zuvor gewesen,
> Der Krone Zweck—ihn binde keine Pflicht,
> Als seiner Brüder gleich ehrwürdige Rechte.
> Wenn nun der Mensch, sich selbst zurückgegeben,
> Zu seines Werths Gefühl erwacht—der Freyheit
> Erhabne, Stolze Tugenden gedeihen—
> Dann, Sire, wenn Sie zum glücklichsten der Welt
> Ihr eignes Königreich gemacht—dann ist
> Es Ihre Pflicht, die Welt zu unterwerfen.
> (Lines 3243-52)

If Posa idealistically tries to reconcile republican virtue with his vision of a constitutional monarchy, he does not completely contradict either Montesquieu[16] or Ferguson.[17]

The example of Elizabeth, who offers asylum to the Flemish political and religious refugees (*op. cit.*, lines 3172 ff.), also speaks in favor of constitutional monarchy.

The famous ideological "punch line" of the tragedy, "Geben Sie Gedankenfreyheit" (line 3215), may of course reflect a democratic regime in a republic as well as in a constitutional monarchy. The moment when Posa shifts from his republicanism to the recommendation of an enlightened liberalization of the kingdom comes just before: "Alle Könige Europas huldigen dem spanischen Namen. Gehen Sie Europas Königen voran. Ein Federzug von dieser Hand und neu erschaffen ist die Erde" (line 3211). This is by no means a hint that Philip should abdicate and relinquish power to the people. The royal adviser recom-

[16] "Tant il est vrai que la vertu n'est pas le ressort de ce gouvernement! Certainement elle n'en est point exclue; mais elle n'en est pas le ressort" (p. 256).

[17] *Versuch*, p. 107: "Regierungsformen kommen, in der That, durch viele und oft unmerkliche Stufen entweder wechselweise einander nahe ... oder sie weichen von einander ab."

mends the softening of absolutism and perhaps steps leading to a more liberal constitutionalism.

Posa's recommendation and the subsequent passages of Scene 10, which recalls Montesquieu's and Ferguson's definitions, support Lieder's point of view. In connection with Posa's shift in opinion, let us also remember the introduction to Scene 10. It is a short dialogue between Alba and Posa and a short monologue by Posa. The idealistic marquis is practical enough to find a grain of wisdom in the Machiavellian advice of Alba, who reminds Posa with ominous irony that he should not miss his chance to influence the king (line 2948). His fervent and determined advocacy of enlightened constitutionalism may have been directly inspired by the solemn finale of the *Institutions*, in which the freedom-loving Scot pleads with some pathos for a constitution worthy of free men.[18]

Posa's inconsistency can be explained in two different ways: Schiller either did not know "his Montesquieu" too accurately and confused two different notions, or his shift from republicanism to monarchism was deliberate. Perhaps Posa came to the king as a crypto-republican but, seeing that his contagious idealism could achieve some progress toward his ideal by inspiring a voluntary metamorphosis of the despotic monarch into a more humanitarian ruler, he decided to advocate a more practical, and to Philip more palatable, compromise.[19] The latter possibility is supported by Albert Kontz, not without some sarcasm:

> En politique, ses préférences paraissent être pour une monarchie modérée. Comme Montesquieu qui ne confond pas le "pouvoir du peuple avec la liberté du peuple" avec plus de sentimentalité et moins de précision, il appelle de ses vœux un souverain qui serait le premier chef ou le père de ses libres sujets. Posa donne à Philippe II ce conseil, qui aurait sans doute fait dresser les cheveux de l'un et tomber la tête de l'autre, "de devenir le maître d'un million de rois." En récompense, le souverain recueillera l'amour de ses heureux sujets, et son royaume se

[18] "Diejenigen Staatsverfassungen, welche die ursprüngliche Gleichheit der Menschen erhalten; den Geist der Bürger mit Ausübung öffentlicher Pflichten beschäftigen; die Menschen lehren, den Rang nach dem Unterschiede persönlicher Eigenschaften zu bestimmen, gereichen zur Erhaltung und Übung der Tugend...

"Verfassungen im Gegentheil, durch welche die Menschen ihrer Rechte beraubt ... von der Willkühr ihrer Obern abhängig gemacht werden; Verfassungen, bei welchen ... nur durch Zwang, und die Furcht der Strafe regieren, haben die Wirkung, in dem Souverain Tyranney and Übermuth in den Unterthanen einen sklavischen Geist und Niederträchtigkeit hervorzubringen; jedes Gesicht mit Blässe zu bedecken und jedes Herz mit Muthlosigkeit und Eifersucht zu erfüllen. Die größte und sich am weitesten erstreckende Wohltat, welche einzelne Menschen ihrem Geschlechte erweisen können, ist die Errichtung oder Erhaltung weiser Staatsverfassungen."

[19] Posa's ideological hesitation may have contributed to other controversial interpretations of this hero. See André v. Gronicka, "Friedrich Schiller's Marquis Posa," *GR*, XXVI, 196-214.

changera en paradis terrestre. Si Montesquieu avait lu cette fin d'un rêve de poète, s'il avait su que cette bergerie faisait suite à ses théories politiques, on devine quel sourire se fût dessiné sur les lèvres de ce fin Gascon [*op. cit.*, pp. 437-438].

Of course, Kontz does not seem to be aware that the more sober tidings of the "shrewd Gascon" were brought to the political *Schwärmer* by the more righteous radical Scot, whose somewhat too apodictic and pathetic maxims might have colored Schiller's political "pastoral" more than Montesquieu's more cautiously worded speculations.

Considering Schiller's familiarity with these sources, it is legitimate to seek Montesquieu's and Ferguson's influence, not only in *Don Carlos*, but especially in the play, *Die Verschwörung des Fiesko zu Genua*, dedicated to his teacher of political science, Professor Abel. This seems to be justified, first, by a political content much more intensive than that of *Don Carlos*, second, by the shorter lapse of time between Schiller's reading of Ferguson and the publication of *Fiesko*, and finally, perhaps to a certain extent by Schiller's youthful hesitancy concerning which of his three creative talents, poetry, theater, and political philosophy, should be most encouraged.[20] Ayrault observes the relation between *Fiesko* and *L'Esprit des lois*, and points out the analogy of the political problem as dramatized in the two plays:

Une étroite familiarité avec l'ensemble de ce système était déjà à l'arrière-plan de *Fiesco*. Non seulement Verrina était exactement le républicain selon Montesquieu, mais l'œuvre tout entière était plus particulièrement en ceci une "tragédie républicaine" [*op. cit.*, p. 235)].

This republican tragedy does not lend itself to many textual comparisons, since it is filled with melodramatic action rather than with contemplative monologues or theorizing dialogues. However, all the main characters and the whole plot stylize the struggle of the various types of regimes described by Montesquieu and Ferguson. And the dialogue returns again and again to this clash of the rival ideologies.[21]

[20] Reinhard Buchwald, *Schiller* (Leipzig, 1937), p. 19: "Hatte er doch eine Zeit lang geradezu daran gezweifelt, ob er überhaupt zum Dichter geboren sei ... Er hatte ernstlich gefragt, ob wirklich ein deutscher Sophokles oder nicht vielmehr ein deutscher Montesquieu in ihm steckte."

[21] *Schillers Werke* (Berlin, Leipzig, Vienna, Stuttgart, 1909), ed. Arthur Kutscher, *Die Verschwörung des Fiesko zu Genua*. "...und am Ende, wenn Genua bei der Gelegenheit frei wird, läßt sich Sacco Vater des Vaterlands taufen. Wärme mir einer das verdroschene Märchen von Redlichkeit auf, wenn der Bankerott eines Taugenichts und die Brunst eines Wohllüstlings das Glück eines Staates entscheiden!" (Act I, Sc. 3, p. 159). "Geh in die Hölle mit Deinem Republikaner! Der Zorn eines Vassallen und meine Liedenschaft!... Hat darum Herzog Andreas seine Narben geholt, in den Schlachten dieser Lumpenrepublikaner, daß sein Neffe die Gunst ihrer Kinder und Bräute erbetteln soll?" (Act I, Sc. 5, p. 162). "Werden vier Patrioten genug sein, Tyranney, die mächtige Hyder, zu stürzen?

Fiesko's fable, told to the people of Genoa, is an obvious imitation of the famous political parable with which Menenius Agrippa tempered the animosity of the Roman plebeians after their withdrawal to Mons Sacer. But in his Aesop-like fable Schiller echoes Montesquieu's and Ferguson's descriptions of the various political systems rather than the ancient political lesson.

In both versions of *Fiesko* as in *Don Carlos*, Schiller tries to show a way to a practical political ideal harmonious with both human dignity and the imperfections of human society. In *Don Carlos* the author limited the conflict to the criticism of a despotic government by an enlightened idealist. In *Fiesko*, the problem is not reduced merely to two types of regimes; here there is a thumbnail dramatization of the ruthless rivalry of various governmental systems: democratic republic, monarchy, two types of despotism, and even an aristocratic republic. The abstract precedents which describe the fragility and fluctuation of political systems as dramatized in *Fiesko* can be found both in Ferguson and in Montesquieu.[22] The political abstractions are reduced to an individual level in the persons of Verrina, Andreas Doria, Gianettino Doria, and the protagonist. Fiesko's moral conflict arises from the incompatibility of his hesitant republican virtue and the thirst for power

Werden wir nicht den Pöbel aufrühren, nicht den Adel zu unsrer Partei ziehen müssen?" (Act. I, Sc. 13, p. 175).

"Diese Doria müssen weg! Der Staat muß eine andere Form haben!" (Act II, Sc. 8, p. 186.)

[22] "Doch was die bloße Form betrifft, so treten Gesellschaften gar leicht aus einer Verfassung, in welcher jedes einzelne Mitglied ein gleiches Recht zu regieren hat, in eine andere über, wo einer so gut, als der andere zu dienen bestimmt ist. Einerlei Eigenschaften, Mut, Geschicklichkeit, Gunst des Volkes, und gutes Verhalten im Kriege erheben in beiden den Ergeitzigen zu einem vorzüglichem Range. Mit solchen Eigenschaften steigt der Bürger oder der Sklave mit leichter Mühe von den unteren Würden bis zu der Befehlshaberstelle eines Kriesheeres [*sic*]" (*Versuch*, p. 108). Ferguson's sources of these passages can be found especially in the twenty-one chapters of Book VIII of *L'Esprit des lois* entitled "De la Corruption des principes de trois gouvernements." Among the many statements enumerating the general or specific historical causes of political lability in various regimes, the following passages may be cited to illustrate the obvious connection of the three works: "Le principe de la démocratie se corrompt non seulement lorsqu'on perd l'esprit d'égalité ... Il ne peut plus y avoir de vertu dans la république" (Bk. VII, Ch. 2, p. 349). "La démocratie a donc deux excès à éviter: l'esprit d'inégalité, qui la mène à l'aristocratie, ou au gouvernement d'un seul; et l'esprit d'égalité extrême qui la conduit au despotisme d'un seul, comme le despotisme d'un seul finit par la conquête" (Bk. VIII, Ch. 2, p. 351). "Comme les démocraties se perdent lorsque le peuple dépouille le sénat, le magistrat et les juges de leurs fonctions, les monarchies se corrompent lorsqu'on ôte peu à peu les prérogatives des corps ou les privilèges des villes. Dans le premier cas on va au despotisme de tous; dans l'autre, au despotisme d'un seul" (Bk. VIII, Ch. 6, p. 354). "Les fleuves courent se mêler dans la mer: les monarchies vont se perdre dans le despotisme" (Bk. VII, Ch. 17, p. 364).

which provokes his attempt to become a despot. In Act II, Scene 19, he questions himself:

> Republicaner Fiesko? Herzog Fiesko?——Gemach—Hier ist der gähe Hintersturz, wo die Mark der Tugend sich schließt, sich scheiden Himmel und Hölle. Eben hier haben Helden gestrauchelt, und Helden sind gesunken und die Welt belegt ihren Namen mit Flüchen.

Each of the rival regimes in the tragedy is represented by one of the protagonists: republic by Verrina and by a headless mass, monarchy by Andreas Doria, and a budding tyranny by Fiesko. Gianettino Doria, the prince-to-be, personifies a degenerate despotic monarch.

Each of these characters has attributes indicated by Montesquieu and Ferguson as typical of the moral and social climate of the three types of government. Later indirect characterizations in the play basically confirm Montesquieu's scheme. The republic, with separate powers and individual freedoms, conserved by the spirit of political virtues, frugality and love of equality, is represented by the venerable, puritanical old man, Verrina. To make his portrait parallel with Montesquieu's and Ferguson's image of a republican, it would be enough to change the word "Ehre" in Act I, Scene II, to "Tugend."

Andreas is a symbol of the dignified tradition of a monarchy preserved by respect for political honor. The "tükisch hofgeschmeidig" Fiesko is the prototype of a rather Machiavellian hero—a more vigorous dictator than Gianettino. But both these potential tyrants tend to get hold of power unscrupulously and excite fear. Andreas tries to keep the steering wheel for his nephew, relying on his own merits and statesmanship and on the code of honor of his noble subjects. Gianettino is eager to grasp power because he is a self-complacent weakling and the role of the most powerful man in the state appeals to his vanity, Fiesko because he is ambitious and capable and because he loves power, and Verrina because he loves freedom and is afraid of the despotism which might follow Andreas Doria's death. Naturally, Verrina does not seek power for himself but wants to overthrow the regime to protect individual freedom.

The technique with which Fiesko prepares his *coup d'état* indicates Schiller's fundamental political erudition and his interest in the sources and application of political powers. Schiller may have found in Ferguson's *Essay* various recipes for political revolution which contributed to the political tendency of the tragedy.[23]

The solution of the first version of *Fiesko* (1782) is somewhat similar

[23] Especially in Part III, Sec. 2, entitled "The History of Political Establishments."

to the shift from republicanism to the cause of a constitutional monarchy in *Don Carlos*. Verrina joins forces with Fiesko to prevent Gianettino from becoming a despotic doge. But, realizing the scope of Fiesko's power and political goals, Verrina kills the would-be tyrant and remains loyal to Andreas, thus choosing the lesser of two evils. The development of the plot reflects a Machiavellian Jesuitism rather than Montesquieu's liberalism. The colorfully romantic method used to dispose of both champions of despotism, Gianettino and Fiesko, expresses Schiller's own radical formula for getting rid of any kind of tyrant.

The second version of *Fiesko* (adapted for the theater in 1784) has a happy ending. Fiesko and Verrina are reconciled forever when Fiesko gives up his autocratic tastes; the hero proclaims Genoa a free state and himself the happiest citizen in it. In Fiesko's great moral conflict his virtue proves stronger than his thirst for power. This republican happy ending clearly emphasizes the fact that Schiller is a republican at heart. The second solution is more in harmony with Montesquieu's theory that small states tend to the republican regime and the large to despotism (the Spanish empire under Philip). The same theory is expressed in the *Essay* (p. 193).

The third, more recently published, version of 1786 combines the tragic ending of the first version with the uncompromising republicanism of the second. Verrina kills Fiesko and surrenders as a murderer to the justice of the Genoese citizens. Such a climax is closer to Ferguson's political pathos than to Montesquieu's generally less subjective evaluation of political regimes.

To summarize Montesquieu's influence on Schiller's early dramatic works, we may draw the following conclusions:

Schiller became thoroughly familiar with *L'Esprit des lois* only while writing the tenth letter on *Don Carlos*, about one year after the completion of the play; earlier he knew the French classic unquestionably from his reading of Ferguson's *Essay* and *Institutions*.

Ferguson's radical republicanism influenced Schiller's political orientation at least as much as did the more reserved views of Montesquieu.

The political tendency of both *Fiesko* and *Don Carlos* is the apotheosis of what Schiller considered the dignified political ideal of a free man. Posa's and Verrina's ideal was the democratic republic which appealed to Ferguson's bold antimonarchism. An acceptable compromise for Posa and Verrina, and probably for Schiller, was a constitutional monarchy similar to the British government, much admired by Montesquieu.

Posa's political hesitations have led many scholars to interpret the hero as a monarchist; others see in him a republican. Yet it seems he

was both—his daring, utopian dreams were democratic and republican; his final practical adjustment to the historical situation was monarchic. Such an attitude somewhat resembles Montesquieu's own sober feelings about government.

The parts of Schiller's works in which Montesquieu's and Ferguson's thoughts are deeply rooted form one of the pillars of the German author's creation—his political *noesis,* his idea of the state and power, and his concept of freedom and justice. Because of the importance of these notions throughout Schiller's life, it would be of great interest to trace Montesquieu's and Ferguson's influence upon Schiller's later works and upon the tradition of political thought common to France, Great Britain, and Germany.

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The Waste Land and Contemporary Japanese Poetry

IN POSTWAR Japan, one of the most read and the most often discussed Western poets is T. S. Eliot. In spite of their unusual difficulty, his poetry and his poetic drama have attracted the attention of those who are interested in poetry, and stimulated, as in other countries, many young poets to attempt the Eliotian style.

It is said that there are about two thousand poets and more than two hundred poetry magazines in Japan today. Roughly speaking, the poets are divided into five groups: (1) a group publishing the magazine, *Vou,* under the flag of new humanism; (2) *Jikan* (time), with neorealism as their motto, trying to depict the gap between reality and the socialistic ideal as simply as possible; (3) the Communist group; (4) *Rekitei* (progress), mixing Chinese Han poetry and the traditional Japanese lyric, and (5) *Arechi* (waste land).

This last group, including about twenty poets, concerns us here. I shall attempt to indicate what Eliot's waste land of Western civilization has to do with the waste land of postwar Japan, and how these Japanese poets have reacted to Eliot's poems. A limiting difficulty is the fact that the materials for this study available in America include only two volumes of *Arechi,* both published in 1953, and a small *Anthology of Modern Japanese Poetry,* published in 1957, which contains some poems by the *Arechi* writers. Another difficulty arises from the fact that we are dealing with comparatively young men whose permanent place as poets is still in question. This study can be, therefore, only an introductory note.

More than half the pages of *Arechi* are devoted to poems, occasionally including poetic dramas, the rest to critical essays on poetry and art. One of the volumes contains a complete translation of Eliot's *The Waste Land* (there have been three complete Japanese translations of this poem). The titles of the poems published suggest the nature of *Arechi* poetry: "The Age of Illusion," "Empty City," "To a Precipice," "Winter," "Inside and Outside." Their common characteristic is a poignant consciousness of the waste all over the land of Japan and over the whole world. Most *Arechi* poems are tinged with pessimism and desperation, and loaded with images of waste and the petty and hard daily life of postwar Japan.

Why should T. S. Eliot's poetry fascinate postwar Japanese poets? The Western poets who appeal to the taste of poetry lovers in Japan are principally French—Verlaine, Valéry, Rimbaud, Baudelaire; Rilke is also a favorite. English poetry is not very popular except among students of English literature in the universities—though Wordsworth, Shelley, and Browning inspired many of the Japanese poets in the quickening period of modern Japanese poetry, as they freed themselves from the traditional *tanka* form into free verse style only half a century ago. Today, Eliot is an exception—partly, perhaps, because of a certain French quality or savor in his poems.

More important, however, has been his image and idea of the "waste land"—an image that could not help but have a great impact on the people of postwar Japan. The country itself was the very picture of a waste land—Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Tokyo, destroyed miserably, lying in cinders. Eliot's crystallized image of the spiritual sterility of Western civilization, in *The Waste Land,* was reflected, after twenty years, literally and physically in the sterility of Hiroshima:

> What are the roots that clutch, what branches grow
> Out of the stony rubbish?

"Sacrifice" by Kōichi Kihara is one of many "waste land" poems about Hiroshima. It is a fairly long poem, written in the form of dramatic dialogue and chorus.

> CHORUS
>
> In that one moment
> When the flow of all the rivers was dammed up,
> In that one moment
> When the sun kept away from the soil of Men,
> At that one moment,
> Moment when the world was shut up in a flash
> of phosphorescence!

WOUNDED WOMAN

This unknown thing
That has burnt my hair!
This unknown thing
That has penetrated my tender skin!
Another sun
I have never seen till now!

My guts were torn one by one,
Became birds and flew away.
My nerves were melted one by one,
Became fishes and flowed away . . .

YOUNG GIRL

A drop of water gathered in a tiny leaf
A spoonful of water left in a bird-dish
The last drop from a water-tap
I know I shall die if I drink water, yet
I want water for I want to die . . .

WOUNDED WOMAN

In this dead desert
What sin have men committed?
On this dead desert
What punishment have men received?

Men can kill enemies
By the act of their own hands
But men cannot punish sinners
By the act of their own hands.

YOUNG MAN

It is the token
That man's hand reached the unknown womb
Where every life is born
Where every substance burns to cinders.

It is the first sign
That the hand of Man has created an unknown order
destroying the order of God
In the core of everything
In the last state of all that live.[1]

It is the proof of what Eliot sang in *The Rock:*

The cycles of Heaven in twenty centuries
Bring us farther from God and nearer to the Dust.

For people left among the cinders of sterility, even the sound of the words "waste land" was enough to provoke poetic images and ideas. The words also provoked in them a poignant sense of despair, but their

[1] Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are by the author.

spiritual experience was still too immature for any solution. They cannot say as Eliot could say:

> Pray for us sinners now and at the hour of our death
> Pray for us now and at the hour of our death.

Toyoichirō Miyoshi, one of the *Arechi* poets, attempts to present the picture of the waste land with grotesque imagery—toads, ravens, giant crabs, vultures, broken and lifeless metallic tools and machines, which can produce a peculiar effect of heaviness and horror when written in Chinese characters; his verse loses much of its effect in English. The following is a part of one of Miyoshi's poems, called "Variation":

> In winter, not even a drop of water
> is found
> in this territory devastated and covered with shrouds,
> She has no saliva, no blood, no dream.
>
> Feet bound round in bandage, arms of rasp, necks of steel,
> heads of mantises,
> Dead branches of nails, dry herbs of thin hair, brains that
> are collapsed.

The tone of Miyoshi's poems is gloomy and nihilistic, though he knows that "now is the time of ordeal"; his despair does not lead him to any personal solution. Among Japanese poets, however, whose thoughts are so much penetrated by Oriental naturalism, despair often leads to a quiet philosophic view about the vanity of the world, in which everything changes with the rhythm of nature. So Miyoshi's poem goes from the landscape of winter to that of spring:

> The wheels of season run in the midst of the sand
> Till spring puts blooming grass on the bare region of hills.
>
> Horizon is filled with birds' song
> In the sky open eyes of countless hidden tongues and lips.
>
> As the light increases, the shadow recedes, and
> Soon in the desert spring will recover her torn wings.

This might seem a song of hope, but the hope itself is not really vital; for there is an undercurrent of anticipation of the coming again of winter. The final tone is a kind of resignation, which is at once romantic and Oriental. And it should be noted that the tone and imagery of these stanzas have much in common with the traditional Japanese *tanka,* in which we often feel a deep sense of the evanescence of the world.

The same kind of feeling is expressed in Masao Nakagiri's poem, "Chorus"—a chorus by two Japanese men, A and B, who have come

back from the war in the South Sea, with "hearts swollen like legs suffering from beriberi." Tokyo is the cactus land of the hollow men!

> This is a desert city, town of scorching heat,
> where hopes and despairs
> appear and disappear
> like mirages,
> and people go looking for a phantom stick to lean on,
> staggering
> even in the faintest wind.
> (Translated by I. Kōno and R. Fukuda.)

They are at once "alive" and "dead" like the speaker in Eliot's "The Burial of the Dead." They must, however, "keep their empty work— / so long as the quiet flame is not burnt out." This is resignation—the past loaded with dear memories, the present empty, and the future without hope.

Nakagiri follows Eliot more closely than any other Japanese poet. "Death and Love," a rather long poem in five parts, is an entwined meditation upon the two themes of death and love. As the poet meditates upon his dead lover, a voice answers, like the voice of Tiresias, who has experienced all and knows all that will happen in the future.

> Thrice was I reborn
> Well I know, turning, turning over in my mind
> All the laws of the world (are in my bosom)
> What has happened and what will be happening
> "Of any circle, the center is only a point
> It is only the circumference that changes"
> My home was where the summer stars glitter
> To Asia I went with Noah in his Ark
> I saw with these eyes the fall of Sodom and Gomorrah
> (Where ashes I found inside of the beautiful apples growing there) ...

The voice is omniscient both in time and space; the fires of Tokyo and Troy are the same fire—which, of course, is the echo of Eliot's concept that all wars are the same for human experience. The speaker in "The Burial of the Dead" cries: "Stetson! / You who were with me in the ships at Mylae!" The prophetic voice in "Death and Love" tells how death was first brought into the world according to Indian myth, how, with the creation of night and day, which is change, we lost the sense of eternity and eternal love, and with it certainty and belief in life. Then time shifts to the present; the poet is on a crowded bus one evening in Tokyo.

> An MP's jeep dashing through a haze of spring night
> driven by a handsome young man with a shapely nose

steam of buns from a bun-shop, smell of the second-hand books
a night-school student with shabby shoes
streetcars run on the usual track
stop here and there and pick up more passengers than before
through the seven-storied Nonomiya Apartment House to Yasukuni Shrine
small belly of a dead rat
drifting in the gutter
  "Make room, please, move toward the back,
  Make room, please"
Drift away, please . . .

I am clinging to a strap and all of a sudden in front of me
the voices from these men with broken front teeth grow louder
famu fam camu
fam famu faf faf
middle aged man beside me dropped a pencil in alarm
dropped a memo-book
dropped
eternal repetition
at the terminal everyone off with an indifferent air
born and die
make money and lose it
love and have children
O eternal repetition of seasons
on the window of a flower-shop
is written SAY IT WITH FLOWERS
on a shoeshine box in the plaza
is written SHOE SHINE. I AM DEAF.
time-casting sounds and a radio saying
  "For your ears the best music
  and for your throats the best beer . . ."
their throats are tombs that lie open
they go from death unto death.

Stream of consciousness is always effective for the expression of the monotony and the pettiness of daily life. The image of a rat echoes T. S. Eliot. The line, "dropped a memo-book," succeeds admirably in presenting the image of an empty man.

One part of the poem is called "Gathering of Ghosts." The ghosts are those of new ideals for the future utopia, lingering in Europe. Communism seems to Nakagiri a force that denies and oppresses the significance of individual existence for the sake of national glory. Yet before our eyes stretch the lands of vast waste.

Unforgotten songs of the forgotten soldiers
What is said by many a voice
Between the sunset and coffee—
  Night will freeze soon
  Tomorrow is the first day of December

Stars will freeze soon
Will be blown out by dawn
Can't read books any more
We only pray
Young deer can't jump any more
We only stand and wait
Cried "Life!" and
Came back the echo "Death"
A big man, an owner of a big factory,
Beat him with a big hammer,
A small man, a father of a small child,
Was fired because of a small slip;
Yes, such things happen one afternoon,
Have happened and will happen again.
I studied classics at Marlborough and at Merton
But it did not help me to build a house of my own.
Do you know Mr. Lowell?
He comes sneaking into my bedroom . . .

So, we see darkness in their eyes,
Under a black umbrella they live their lives,
Insects and birds,
Cold life of fish-blood they live,
Poverty of the windy rainy night,
Of the rainy snowy night.
How much, how much did you pay for your tie?
How much, how much did you pay for the War and Inflation?
Heroes are dead, raindrops are broken,
O, the world is torn,
Under the black umbrella.

Nakagiri's long poem, like many *Arechi* poems, is pessimistic, and, compared with the tough, richly compact style of Eliot, more lyrical and loose. Parallels with Eliot appear in the broken images of desert, stone, heartless spring, etc., as well as in such technical devices as stream of consciousness, dialogue form, and choruses. Though the originality of Nakagiri and other *Arechi* poets might be questioned, their attempts are still of interest. Still young, they reveal their earnest search for something new and significant. Because Japanese poetry still has much to learn about technique, form, and the rhythm of the language, any experiment is precious. Although *tanka* and *haiku,* which require the most compressed kind of imagery, have for the Japanese an eternal classic beauty, we are nonetheless in search of new forms of poetry in which we can express the nature and feeling of our own life today.

Poetic drama is Japan's classic traditional art—the Noh play, with its choruses, poetic language, and highly abstract setting, which are often compared to Greek drama. Today Japanese poets are striving to

bring the art of the Noh play into our own age—to bridge the wide gap between the tradition of the feudal ages and the literary taste and needs of the twentieth century. T. S. Eliot's theory and achievements in poetic drama are for these poets an inspiring stimulus.

As would be expected, when creative minds have absorbed all that they can use, a reaction against the Eliotian way of writing poetry is already evident among the *Arechi* poets. Nobuo Ayukawa, for instance, tries to bypass the problem of artistic technique and to grapple more directly with the reality of daily life. He hopes to revive the meaning of poetic language by a consideration of the poet's attitude toward life. For him, Eliot's despair in *The Waste Land* over the ruin of European civilization as a whole is after all a despair over nothing particular and concrete. And a despair with no particular object has nothing to say of the life of Japan, out of which Japanese despair is born. Ayukawa has a strong concern for the tradition and civilization of his own country, and emphasizes poetic materials selected from Japanese experiences. The following is from his "Diary on a Hospital Ship":

> It is far easier to make dead soldiers
> Rise from death than to meet
> Resurrection of God in a gilt-edged book.
> Countless soldiers
> Died time after time
> And rose from death time after time.
> (So long as there are promises
> Of sacred words and strange rewards
> Which we can never receive—)
>
> Soldiers who die
> And revive time after time
> Will march in endless rows through centuries
> On lands and seas.
>
> For soldiers who die but rise again,
> Destruction of Mankind is negligible.
> For how much more you would destroy,
> The ultimate sum is the same "one."

The poet watched a soldier die "one night of May in 1944 . . .":

> Cursing the war
> He passed away.
> In a cabin on a hospital ship sailing on the East China Sea
> Refusing all the rewards from God
> He passed away forever.
>
> (Ah, humanity!
> This beautiful soldier
> Will never rise again)

In some country far way
His noble death is kept
In a gold-rimmed book
On which falls a soft voice praying
Of a meek lady with gentle hands.

The poem ends with the following stanzas:

Outside of the cruel history,
Are the gray seas
And the gray sky.
Embracing us closely
Is the mist of the distant, future country of our own.

Undercurrent of the sea,
Rocking the wounded soldiers to sleep,
Went slowly toward the land.

Evaluation of the work of the *Arechi* poets is still hazardous. It may be hoped that they will move beyond their Oriental pessimism and their despair, as Eliot moved from *The Waste Land* to *Ash-Wednesday*. However, it cannot be expected that they will reach this maturity through Christianity or Communism; the *Arechi* poets are humanistic and have no sympathy with Christianity or Communist politics.

But, whatever their future, they have contributed to Japanese poetry new rhythms, realistic images, a haunting melancholy, a deep though pessimistic faith in humanity—all through the stimulus of Eliot's *The Waste Land*.

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BOOK REVIEWS

PAUL VALÉRY: LA JEUNE PARQUE. Manuscrit autographe, texte de l'édition de 1942, états successifs et brouillons inédits du poème. Présentation et étude critique des documents par Octave Nadal. Paris: Le Club du Meilleur Livre, 1957. 461 p.

Professor Octave Nadal of the Sorbonne has studied Paul Valéry's *La Jeune Parque* from the first *brouillons* through the final manuscript corrections. The resulting volume is a work of primary importance not only for Valéryans but also for students of the French symbolist movement and those interested in the ways in which the creative mind works. Valéry preserved over five hundred work sheets relevant to *La Jeune Parque,* from the earliest word doodlings through half a dozen progressive versions of the poem. In the hands of Professor Nadal, these unique documents are made the basis of one of the most complete and revealing studies ever undertaken of the genesis of a poem.

The edition includes a reproduction of the hitherto unedited final manuscript of the poem, which differs in several passages from the version which appeared in the first printed edition; transcriptions of six earlier drafts of the poem, beginning with a first version of 232 lines (the completed poem has 512) in which Valéry brought together the various fragments of the poem on which he had been working separately but simultaneously for several years; and photographic reproductions of sixty of Valéry's work sheets from various stages of the poem's conception and development. The study of the manuscript progress of the poem illuminates many questions of interpretation, revealing the original motif of the poem, the chronological structure, the comparatively late elaboration of the female figure of the Parque herself, and the much-debated question of the titling of the finished poem. Professor Nadal also traces the development of several of the individual themes —the *serpent,* the *printemps,* among others—from their first appearance through their final elaboration in the completed poem.

Through his long and privileged acquaintance with *La Jeune Parque,* Professor Nadal is able to speak with authority, in an essay prefacing the study of the documents proper, on the question of the interpretation of Valéry's poem. Not that he abuses his position as the poem's biographer to force any one specific narrow view upon the reader; but the poem has often been considered much more ambiguous, indecipherable, or even meaningless, in any sense other than musical, than it really is. Professor Nadal clears away much of the obfuscation, which has been contributed more by the critics of the poem than by the poem itself.

It is a commonplace that the subject of *La Jeune Parque,* as of all of Valéry's work, is the "conscience de la conscience." Professor Nadal's main thesis is that this, for Valéry, is an essentially tragic condition, and that the poem takes on a certain very real dramatic character from just this basic tragedy of the situation of the consciousness. As Professor Nadal writes:

"On a fait porter l'accent sur l'épopée ou sur l'odysée de la conscience, bien rarement sur la tragédie qui en marque l'éveil. L'insondable accident que rappelle *La*

Jeune Parque ne me semble pas celui d'un désaccord de nous au monde, d'un conflit entre l'événement humain et le sort—qu'il s'agisse du fatal ou du sacré. Ni même essentiellement d'un conflict de nous à nous-mêmes. Mais ceci: à la pointe où l'être s'éprouve, se cherche, se veut, se sait—et peut-être s'invente—l'idée même d'être, ce haut désir d'une figure entière de la connaissance nous prive, en s'efforçant de se réaliser, de la pléntitude et même de la simple joie d'être."

Thus the tragedy of the Parque's consciousness becomes that of an irresolvable schism between *être* and *connaître,* to use Professor Nadal's terms. Consciousness, self-reflection, "narcissism" lead to a state of awareness of being where the mind, abstracted from the body and the simple state of existing, is no longer able to take the natural pleasure in simply being that is the source of all pure joy in life. Seen in this way, the poem becomes a series of attempts of the Parque to elucidate this schism in her being and recapture her primitive joy in life.

Professor Nadal believes that the various solutions of her tragic situation which the Parque proposes to herself are, finally, unsatisfactory and unable to provide the illumination she requires or to restore her to her state of innocent (not-conscious) enjoyment. He concludes that the poem ends on a hardly concealed note of false optimism, after the Parque's thought has proceeded in a near circle and ended leaving her near the position in which she had been before the opening of her self-questionings:

"La verticale finale—la vierge de sang debout, les yeux dans le soleil, ne peut nous cacher l'imminence du crépuscule, l'invasion et le règne de l'ombre ainsi que le tourment de la conscience une fois l'élan vital retombé."

Professor Nadal cogently points out that there is a "malgré moi-même" and an "il faut" in the concluding lines of the poem where the Parque, caught in the immense élan of the rising of the sun, throws off the questions and the temptations of death which have assailed her and accepts again her physical life. However, without minimizing the value of this study, one may here enter the objection that the position of the Parque is perhaps different at the end of the poem than it was before her orgy of self-questioning, and that this difference is the progress that she has made in conscious—Testeian—knowledge of her self and particularly of the dark world of the subconscious within her. Her former existence as the *Harmonieuse MOI* had been one of ignorance of the nature of the world and of her own self. The temptation to suicide through immersion in the sea of the unconscious and of nonexistence, which was the most threatening concomitant of the separation of consciousness from existence, has been overcome. With her survival of her ordeal, the Parque at the end of the poem reaccepts her individual physical life, no longer in the state of unawareness in which she had previously existed, but fortified and deepened through greater awareness. The conclusion of the poem is the rebirth of the Parque into a new, more complete, more conscious existence, under the light of the sun of the physical world and her own awakened individual consciousness.

Professor Nadal revealingly remarks on the constant equivalence throughout the poem of interior and exterior states, the identification of subjective and objective. This is the key to the Valéryan usage of symbolism. Valéry returned to poetry after his long "silence" because, in writing *La Jeune Parque,* he had discovered that poetry could be a useful tool in the attempt of man to build understanding of the world. Valéry was not, like Mallarmé, trying to create a new poetic world where only the laws of poetic intuition would apply, nor was he, like the twentieth-century English symbolist novelists and poets, trying to make the sub-

jective the only valid world. Nor was he of the Hermetic school, seeking to establish "correspondences" between the world of man and the world above man—"as above, so below." The correspondences in Valéry are between the two real, observable worlds of microcosm and macrocosm, and are thus a constant attempt to bridge the division between subjective and objective. Professor Nadal remarks of *La Jeune Parque:*

"La correspondance tacite, en profondeur, de l'univers à l'être reste toujours présente, exprimée ou suggérée: sommeils du monde, nuit et lever d'astres, aube, printemps, silence et rumeur de la mer, autant d'analogies des calmes et des houles de l'âme, de ses élans et de ses abandons, de ses tendresses et de ses fureurs. Heureuse ou désespérée, l'âme demeure liée au texte du monde."

The constant attempt to establish relationships between the soul and the world is the contribution of the genius of poetry to the Valéryan investigation of the world, of the search for "la loi de continuité" which Valéry had earlier defined as the essence of the "method" of a Leonardo.

The study of the work sheets of *La Jeune Parque,* by providing glimpses of rare intimacy into the genesis of the poem, throws new light on the question of "poésie pure" and the Valéryan critique of "inspiration." In the work sheets we see the poet working through a process which Professor Nadal characterizes as that of the "palette." It is very much as if Valéry were spreading words on paper the way a painter spreads colors on his palette before beginning to paint. The composition proceeds first from words themselves, only later from ideas. The words are first grouped by sound and sense without any attempt to form them into sentences, and are then combined and contrasted to bring out their latent richnesses of sound and meaning. The development of themes and images derives from the sound and sense of individual words or groups of words, sometimes from phrases. Gradually the skeletons of lines and sentences begin to appear. Rhyme schemes often but not always form first of all and are later built up into complete lines and passages. Thousands of false starts and experiments go fruitless, but gradually phrases and lines build up. These are revised over and over again. Themes are suggested by the words or simply by the search for rhyme schemes. At a later stage, passages demanded by the progression of the poem to fill out a section or develop a theme are improvised. Schemas, directed searchings for words, sounds, and phrases to create or fill out some theme which has been suggested by the progression of words according to sound and meaning, appear on the work sheets. For example, the conclusion of the famous passage of the *Harmonieuse MOI* as it appeared in the finished poem

> "Si ce n'est, ô Splendeur, qu'à mes pieds l'Ennemie,
> Mon ombre! la mobile et la souple momie,
> De mon absence peinte effleurait sans effort
> La terre où je fuyais cette légère mort . . .
> Sur la poudre qui danse, elle glisse et n'irrite
> Nul feuillage, mais passe, et se brise partout . . ."

had its origin in this brief schema on Valéry's work sheet:

> "Definition de l'ombre
> fonction de la lumière
> Est; n'est pas; diminue, que dit diminue
> Suit l'être—transforme et brise
> Sans effort."

Professor Nadal presents transcriptions or reproductions of many more detailed outlines which Valéry used in filling out and developing themes such as *Harmonieuse MOI,* the *serpent,* and the *sommeil.* These usually begin with phrases developing according to word and idea associations, sometimes but not always with possible rhyme schemes indicated, never at first formed into complete alexandrines. Rudimentary forms of some of the final verses appear. In elaborating the theme of the Parque's *sommeil,* Valéry began with a prose note defining the nature and purpose of the action; then jotted an outline with such headings as *fatigue, désintérêt, confusion,* etc.; and then began to build with words and phrases suggested by this outline—only much later approaching the formal poetic lines of the alexandrine.

The method of composition apparent in the work sheets of *La Jeune Parque* exemplifies what Valéry meant when he denied the accepted notion of poetic inspiration. Valéry endeavored in all mental activity to expand as much as possible the workings of the conscious mind and to reduce the importance of the unconscious, that is, to make unconscious processes conscious. But, as T. S. Eliot has remarked, he was no more able than any other poet to explain completely why and when his words came to him, and to this extent he never denied "inspiration." What he did do was to remove the mystery from "inspiration" by turning it into an observable exercise of a trained mind proceeding systematically. Valéry wrote in the "Introduction à la méthode de Léonard de Vinci" that all great creations, in art or in any other field of human endeavor, could be rationally explained by understanding the functioning of the mind that produced them. New ideas and creations occur to the creative mind through the perception of relationships which the ordinary person does not notice; the superior, creative mind is the one which has trained itself to find these relationships which are overlooked by the mass of men. Valéry bore these precepts in mind when he wrote *La Jeune Parque.* In the careful, conscious, and long procedure by contrast, comparison, and development from the words and themes themselves, Valéry used his language as a tool to reach his most penetrating discoveries about his thought and relationships with the world.

The work sheets also reveal much of what Valéry meant by "poésie pure"—and why, with his insistence on composing with words, not ideas, his poetry becomes as dense with carefully nurtured thought as any in French or Western literature. Clearly "poetry without thought" was not what Valéry meant by "poésie pure." It was methodical thought—what he considered "philosophical thought"—that Valéry considered incompatible with poetry. He did believe that a poem should not *start* with thought—that to begin with ideas was to begin with prose (an idea he received, of course, from Mallarmé); but that is clearly a different thing from saying that ideas and thought must be kept out of poetry. The beginning is with words, and it is the words which suggest the ideas which will bind them together into lines and passages. Valéry thought of the mind as a flow of thought progressing by constant modulation of ideas; and a poem such as *La Jeune Parque* or "Le Cimetière marin," where the poet attempts to reproduce the state of a mind, becomes a word reproduction of the modulations of thought. In this sense the poems contain thought, not ideas—which is to say, ideas constantly in movement, never ideas stabilized or strictly contained and defined, as are the sort of ideas with which philosophers attempt to construct their philosophies or logical systems.

Professor Nadal finds the embryo of what was to become *La Jeune Parque* in the theme of the *larme.* This survived in the finished poem in the opening lines

("Qui pleure là . . . ") and in the later section of the questioning of the tear ("Je n'implorerai plus que tes faibles clartés . . . "). The source of the idea of the tear itself was apparently the project of a poem on the theme of Helen; this must have been the poem which Valéry felt impelled to undertake, as a sort of farewell to poetry, when confronted by Gide and Gallimard with his early poems and the project to reprint them in book form. The sketch for the "Hélène" which Professor Nadal has found among the work sheets outlines a Helen bemoaning the fact that, though so beautiful to others, she has never seemed beautiful to herself. It is a reverse of the Narcissus theme—Helen loved by others, wanting instead to love herself, but finding herself unmoved by her own beauty. The Helen of Valéry's sketch observes herself in a mirror and finds tears in her eyes, tears of which she does not understand the origin:

> "Hélène belle pour les autres
> Heureuse si
> Que me font ces cheveux je ne cherche que la nuit
> (une ligne illisible)
> Je ne suis admirée que pour mon parfum
> Etre belle pour soi. Que me font ces regards, ces soupirs, désirs
> Si je me vois au miroir, des larmes me viennent d'ou?
> Mais plus belle on me trouve en larmes et on m'arrache
> On me fait souffrir pour les faire couler
> Qui pleure?
> Qui . . . . . "

On the same work sheet, apparently growing directly from his sketch of an "Hélène," follow these lines:

> "Qui pleure encor, sinon le vent simple, à cette heure
> Seule aux diamants toute
> Seule avec diamants sans cause? Mais qui pleure
> séparés
> Seule et de diamants disposés?"

This sketch, removed from the subject of Helen, became a nameless allegory of thought, and was slowly elaborated into the opening lines of *La Jeune Parque*. The theme of the *larme* itself, as the reflection of the interior drama of the girl, was held aside to be taken up later in accordance with the gradually developing arrangement of themes and modulations of thought.

In one of the early versions of the poem, Professor Nadal finds the conclusion to be on the theme of the suicide, which was later moved toward the center of the poem (to become the section concluding with line 324: "Terre trouble, et mêlée à l'algue, porte-moi!"). This change leads Professor Nadal to see the poem as divided, structurally, into a diptych, with the suicide passage representing the conclusion of the first section of the Parque's reflections.

Professor Nadal is able to date the composition of various sections of the poem with reasonably certainty, and to trace the comparatively late filling out of the figure of the Parque herself and the addition of the more sensuous passages. Among other titles which he finds that Valéry affixed to his poem at different stages of its composition are "Hélène," "Larme," "Pandore," "La Seule Parque," and "L'Aurore." The final title, although definitively determined only when the poem

was in press in March 1917, was one which Valéry had been already considering as early as a year before.

A study such as Professor Nadal's arouses an inevitable feeling of frustration in the reader, who naturally wishes that he might have in front of him the entire document for his own perusal. But there is no doubt of the reliability of Professor Nadal as explorer and reporter of the trail of the poem's creation. For those of us who do not have access to the complete document, this study and the versions and work sheets of *La Jeune Parque* transcribed and reproduced provide a primary source for the study of Valéry.

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ALBERT CAMUS: A STUDY OF HIS WORK. By Philip Thody. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1957. 155 p.

ALBERT CAMUS: THE INVINCIBLE SUMMER. By Albert Maquet. Translated from the French by Herma Briffault. New York: George Braziller, 1958. 224 p.

THE THOUGHT AND ART OF ALBERT CAMUS. By Thomas Hanna. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1958. 204 p.

ALBERT CAMUS AND THE LITERATURE OF REVOLT. By John Cruickshank. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959. 249 p.

CAMUS. By Germaine Brée. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1959. 275 p.

In these studies the reader is offered a veritable smörgasbord of critical fare, so marked is the variety of treatment and style. The five books may be distinguished as expository-synoptic (Hanna and Maquet), analytic-evaluative (Thody and Cruickshank), and descriptive-evaluative (Brée).

Taking his cue from an earlier essay by the empiricist A. J. Ayer (*Horizon*, March 1946), Philip Thody analyzes the weaknesses of absurdism, but praises Camus for the rigorous consistency of his position, given the premises, and for his repudiation of the mystic "leap" (the term with which Camus reproves his existentialist contemporaries in *The Myth of Sisyphus*). Especially in his Chapter VII, "Achievement and Limitations," Thody attempts a considered evaluation which, without blinking the defects in the logic of *The Myth* and *The Rebel*, arrives at an essentially positive appreciation of Camus' achievement as a whole. Camus' "conversion" to the new humanism is said to have begun in 1945, and is marked by an emphasis on empiricism, tolerance, and relativity, and by an affirmation of respect for the individual. After his fine first chapter on *The Stranger*, Thody presents cogent analyses of the major works from *The Myth* through *The Rebel*, with a close criticism of *The Rebel* as history and philosophy. In "The Creative Revival" (Chapter VI) Thody maintains that by 1955 Camus had made a "complete reversal" of attitude since 1942, that he regarded literature less as a protest against life than as a "deeper understanding" of it. Although *The Fall* is interpreted as a satiric attack on the idea of universal guilt (the guilt complex of our time) and the despicable uses to which it can be put, Thody cannot resist at least tentative identifications of Camus with Clamence; he saves himself from the bio-

graphical fallacy by insisting that Camus' irony divorces author from character. Similarly, after an excellent detailed analysis of *Exile and the Kingdom,* in which Thody stresses the themes of isolation (exile) and reconciliation (kingdom), he insists that this work is "first and foremost a set of exercises in the technique of story-telling . . . " A "Supplementary Note" discusses Camus' 1957 essay on the guillotine in relation to his humanist perspective.

Like Thody, Albert Maquet traces the evolution in Camus of a philosophy of "comprehension," which goes beyond nihilistic absurdism in its "search for eternal truth" and in its reliance on "the true revolt," "the true healer," and "hope." Conscientious as he is, however, in his analysis of *Le Malentendu* and the three novels, especially the symbolism and style of *The Stranger,* Maquet's criticism consists mainly of a synoptic, rapid survey of each work, without sufficient analysis or evaluation. As an introduction to Camus, this translation (an expansion of the original *Albert Camus ou l'invincible été,* Paris, 1955) makes effective use of vigorous phrasing, quotation from the original Camus, and an enthusiastic appreciation for the works discussed. In attempting to be comprehensive within a rather limited compass, Maquet's biographical sketch of Camus in Part I seems fragmentary and superficial in comparison with Miss Brée's. There is, however, a useful seventeen-page bibliography, which includes articles and books on Camus in French and Italian, recordings, adaptations, prefaces, lectures, interviews, and articles by Camus, a listing of countries where translations have appeared (publishers and dates omitted), and articles in English on Camus from 1946 through May 1957. In an appendix Maquet notes Camus' preoccupation with executions and presents a brief synopsis of "Reflexions sur la guillotine."

Although more detailed than Maquet's study, Hanna's *The Thought and Art of Albert Camus* represents the expository-synoptic method rather than critical analysis and evaluation. Regarding Camus as "primarily a philosopher," Hanna (himself a specialist in philosophy and religion) all but ignores Camus the writer; the word "Art" in the title is therefore rather misleading. Unlike Thody, Hanna rejects any very sharp distinction between the earlier and the later Camus, arguing—in opposition to Thoorens, Luppé, Quilliot, and Maquet—that the critics of Camus have erred in lumping together all of Camus' earlier work as an expression of the absurdist point of view. The "authentic thought" of Camus is his philosophy of "revolt"; and Hanna traces the development of this philosophic design from *Noces* (1938) and *The Stranger* through *The Fall.* In Part II, "Man, the World, and Men—Revolt," he meticulously paraphrases the argument in *The Rebel,* section by section, drawing upon Camus' political essays of 1944-47 for confirmation. Discussions of *The Plague* and *The Fall* round out the thesis. Judging by the absence of any reference to the Nobel Prize, the essay on the guillotine, and *Exile and the Kingdom,* Hanna's book apparently went to press before the fall of 1957. Hanna limits his critical bibliography to twenty-one articles and books on Camus. Like Thody and Maquet, he provides no index.

Cruickshank sets the stage, in his introduction, by defining Camus' highly representative place in the cultural climate of present-day Europe, as both symptom and spokesman of the *Zeitgeist* of the 1920s and 1930s. Seeing absurdism as only a point of departure for positive reconstruction, Cruickshank evaluates Camus' "existential" response in terms of freedom and responsibility to create meaning out of revolt, not in terms of pessimism or nihilism. He traces the evolution of revolt in Camus' thought from the dualistic, non-European cultural tradition manifested in *L'Envers et l'endroit* and *Noces,* stressing the ironic and tragic nature

of an intense love of life frustrated by death and the consequent "passionate disbelief" in any form of resignation or absolutism. In *The Myth of Sisyphus* this dualism is seen as the paradox of the absurd, and is identified with the debate of the One and the Many and with the antirational Nordic and Slavic world of thought (Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Dostoevsky, et al.). Reflecting a sense of crisis in the current European intellectual climate, Camus' absurdism seems more a state of mind, a sentimental or moral choice, than a philosophical inquiry, based as it is—so Cruickshank maintains—on a naive conception of the limits of logic and science and on an inconsistent use of the term "absurd." Also considered unsatisfactory are Camus' quantitative ethics (likened to Pater's "multiplied consciousness"), his solipsistic moral world, which provides no basis for a sound ethics, and his moral absolutes of "freedom" and "lucidity." Camus' claim that evasion of lucidity is sin, for instance, illustrates the "emotional determination behind much of Camus' apparent logical detachment."

In Part Two, "Revolt and Politics," the theory and practice of revolt are dealt with in separate chapters. Cruickshank grants that absurdism was, with Camus, a negative methodology for reaching a positive conclusion; yet he insists on a sharp distinction between radical absurdism as logically contradictory and as practically inadequate. It is "an obvious inconsistency" for *The Rebel* to begin with the virtues of revolt and to end with a plea for moderation. Not all political revolution, moreover, stems from revolt against the absurd; other social, political, and economic factors are involved. As distinguished from revolution and absurdism, revolt is an "authentic" view of life: it implies positive values (freedom, self-discovery, human solidarity) : it imposes limits in its "practice"; it is essentially spiritual (a defiance, not a negation of God) ; it is realistic in that the *révolté* seeks salvation through time and history, not through grace. Yet, Cruickshank claims, *The Rebel* represents a form of "anti-historicism" in that Camus rejects both Christianity and Marx (history), and resorts to "a mystical hymn of praise to the virtues of sunshine and light" in the lyric climax of his argument. This charge of antihistoricism loses sight of Camus' central purpose in *The Rebel,* it seems to me, which is to bring the moral force of public opinion to bear against the Marxist and other doctrinaire views of history when those views become rationalizations of calculated deception and violence.

In a section on "Revolt and Literature" Cruickshank analyzes *The Stranger* for the organic interrelations of point of view, vocabulary, time and tense, as well as for the limitations of the absurdist novel. *The Plague* is valued more as a symbolic (not allegorical) treatment of a closed, timeless "absurd" universe than as an allegory of the occupation. *The Fall,* though not positively un-Christian to Cruickshank, presents an antibourgeois image of profound duplicity and guilt, the "fall" resulting from such a lack of stable values as to leave modern man in a state of continuous "ambiguity." *Exile and the Kingdom* is not included in the discussion.

Cruickshank introduces his analysis of the plays with a definition of the "theatre of situation" and a statement on Camus' search for the modern tragic form. *Caligula,* rated as "a good play," represents effective "theatre" and unity, as well as the theme of the absurd. In *Le Malentendu,* also absurdist in theme, the symbolic and naturalistic aspects are not organically related. *The State of Siege,* Camus' most ambitious play, also has serious faults, despite its worthy theme and impressive theater. *The Just,* Camus' "greatest dramatic achievement to date," is closely examined for credible, significant characters and genuine dramatic tension.

In his conclusion Cruickshank holds that the novels and dramas are superior to Camus' political and moral philosophy, and are not damaged by the intellectual extremes in that philosophy. As "both a spokesman and a symptom of his times," Camus represents the conflict between belief and skepticism, moderation and extremism. Cruickshank finds tension in the "geographic dualism" of the North African moderation, love of nature, and Greek humanism, on the one hand, and the extremist revolt of the European present, on the other. Yet he sums up Camus as "a static moralist" who "rejects one set of absolutes only to replace them by another" and is therefore "ultimately an absolutist, an essentialist rather than an existentialist, in the sphere of morals."

In Germaine Brée's *Camus,* finally, a happy balance or partnership has been achieved between biography and criticism, each illuminating the other. Stressing Camus' humble Algerian background and his loyalty to it, this biography presents the best account of his early life (1913-39). In his "inner kingdom" Camus experienced the poverty and dignity of the working class, as well as the beauty, hedonism, and contradictions of life in North Africa. Yet, though an Algerian, Camus early (1934-39) felt identified with Europe and its crises, social and political. The war years that followed (1939-44) brought quick success, despair, suffering, and the discovery that man must give meaning to a life otherwise "absurd." During the "trial by solitude" of 1944-45 Camus applied his new social ethics to politics in his outspoken opposition to Franco, Stalinism, anti-Semitism, imperialism, terrorism, and the Marxist line of Sartre and in his advocacy of "renaissance" instead of revolution.

In *L'Envers et l'endroit* and *Noces* Miss Brée identifies symbols and antinomies: the "black sun" of death versus the radiant sun of nature, suffering versus happiness. The novels, too, are not only related to the *Zeitgeist* but also analyzed in terms of irony, style, symbolism, time patterns, and décor (determinism of place).

Chapters 13-18 deal with the ideas in the novels and the plays. *The Stranger* develops the necessity to question the meaning of life. *The Plague,* both disturbing and moving, dramatizes two themes—despair over man's absurd suffering, and the love of life, the compassion for man. *The Fall* is considered a parable "addressed to only a part of ourselves, the Sadducee in us," of which Clamence is the modern counterpart, a victim of inner nihilism. In *Exile and the Kingdom* each story leads to a revelation of harmony of man and nature. "The Growing Stone," for instance, is "illuminated by a new approach to the figure of man," by the discovery that "man's kingdom is within him and 'of this earth,'" as distinct from "that humiliating image of man which Christianity presents, man incapable of goodness unless he be sustained by supernatural grace . . . " The plays, especially *Caligula* and *The Just,* are separately discussed for their technical elements and ideas.

Five chapters are devoted to the charting of the main currents in Camus' thought, from the ideas of the early meditative essays to the existentialism of *The Myth* and the rise and fall of Prometheus in *The Rebel.* In *L'Été* the sea symbolizes life, and thus a return to equilibrium. The final chapter, on "The Role of the Artist," concludes that Camus' work is short on human love, but that in the later writings, especially in *Exile and the Kingdom,* there is a promise of a new, free image of man.

In Miss Brée's study, both biography and critical scholarship benefit from her conversations with Camus and from access to his unpublished notebooks and an early draft of *The Stranger.* Even so, curious omissions are noticeable in her

story of the social and political man: his work in the Resistance movement, his family life, his lecture tour in the United States (1946-47), etc. The other four books are even less informative, perhaps out of respect for Camus' private life, already invaded by *The Mandarins*. Since his death there is need for a full-length study of Camus with biographical completeness, an ideal already well served by the recent flood of commemorative essays and personal tributes. But it will be some time before we have criticism more incisive and judicial than Thody's or Cruickshank's and more sympathetic and perceptive than Miss Brée's.

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BRECHT: A CHOICE OF EVILS. A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE MAN, HIS WORK AND HIS OPINIONS. By Martin Esslin. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1959. xii, 305 p.

"There can be little doubt that Bertolt Brecht is one of the most significant writers of this century. German literature, unlike that of France, Italy, pre-revolutionary Russia, or Scandinavia, is on the whole so remote from the taste and aesthetic conventions of the English-speaking world that its influence does not often make itself felt. Yet occasionally an author writing in German imposes himself and leaves a lasting impression: Kafka was one of these, Brecht is another. His influence on the theatre may well prove as powerful as that of Kafka on the novel" (p. ix).

After thus establishing, with admirable firmness and clarity, Brecht's position in contemporary literature, Esslin proceeds to an examination of the poet from various points of view: biographically in "The Man," as dramatic reformer in "The Artist," politically in "The Pitfalls of Commitment," and philosophically in "The Real Brecht." This many-sided interpretation is concluded by a fifth chapter, "For Reference," which offers not only a descriptive list of Brecht's works but an exhaustive bibliography of books and articles, commemorative issues, periodicals, etc. in German, English, French, and Russian. No doubt Brecht himself would have been amused to see both the *Bolshaya Sovietskaya Entsiklopediya* and *Hearings Regarding the Communist Infiltration of the Motion Picture Industry* represented.

The book as a whole is an impressive achievement. It is amply documented and written in an appealing style, with occasional flashes of a Brechtian mordacity. It serves equally well as a first introduction to Brecht, and, for the reader already familiar with the poet, as an account of the present state of Brecht studies. It would be hard to quarrel with the conclusions reached by Esslin in the first two chapters, which include the material generally presented by positivist literary historians under the heading of Life and Works. It is possible that the author has somewhat simplified the motivations of Brecht's conversion to anarchism, and later to Marxism, by explaining it solely on the basis of the poet's experiences as a medical aide in World War I; however, Brecht's inner biography cannot be definitively written until all the material scattered in letters, diaries, etc. is collected.

The pivotal chapter is the third, which deals with the most intriguing question posed by the phenomenon of Brecht: "... how far is it possible for a great writer

to adhere to a creed so rigidly dogmatic, so far divorced from the reality of human experience as our latter-day brand of Communism without doing violence to his talent?" (p. xi). Esslin's conclusion is—not very far. In arriving at this conclusion he presents a wealth of details on the aesthetic, intellectual, and political tergiversations of the German Left from 1918 to the present. In this and in the final chapter Brecht emerges as a *rara avis* indeed. He was a great poet and one of the most powerful dramatists of our century, a thwarted moralist and in many ways a child at heart, but at the same time gifted with an uncanny shrewdness in dealing with the practical questions of life in general and—a far greater achievement—of survival in East Germany.

The combination of artistic creativity on one side and a mastery of practical life on the other has always been rare in the annals of literature. German letters, in particular, have a long tradition, hallowed by such names as Lessing, Schiller, Hölderlin, Nietzsche, and Rilke, of the poet as pauper (not to mention practically all major musicians whose lives fell in the period bracketed by those two "successes," Händel and Wagner). It is one of the splendors of Goethe, and a thorn in the side of many Goethophobes, that the greatest of Germany's poets was also one of the few who achieved some worldly success and recognition in their lifetime, instead of "going to pieces at all costs like a good poet" (Barker Fairley). But even Goethe's vaunted *Lebenskunst* did not measure up to Brecht's. By the end of his life, Brecht had an Austrian passport which enabled him to travel whenever and wherever he wished; he managed his own theater in East Berlin, state-supported and state-controlled but reasonably free from supervision in artistic matters; he had given the copyright to his works to a West German publisher, so that they could be issued uncensored while their author was assured of very considerable royalties; he had received, and personally accepted in Moscow, the Stalin Peace Prize for 1954, only to invest most of the 160,000 rubles in a Swiss bank run on eminently capitalistic principles; he lived in East Berlin, and sent his son to school not at home or in Moscow but in Paris (this is not mentioned by Esslin but was a persistent rumor in the Berlin of 1956). Compared to this, Goethe's distant acquaintance with both Napoleon and Metternich was child's play!

It may seem odd under these circumstances that it is, in Esslin's considered judgment, nonetheless all but impossible for a truly great artist to work in as restrictive a society as that of the German Democratic Republic. His explanation of the seeming paradox is that Brecht was in the Communist world but not of it. As an artist he survived partly by luck, partly by "rolling with the punches" (e.g., by adapting earlier works to the latest ideological requirements), and partly because the Communists grant certain "showcase artists" a freedom quite beyond that accorded to regular party hacks; Esslin points out that Picasso, too, is *demi-engagé* and *demi-dégagé*. Brecht, although a convinced Marxist, managed to survive only by dint of constant compromises between the theory and practice of dramatic art as he saw it and the theater recommended by the authorities; this is shown by his gallant, and on the whole successful, attempts to keep the East German stage, including his own magnificent Berliner Ensemble, from having the Stanislavsky method imposed on it by party theoreticians. (It is strange that, among these, Esslin does not mention Wolfgang Leonhard and his *Die Revolution entläßt ihre Kinder*; possibly Leonhard had already defected to Yugoslavia when Brecht settled in Berlin). The Communists knew that their distinguished dramatist—Brecht was undoubtedly the most gifted and most influential writer

to have thrown in his lot with the German Democratic Republic—was an erratic individualist, and they were careful to stage his plays as rarely as possible. That Brecht, too, was aware of the oddity of his position is shown, among other things, by the report which a friend of his, a Protestant clergyman, made of their last meeting:

"It was a conversation as unsentimental and unpathetic as any I ever had with him and dealt with the obituary I should probably have to write when he died. He regretted, with a smile, that he would be unable to read it and all the other beautiful obituaries, in which posterity would breathe its sigh of relief . . . 'You at least write a candid obituary!' he said. 'That will make a very original effect among my obituaries . . . Don't write that you admire me! Write that I was an uncomfortable person, and that I intend to remain so after my death. Even then there are certain possibilities.' These were his last words to me" (p. 174).

The book's only weakness lies in a disproportion between its author's knowledge concerning Brecht, which is phenomenal, and his grasp of German literature in general, which is weak. It is not true that "Literary German, and above all stage German, is essentially an artificial, a dead language," or that "Some of the greatest achievements of German dramatic literature are in fact dialect plays and confined to a limited area: the Viennese folk theatre of Raimund and Nestroy, or the Darmstadt comedies of Niebergall" (p. 92; the present reviewer cheerfully confesses that he has never before heard of the Aristophanes of Darmstadt). Nor is it fair to argue that Germany is "a country where intellectuals were traditionally classed as mere dreamers and excluded from any influence on the affairs of the real world" (p. 220).

Observations of this sort are especially painful when made apropos of Brecht, who first came to the public's notice in the days when that intellectual *par excellence,* Walter Rathenau, was Germany's foreign minister, and who died when the ex-university professor Theodor Heuss was President of (West) Germany. Mistakes of this kind, which blight the book but do not invalidate its central argument, epitomize the dangers incurred by brilliant amateurs—Esslin is a BBC commentator—when they write on specialized fields of knowledge. They often see the subject with fresh eyes, and, sad to say, frequently write better English than the experts. But enthusiasm does not make up for the lack of background and training. Fortunately, such excursions into the broader ranges of literary history are rare in this work. As far as Brecht himself is concerned, Esslin's book is, at this writing, one of the best available accounts of that fascinating author.

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MALLARMÉ ET LA MUSIQUE. By Suzanne Bernard. Paris: Nizet, 1959. 184 p.

Mallarmé's relationships with music have been touched on by almost all his biographers, critics, and exegetes, and by most historians and critics of both symbolism and French Wagnerism. These scholars have had to consider the topic, but have treated it incidentally and, for the most part, briefly. Thus, though the subject is important and a great deal has been written on it, no really adequate investigation had been attempted until the appearance of Miss Bernard's book.

Miss Bernard's treatment is thorough and systematic; nothing relevant has

been overlooked. She has a sure knowledge of all of Mallarmé's own work and of the works and memoirs of his contemporaries; and she has threaded her way through the vast and far from peaceful jungle of Mallarmé criticism without falling into any of its worst sloughs. Many a book has been written to reveal *the unique* key to all problems in Mallarmé's poetry. We have been told that everything becomes clear when we realize that he used words in archaic meanings taken from Littré—or that his pious upbringing dominated his thought and imagery to the end of his life—or that Méry Laurent was his mistress—or that Méry Laurent was not his mistress. Miss Bernard is particularly to be commended for giving music its full value in Mallarmé's work without trying to make it a universal solvent of difficulties.

Her introduction begins with a general consideration of the place of music in the theory and experiments of the symbolists, and then moves on to Mallarmé's musical initiation at the Concerts Lamoureux (where Beethoven made a greater impression than Wagner) and his introduction to Wagner's theories through the pages of Dujardin's *Revue wagnérienne*. Her first chapter traces the influence of these Wagnerian theories on Mallarmé's own thinking about the basic nature of music, its relation to poetry and the possibility of a synthesis, and its quasi-religious function. Chapter II treats of Mallarmé's own conception of music, considered from idealistic, architectonic, and religious points of view, and his conception of the dance as "musique corporelle et figuration de l'Idée." Chapter III is the most important part of the book. It traces Mallarmé's development of his own ideas, especially "le defi à Wagner"—the insistence that poetry is the supreme art and that the synthesis of the arts is to be achieved, not by combining them in the Wagnerian manner, but by creating a new poetry which will adapt the techniques and peculiar excellencies of the other arts to its own purposes ("reprendre à la musique son bien"), and thus subsume them all. Chapter IV traces the stages of Mallarmé's "musicalization" of poetry, considering as successive examples the *Ouverture d'Hérodiade*, the *Après-midi d'un faune*, the sonnet *À la nue accablante tu*, the *Coup de dés*, and, finally, the dream of the ultimate *Livre*, as far as it has been recently reconstructed from notes. A general conclusion is followed by two appendices—one on Mallarmé and composers, with a list of vocal settings of his poems, and the other on the *Après-midi* in music (including a pre-Debussy version) and ballet—and a good bibliography.

All of the historical and biographical research is excellently done and its findings are, in my opinion, unexceptionable. The interpretation of the established facts is more open to question and objection. Here we are, of course, in the realm of opinion rather than demonstrable fact; and it is to be expected that informed opinions may be widely divergent on a subject as intricate as the musical influences on Mallarmé's poetry. With this reminder of the futility of flat dogmatism on either side, I shall point out and briefly illustrate what seem to me to be two sources of dubious interpretation.

The first is a dilemma common to practically all interpreters of Mallarmé. The man is so suave, so charming, so aesthetically sophisticated, and his critical writing is so refined, lyrical, and enigmatic, that he often gets by with forced analogies and false logic which would be instantly challenged if presented in a less ingratiating fashion. When Mallarmé began to attend the Concerts Lamoureux in 1885 he was, as everyone knows, a musical tyro; and there is nothing in the record to indicate that he tried to inform himself even to the mildly technical extent represented by the ordinary "music appreciation" book. Miss Bernard is well aware

of this fact, and states it frequently. For example: "Il serait donc vain d'attendre de Mallarmé des considérations techniques sur la structure des œuvres qu'il a pu entendre (et dont il ne cite aucune avec précision)" (p. 47).

But in practice she is unable to keep in mind that a man so well informed and perceptive on literary matters could really be as musically ignorant as he actually was. Thus his description of Beethoven's *Ninth* as "un type d'architecture musicale s'appliquant à tous les arts" (pp. 24, 44) is taken with a seriousness which could be justified only on the assumption that he actually understood its structure. More questionable still is the explanation of Mallarmé's cult of the symphony orchestra, to the exclusion of chamber music. "Il n'y a là rien d'étonnant, si l'on songe que Mallarmé s'intéressait surtout à la structure symphonique et à ce que l'on en pouvait reprendre en poésie" (p. 24). But symphonic structure is essentially sonata form—as are string quartets and practically all forms of chamber music. Orchestration is not structure. Musical tyros *always* prefer the symphony as *the* instrumental form (and we can agree that vocal music obviously was not suited for Mallarmé's purposes), simply because it does not demand so much purely musical comprehension as a string quartet. In exactly the same way, literary tyros prefer the *tirades* of Corneille and the thunders of Hugo to the restraints and implications of Mallarmé's *Après-midi*. If Mallarmé had liked chamber music, that fact would have called for an explanation.

The second pitfall is that of the forced analogy. Anyone who has worked his way through all the published *explications* of *Un Coup de dés* knows how easy it is to introduce loose musical metaphors and then treat them as sober facts. Miss Bernard is well aware of this danger and warns against it (p. 95), but is unable to steer clear of it. To take only a single example (the interpretation of the sonnet *À la nue accablante tu*), we are first told that "s'il y a musique ici, ce n'est pas dans le sens de l'euphonie et de la facilité mélodique; mais dans le sens de la rigueur, de la construction harmonique" (p. 120). On the next page, "la composition est, peut-on dire, 'fuguée': les thèmes se recouvrent comme des vagues sans qu'il y ait jamais de temps mort pour la respiration"; and a few lines later, "la nue, l'écume, l'abime, la sirène sont là beaucoup moins comme éléments descriptifs qu'à titre de thèmes architectoniques supportant tout un jeu d'harmonies et d'oppositions" (p. 121). Finally, we must conceive the poem "comme un déroulement mélodique et non comme une structure soustraite au successif" (p. 124). Thus the poem is not melodic, but harmonic—then fugato (with a number of themes!)—then harmonic with these themes—and finally melodic. Obviously, the analogies have run wild, and none of them can be taken very seriously. There is a good deal of this sort of thing in Chapter IV, and throughout the book the word *symphonique* is used in a bewildering variety of senses.

Fortunately, however, these shortcomings are not too serious; for the reader can readily judge the musical analogies on the spot and accept, reject, or question them as he sees fit. In fact, many of the false analogies are originally of Mallarmé's own devising, and are thus important for the subject of Mallarmé and music, even when unconvincing in themselves. Mallarmé did not really understand music; but he offers a fine example of fruitful misunderstanding, and Miss Bernard has done a real service by collecting and arranging all the evidence on his musical interests and experiments. With this evidence before him, the reader can make his own interpretations or reservations.

CALVIN S. BROWN

University of Georgia

BURNS: A STUDY OF THE POEMS AND SONGS. By Thomas Crawford. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1960. 400 p.

Undoubtedly a contribution to Burns studies at once notable and readable, this book forsakes the usual scandal in favor of criticism, eschewing biography wherever it is not strictly relevant for "background." Since Burns offers the same sort of temptation as Byron, this is all to the good—though Mr. Crawford might well have mitigated his rigor to the extent of adding to the admirable glossary and appendixes a biographical date list for those not having the life at their fingertips. Eschew as you will, life turns out in the case of Burns to be rather frequently relevant. In every other minor respect, the book is thorough, well documented, and scholarly; and in the major respect of its thesis, it argues a twofold case cogently. One fold has to do with the sources, the other with the texture of Burns's work.

About the first, little controversy is likely. The importance, to a full understanding of the poetry, of the American and French Revolutions, the agrarian changes in late eighteenth-century Ayrshire, and the conflict between extremists and moderates in the Scottish church seems to be indisputably established. Similarly unarguable is the general line of development traced: in form, from particularity to relative abstraction, in content, from local satire or personalities to songs of democratic rebellion or universal feelings.

The second thesis is more novel, and perhaps less fully established. Irked at the common critical practice of ignoring Burns's content and deprecating his English English, Mr. Crawford points out that "With few exceptions, the songs which arose directly out of the circumstances of the poet's own life are markedly inferior to the more impersonal songs, which appear to have been deliberately manufactured" (p. 268). Further, Burns is shown, by his own account, to have been in the habit of starting with a sentiment, choosing a theme to suit it, and only then coming to the matter of language. Finding the right diction, moreover, was largely a conscious matter (though Burns sometimes pretended it was fully inspirational).

It is here that Mr. Crawford delivers a severe blow to the body of Scotticists. He points out that "High English" was just as much a part of the national tongue as Scots English, being the accepted language for sermons, lay discussion of theological and moral questions, business and other letters. Having shown also that Burns was not wedded to modern dogmas about concrete particulars, he can argue that Anglo-Scots was deliberately chosen to deal with abstract ideas—indeed *had* to be, since the vernacular lacked the necessary resources. Moreover, he can plausibly maintain that Burns went on to make a more positive virtue out of the co-presence of two dictions and two cultures by playing them off against each other.

It is in the analyses supporting this contention that Mr. Crawford is at his most interesting and most disputable. He is excellent on the use of linguistic shifts in "The Jolly Beggars," "Tam O'Shanter," and several other poems, where he demonstrates an effective interplay of dictions for quasi-dramatic and mock-heroic effects, for modulating from one key to another, and for subtly adjusting the tone to reader or subject. Questions begin when he seems to be forcing the thesis and bringing in sentimentality and uncriticized assumptions to buttress cases that could otherwise hardly stand.

Few "sneering professional critics" are likely to be impressed by the statement that "The Cotter's Saturday Night" finds a welcome among quite ordinary readers

throughout the world (p. 130), or by the long argument in its favor (pp. 174-182). If popular appeal were to be taken as a criterion—as it is again in connection with the songs, p. 335—then Irving Berlin would easily outrank Burns. And, if the criterion is bad, the argument is worse. It starts by offering the excuse that Burns wasn't good at Spenserians (as if stanza form were not part of the total effect), goes on to knock down a mere Aunt Sally (surely critics have complained not of the Englishness of the diction but of the second-rateness of the Englishness?); then it argues by name changing (cliché becoming "familiar associations to enrich the reader's perception," awkward inconsistency, "pleasantly artificial antithesis"), and concludes by trying to justify the poem's Pamelan uplift with an appeal to authority (an appeal marred by the French authority's obvious inability to recognize, or even refrain from, cant): "Never has the existence of the poor been invested with so much dignity . . . a solemn homage to humble virtues . . . It attains the summit of human dignity . . ." (Angellier, II, 222). Quite.

Characteristically then, it would seem, Mr. Crawford takes Burns's sentimental version of "John Anderson my Jo" to be much superior to the longer bawdy version of "The Merry Muses," and seems to miss the irony and symbolism of Conrad's fine concluding sentence to *Nostromo* which is cited as an instance of un-Burnsian "false romanticism" (p. 310).

However, these tendencies are a minor if pervasive blemish in a work that finely and firmly places Burns in his time and place, shows him to have been the inheritor not only of a Scots, but also an English—and even European—tradition, literary and ideological, and proves him sometimes capable of using all these sources to better effect than has previously been recognized.

ALLAN RODWAY

University of Nottingham

THE POEM ITSELF. Edited, and with an introduction by Stanley Burnshaw. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960. xiv, 338 p.

Most men foolhardy enough to translate poetry begin by assuring the reader that no translation is worth reading. It is pleasant to find one who claims to give us the poem itself. Stanley Burnshaw and his associates have, in fact, little to apologize for; they have put together not only an admirable anthology, but one which deserves to be imitated.

The book's 150 poems are by forty-five authors and in five languages. Each poem is printed in the original, followed by a commentary including, in italics, a literal translation. The commentaries are intended—at least the best of them—to help the reader grasp the poem in the original, even if he does not know the language.

This is, of course, not quite possible, and a "Note on the Pronunciations" helps very little. The reader must have some knowledge of the language or be prepared to work rather hard. Even so, Burnshaw's is probably the easiest and certainly the most rewarding way to get acquainted with a totally unfamiliar poem. The best thing about his method is that it concentrates on the original, escaping the dilemma of the poem untranslatable because of local references, puns, or words without English equivalents.

The volume will surely be imitated, not, I hope, at the expense of literary translations, but alongside these. Good translator poets, a Herman Salinger or a Pa-

tricia Terry, are hard to find (Samuel Beckett's collection of Mexican verse is the only firstrate anthology of a foreign poetry consistently well Englished). Competent scholars—even literate ones—are by comparison plentiful, and an edition of *Les Fleurs du Mal,* for example, done à la Burnshaw, would be more valuable than all translations so far, including the one labeled "definitive."

The Poem Itself does not claim a comprehensive selection of modern (i.e., since Hölderlin) continental verse, but it comes close to being representative; the Spanish and Portuguese and the Italian sections (edited by Dudley Fitts and John Frederick Nims) are excellent. The German section is weakest, skipping everything between Rilke and Brecht. The notion that Germany produced no important poetry in the Expressionist decades seems to be widespread, but could have been easily disproved if Mr. Burnshaw had included a few poems by Morgenstern or Trakl or Heym or—at least—by Benn.

Since a poem explained is longer than a poem without explanation, the most obvious problem in such a book is length. Sometimes the difficulty seems mechanical; Mr. Nims (whose performance is otherwise particularly good) apparently felt constrained by the general format to give Ungaretti's two-line poem

"M'illumino
d'immenso."

a full-page treatment. No doubt it deserves a detailed explication, but the only way to economize here is to assume the audience, though ignorant of Italian, can read poetry.

Another problem is equally serious but more subtle. Take the first lines of Mallarmé's "Sainte": the literal translation reads: "(1) At the window secretly hiding (2) The old sandalwood [slowly] losing (shedding) its gilt (3) Of her viol shining (glittering) (4) Formerly with flute or mandore [mandolin] (5) Is the pale Saint . . . " My point is not that this is not poetry—it was not meant to be—but it is not prose either. The discussion surrounding it is fine, and no one would quite call the original simple; still, it would surely be better to make the starting point readable English.

Nims, Glauco Cambon, and Eugenio Florit are perhaps the best of the contributors, but nearly all are more than competent. Mr. Florit's treatment of four Jiménez poems could well be taken as a model.

The Poem Itself is an important experiment. It needs imitators to show its full worth—imitators who will be more specialized or more comprehensive, who will include other periods and other languages; and who will, let us hope, produce a less expensive book. They will find it hard to do better than Burnshaw.

BERNARD WALDROP

University of Michigan

SHELLEY'S MYTHMAKING. By Harold Bloom. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959. 279 p.

This ambitious interpretation of Shelley's poetry raises rather forcibly the question of the propriety of rereading a classic author through the medium of a contemporary thinker, in this instance Martin Buber. For Buber, according to Mr. Bloom, the *I-Thou* relationship, as opposed to *I-It,* is the basic mythopoeic

perception, and Shelley is a mythopoeic poet. Bloom distinguishes a primitive mythopoeia embodying direct perception of a *Thou* in natural phenomena from a more complex form of mythopoeic poetry in which the poet makes his own individual abstractions from prior *I-Thou* relationships. Shelley's poetry contains both these kinds of mythopoeia. In Bloom's view Shelley is not a Platonist but an "apocalyptic humanist" like Blake; he is not scientific or philosophic but mythopoeic. The *I-Thou* relationship first appears in the 1816 hymns, "To Intellectual Beauty" and "Mont Blanc," disappears for a time, emerges at its height in *Prometheus Unbound,* declines in *Epipsychidion,* and falls in final defeat in *The Triumph of Life.*

This confrontation of one age with another is helpful, let us say, if it is made dramatically and tentatively, for the purpose of enriching our understanding of the writer in his own terms, to which we must always ultimately return. The process would be comparable to the creation of an original metaphor, which juxtaposes different objects in a manner to convince us that a new unity has been accomplished, a novel insight at once striking and inevitable. The juxtaposition would be unhappy, on the other hand, if it were made on the assumption that one object was a touchstone by which the value and identity of the other were to be appraised with certainty. To put the matter otherwise, it should not be assumed that we are now in possession of authority which will solve for us critical problems by reference to extraliterary knowledge. In *Shelley's Mythmaking* Mr. Bloom establishes a new orthodoxy which has some relation to Buber and some to Northrop Frye, which consigns all previous Shelley criticism and scholarship to outer darkness, and which concludes by eliminating everyone but himself from the Shelleyan elect. It is extremely unfortunate that his point, which would have made of itself an interesting hypothesis, has been magnified into a flaming sword. It turns a thoughtful and perceptive book into an irritant.

Shelley's Mythmaking furnishes close interpretations of a considerable number of important poems, while omitting some others such as *Alastor* and *Adonais.* Bloom has interesting things to say of every poem he analyzes, and he sees and grapples with a remarkably large number of vital issues. He offers an extensive comparison of Shelley and Blake, a real contribution finally vitiated by some failures in discriminating, and through Blake he is able to bring Milton to bear effectively upon *Prometheus Unbound.* He also justly emphasizes the relationship of Yeats to Shelley, which most Yeats specialists would apparently prefer not to notice. He possesses an unusually wide knowledge of nineteenth- and twentieth-century poetry, which he uses with aptness.

Shelley's Mythmaking is, then a potentially excellent study which has been deprived of some of its possible effect by its author's misconception of the purposes and the limits of critical interpretation. In Mr. Bloom's own terms, he aspires to an *I-It* relationship with Shelley's text, whereas only the *I-Thou* relation is attainable. The truth to be garnered is approximate; it *is* a truth, but the aspect we grasp of it depends upon the approach and the point of view. It is not possible, to speak specifically, that the entirety of a poem should be conveyed in the different medium of a prose commentary upon it. One can only suggest ways of approach. Too frequently *Shelley's Mythmaking* endeavors to exhaust the poem, or to substitute for it its discursive explanation.

RICHARD HARTER FOGLE

Tulane University

CÁNTICO: EL MUNDO Y LA POESÍA DE JORGE GUILLÉN. Por Jaime Gil de Biedma. Barcelona: Editorial Seix Barral, 1960. 189 págs.

El autor es miembro activo de la "escuela" conocida con el nombre de "realismo histórico," cuyos principios han sido sentados por José María Castellet en *La hora del lector* y en el prólogo de su *Antologia, Veinte años de poesía española, 1939-1959*, así como por Juan Goytisolo en su obra *Problemas de la novela*.[1]

El libro que ahora reseñamos empezó a ser escrito con gran admiración hacia Guillén, pero después el autor se ha ido viendo movido por la necesidad de explicarse por qué esa admiración ha ido decayendo, y se ha tratado de analizar racionalmente la falla de *Cántico* al no mover ya los sentimientos del lector (sobre todo el *Cántico* de 1950). La falla está en *Cántico*, por supuesto, no en el lector. El lector no tiene la culpa de ser como es: es el producto de su tiempo, y desde su fatal histórica bendición, o condenación, no sólo tiene derecho, sino obligación, de juzgar lo que ve acaecer en sus días. Tal es la actitud de esta "escuela."

Lo más interesante del caso es que *Cántico* era un texto "realista histórico" (así lo presenta G. de B.) cuando a nadie se le ocurría hablar de eso (por ejemplo, los primeros poemas de "totalidad" y de "objecto,"[2] como los llama G. de B., en los que el equilibrio entre la "realidad mental" y la "realidad sensible" era perfecto), cuando Guillén no sabía lo que era *yo* y don Antonio Machado le criticaba por no tener *alma*. Y ahora que, como es natural, Guillén va sabiendo más, va sabiendo quién es *yo* y va teniendo un alma más completa (porque el alma, según Guillén, es la adición de las cosas aprehendidas—y cuanto más viejo, más inteligente y más alma); ahora que todo el mundo habla del "realismo histórico" y lo practica fervientemente ("realismo histórico" en el que el *yo* del poeta debe alejarse y no desvirtuar la "realidad sensible"), ahora es cuando Guillén se aparta de esa actitud. (A mí esto me parece de un extraordinario mérito.) ¿Por qué no criticar a Guillén por no haber sido fiel a los principios de 1930? G. de B. lo alaba, aunque don Antonio Machado lo criticaba; ahora que tal vez empezase a alabarlo don Antonio, lo critica un joven de 33 años. Aquí podría verse una muestra de la miopía del *historicismo* que caracteriza a este "realismo histórico." Pero dejando eso aparte, y dejando aparte la innegable verdad de que todos somos hijos—y aún esclavos—de nuestro tiempo, yo me pregunto: ¿y don Jorge Guillén, es que no tiene derecho a su ser, a su existir, a su peculiar

[1] Resumiendo, podría caracterizarse así a esta "escuela": preocupación principal por los problemas económicos, sociales y políticos de nuestro tiempo; la personalidad del autor no importa: interesa su testimonio objetivo; la poesía está destinada a "la inmensa mayoría"; ha muerto el "simbolismo"—personalista, subjetivista. La "escuela" tiene una cosa buena: que sus miembros son muy conscientes de una realidad política y social, y espontáneamente han ido descubriendo las necesidades de un nuevo tipo de poesía; pero tienen un defecto estos nuevos poetas, desde el momento en que se han constituído como "escuela": su intolerancia hacia otras actitudes y la falta, ya, de espontaneidad. Ellos dirían: "hoy no se puede poetizar sino como nosotros lo hacemos." Naturalmente, a esta frase no se puede responder sino mostrando la obra de otro gran poeta que sea *diferente*. (Véanse mis reseñas al primer libro citado de Castellet y al de Goytisolo en *RHM*, XXV, 1959, 333-334, e *ibid.*, XXVI, 1960, 147-148. Sobre la *Antologia* de Castellet aparecerá en breve otra reseña mía en la misma *Revista.)*

[2] G. de B. clasifica los poemas de Guillén, según la técnica de la composición, en poemas de la totalidad (ejemplos, "Festividad," "Relieves"), poemas del objeto ("Naturaleza viva") y formas tardías.

manera de ser don Jorge Guillén, y a lo que él entiende como "la fiel plenitud de las palabras?"

Tratemos de ser todo lo objetivos que podamos al hablar de este libro de G. de B. Después de un primer capítulo, en el que el autor nos cuenta su personal reacción a *Cántico* durante años y el principio de su desilusión ("los poemas de Guillén no son ciertamente los que yo escogería para pasar a gusto una tarde en casa," p. 19), se pasa a un análisis de los temas tratados por Guillén y se interpreta con acierto algunos poemas clave, como "Más allá." El tema del ser, del amor y del tiempo son ampliamente tratados: son comentarios válidos, en general, aunque no siempre coincidamos con G. de B.; por ejemplo, en nuestra opinión, hay que hacer tanto caso al *estar* como al *ser*, y deslindar bien los dos conceptos; en cuanto al *tiempo*, según lo ve G. de B. en *Cántico*, habría mucho que discutir, pero no vale la pena. Valdría la pena tratar del asunto al hablar de *Clamor: Tiempo de Historia*, pero no de *Cántico*, que trata sobre todo del *presente*, un presente ácrono; de tal forma que no creemos que "el protagonista de *Cántico* se pasa el día *haciendo tiempo*" (p. 64), sino deshaciéndolo: lo que quiere es que el *presente* se *eternice*, es decir, se *destemporalice*, pierda el peor sentido que la palabra "tiempo" puede tener y tiene. La poesía y el amor son los dos medios de que dispone el protagonista de *Cántico* para destemporalizar, para eternizar.

Al hablar de "los claroscuros de *Cántico*," los poemas que aparecen en la última edición, sobre todo, pero ya en la penúltima, G. de B. empieza a expresar su desilusión. Hablaremos enseguida de esa desilusión y sus motivos. Antes queremos manifestar nuestro desacuerdo respecto a la interpretación del poema "Su persona" (pp. 100-101). El poema se comenta al analizar el tema de la muerte y se le considera incluso en ese tema. No lo creemos así. Ese poema trata, en nuestra opinión, de la nostalgia por una forma, que ahora está ausente, y de lo peligroso que es sustituir a esa forma por el sueño a solas, que es desvarío; hay que soñar la realidad abrazado a la realidad, y ése es "el hondo sueño," cuya relación con "Su persona" nota G. de B., pero o no la entiende bien o no la expresa. Pensar que el ser ausente está muerto es suponer que Guillén da gritos histéricos cuando reclama "su persona, su persona," cuando reclama un volumen, una forma, una presencia. Guillén, que yo sepa, nunca pide que le devuelvan los cadáveres.

Volvamos ahora a las razones de la desilusión del joven crítico ante la última edición de *Cántico*. G. de B. penetra en la técnica de la composición, estando especialmente interesado, y sin duda dotado, por ser poeta. (Sin embargo, me extraña el exceso de "psicología" que hay en estos capítulos—V, VI y VII—siendo G. de B. un hombre muy de su "escuela" y seguramente conocedor, como los mejores entre sus correligionarios ingleses, de las máximas de Wittgenstein: "in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion."[3]) Pero lo importante es esto: G. de B. había logrado separar, y muy bien, en las ediciones anteriores a la de 1950, el protagonista de *Cántico* de la persona de Jorge Guillén, y se podía ver otra distinción muy clara: la distinción entre las dos realidades, inseparables ciertamente, que Guillén entregaba a través de su protagonista y de su lenguaje al lector: la realidad sensible y la realidad mental, lo que ven los ojos de la cara y los ojos de la mente. A esta dualidad es a la que ha venido llamando G. de B. a lo largo de su libro "inmediatez y reflexión" (sensación y abstracción son también un eco de lo mismo, según dice G. de B.—no sabemos si lo mismo; yo, por mi parte, confieso mi miedo a la confusión conceptual de la psicología). Guillén había sido muy hábil al ofrecernos esas dos realidades, perfectamente equilibradas,

[3] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford, 1953), p. 232.

o intencionalmente desequilibradas, a través del personaje de *Cántico*, siempre en un "lugar" y un "momento" dados, en una "situación de hecho" dada. Pero en las últimas composiciones escritas para *Cántico*, ya desde algunas introducidas en la edición de 1945, este *sistema* guilleniano se ha alterado o desequilibrado: en el sistema se ha ingerido un "subjetivismo" (primero del protagonista, luego del propio Guillén) que ha llevado a un "conceptualismo" desvirtuador: la balanza se ha vencido del lado de la mente; el objeto de la realidad sensible ha quedado relegado a la categoría de mero pretexto, o poco menos; y la "situación de hecho," o localización de lo que pasa en el poema en un lugar y un momento dados—y exteriores al poeta—, ha ido siendo cada vez más abandonada en beneficio de elucubraciones más puramente mentales. "Entre protagonista y lector se interpone ahora el poeta, y lo que se nos pide no es ya que nos subroguemos en la particular actividad de aquél, sino que asumamos las ideas y opiniones de éste" (p. 183). Guillén no sigue la corriente actual, en la cual el autor, tras algunos pasos preliminares, ha desaparecido casi por completo. (Piénsese en la novela de Robbe-Grillet o de Nathalie Sarraute.) Las palabras de G. de B. se corresponden exactamente con las de Castellet y Goytisolo. La sentencia es ésta: por ser fiel a sí mismo y a su obra, Guillén se ha transformado en un imitador de sí mismo, en un manierista, en un artífice. Un ejemplo palpable, según G. de B., sería el poema "Tiempo libre," aparecido en la edición de 1950—"especie de interminable y tediosa guardarropía del teatro poético guilleniano" (p. 185). Guillén es un ejemplo de la agonizante tradición simbolista. (Es una lástima que G. de B., por tener su tiempo "comprometido," no haya tenido *tiempo* verdaderamente *libre* para leer en ese poema la magnífica meditación—sin ningún "conceptualismo" onanista, nos parece —anti-narcisista, anti-Valéry y anti-simbolista.)

Si seguimos y aceptamos las bien ordenadas ideas de G. de B. y de su "escuela," no hay duda de que todo es tal como lo presentan. Para rebatirlos tendríamos que aplicar una psicología, una lógica, una teoría y una sensibilidad distintas. Pero entonces no nos entenderíamos, hablaríamos en distinto lenguaje. Y además hoy no se puede admitir que haya una teoría distinta; sólo hay *una, la* teoría, la de ellos.

JOAQUÍN GONZÁLEZ MUELA

Western Reserve University

TEMAS HISPANOAMERICANOS. By Robert G. Mead, Jr. Mexico City: Studium, 1959. 159 p.

Professor Mead presents here various essays which have appeared in well-known journals of this country and Spanish America in the past ten years. In addition to the obvious convenience of having these studies in a single volume, several of the essays take on new significance in the light of the companion pieces. This is particularly true with regard to Mr. Mead's interviews with Anderson-Imbert, M. P. González, and Irving Leonard. The juxtaposition of these interviews gives a lively picture of the divergence of critical approaches and viewpoints that characterizes some of the most active thought in the study of Spanish American literature in this country. The brief essays on contemporary Mexican and Argentine letters provide a rapid overview of recent activity in these major areas, and the survey of Latin American literary historiography will be of value to anyone interested in a general guide to Iberoamerican literary histories and the major problems confronting the literary historian in this field.

The most noteworthy contribution of this collection, however, is in the three precise, informative, and interesting essays on Manuel González Prada, providing an important monograph on one of the most vigorous and talented writers of Spanish America. These essays present a remarkably compressed and convincing summary of González Prada's sociological, political, and literary thought, with succinct, revealing, and always pertinent biographical information. The quotations which Mr. Mead has chosen are apt and portray well the artist and the man. In his study of Prada's notions on Spain Mr. Mead quotes this remarkable judgment on Castelar: "En Castelar los órganos fonológicos se nutren a expensas del juicio. Su palabra tiene la inconsciencia de una función animal, habla como los otros digieren . . . Se le debe clasificar entre los músicos, lejos de Motzart o Wagner, cerca del hombre-orquesta que azora a las muchedumbres en las ferias. Considerándolo bien, es el tambor mayor del siglo XIX: marcha presidiendo el bullicioso batallón de los hombres locuaces, de todos los inagotables habladores que hablan y hablan por el solo prurito de hablar" (p. 49). Prada's most effective writing stems directly from his pugnacious negativism. His most impressive metaphors are naturalistic and his most frequent rhetorical devices are hyperbole and personification.

Mr. Mead's brief description (pp. 35-36) of González Prada's prose will, we may hope, encourage further detailed study of the world of metaphor and image created by this imaginative mind. One feels strongly that Prada conceived his ideas directly in terms of objects, images, and rhetorical figures. The variety, vigor, and spontaneity of his expression can only leave us to wonder at the concreteness and drama with which he must have experienced relationships that in the less imaginative personality are grasped only conceptually. González Prada seems to have thought in images and seen intellectual or ideological oppositions in terms of the physical conflict of things.

Mr. Mead believes, however, that González Prada's prose style is a misleading guide to the artist's personality, "la verdad íntima y natural del escritor" (p. 36):

"Más bien racionalista y objetiva que subjetiva o poética, encierra a la vez la ventaja de su prosa. No es realmente una prosa llana, fluída, espontánea: todo lo contrario. Artística, sí, con el arte del orfebre: calculada, trabajada, esculpida; pero de una claridad intencionada, tan artifical como el foco de luz que arroja un proyector cinematográfico . . . Como hemos visto, tiende a resumir sus ideas frecuentemente por medio de aptas figuras imaginativas. Lo que importa es transmitir la noción, grabando su imagen con una figura deslumbradora pero siempre clara" (p. 36).

These judgments examined in the light of a similar view in the later essay on González Prada's poetry—"estos poemas amorosos no ostentan el pulimento dilatado que *sufre* la mayor parte de su poesía. *En cambio,* poseen una sinceridad que brota claramente del corazón amante de Manuel y logra transmitir sin equivocación sus más íntimos impulsos" (p. 64, italics mine)—suggest that the artful in art is somehow antithetical to sincerity and intimacy. The suggestion that González Prada's love poems are less worked may merely be a tribute to the success of the author's revisions. Art is habitually "calculada, tradajada, esculpida" to some degree, whether this be before its concrete expression, as in the poetry of Martí, or afterwards, as seems to be the case with González Prada. I suspect that the difference between the "art" of González Prada's prose, for example, and that of his love poems is merely one of artistic posture.

One of the most interesting questions that can be asked about González Prada

is his relation to *modernismo*. Perhaps Mr. Mead will one day examine this problem in detail. Certainly there is much to distinguish González Prada from the general movement—his anti-Spanish attitudes, his insistence that art must serve society, his general impatience with any "disinterested" activity. Nonetheless, he did share certain of the *modernista* objectives. His reaction against the excesses of romanticism was violent and his theories on versification revolutionary. His high regard for "beauty" was characteristic of the movement. More significant, however, was his linguistic sensitivity and his intransigence with verbiage and abuse of words: "El mérito de un adjetivo consiste en no admitir sustitución por adherirse al substantivo, como la carne al hueso, como el tegumento al músculo" (p. 36). His notions on rhythm demonstrate a reverence for the word that recalls the symbolist: "La poesía, 'desdeñando las onomatopeyas y todas las demás puerilidades seniles, armoniza el ritmo de la palabra con el ritmo silencioso de la idea . . . '" (p. 65). Mr. Mead discusses in detail González Prada's experimentation with verse forms and metrics, an experimentation which shows an artistic curiosity very much in keeping with the *modernista* attitude.

This collection of essays will prove helpful to anyone interested in Spanish America. The studies and reviews are interesting and informative, and the essays on González Prada assure the work a place in Iberoamerican criticism.

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THE LIFE AND WORK OF EMILE LITTRÉ (1801-1881). By Stanislas Aquarone. Leyden: A. W. Sythoff, 1958. 217 p.

The history of any literature contains a restricted number of important and enticing topics. The major names, the great literary movements, are soon frozen in "standard" works written by older scholars, with the result that doctoral candidates and younger scholars turn to lesser names or esoteric subjects or to footnote scholarship. Many retreat into the "modern" period, where claims have not yet been filed, where a stroke of luck can transform a diligent researcher into *the* specialist on a rising author. The excitement of the immediacy of the present, the lure of the new, the freedom to make judgments along with the canonized critics constitute temptations against which the past cannot compete. On the other hand, a scholar attracted to previous eras must cultivate a hisorical imagination, amass a wealth of facts, social, political, economic, and philosophical. He has to succeed in appreciating the values of the period under study in the same terms as a contemporary, know the concerns of the day, sense the interplay of the rapidly shifting forces that have since lost their fierce social pressure. In short, he must recreate an age before evaluating the works it produced, and even then he still faces the task of making critical judgments valid for the twentieth century.

The re-creation of any era with a measure of clarity or insight comes only after many documents have been retrieved from archives, correspondences published, monographs published on the *minores*. This kind of intellectual archaeology continues steadily and quietly without the frantic air of journalism that permeates so much modern scholarship. Periodically, when sufficient new pieces have been added to the puzzle, there occurs an eruption of "new views," "re-evaluations," or "critical revisions," all based on facts dredged from a series of works in themselves not very spectacular.

Mr. Aquarone's study falls into the category of monographs necessary for the comprehension of a complex period of history, one full of contradictions and paradoxes. Though he was famous as the author of the *Dictionnaire de la langue française,* the last of the encyclopaedists, and a stout defender of that thorny doctrine known as positivism, Littré offers a subject that promises to intrigue few people; his life is merely the intellectual odyssey of an honest man. Of the same generation as Balzac, Hugo, and Vigny, Littré suffered through no purple passions, struck no calculated dramatic poses. His life has a decided academic flavor. The classmate of Burnouf and Hachette, he became a brilliant linguist. Like a good bourgeois, he planned to become a doctor, but had to abandon medicine after his father's death. To make a living, he fell back on his linguistic talent, becoming a translator for Carrel on the *National* while doubling as a popularizer of science.

When, in 1840, Littré read Comte's *Système de philosophie positive,* he was exposed to what became his religion, a faith he fought for with all the missionary zeal of the convert. He turned into Comte's foremost propagandist, publishing concise and simple explanations of positivism in the hope that these new beliefs would supersede outmoded theologies and the principle of monarchy. But, following the coup d'état, Littré broke with Comte when Comte swore allegiance to Napoleon III and began to transform positivism into a liturgical church. Moreover, he was concerned with the absence in Comte's system of a systematic ethics, aesthetics, and psychology. As a dissident who wanted to preserve the purity of his faith, he came to represent "l'idée laïque contre l'idée religeuse."

Meanwhile, unassisted, he toiled for thirty years over his dictionary. By 1863 he had become famous not only as a lexicographer but as the symbol of the anti-conservative and the anti-Catholic. For this latter stand Msgr. Dupanloup fought to keep him out of the Academy, but he finally succeeded in replacing Villemain in 1871. In December 1875 he was elected to the Senate for life, where he aligned himself with Thiers. When he died in 1881 there began the usual irrelevant controversy over whether or not he had expired in the odor of sanctity.

No knight in shining armor, not possessed of a creative mind, Littré nonetheless deserved the courtesy of a monograph as a solid representative of the educated nineteenth-century bourgeois who carried the encyclopaedic spirit almost to the present era. Though occasionally marred by linguistic lapses, the study, unspectacular as it is and treating a fundamentally unexciting subject, nevertheless presents us with the completest treatment of Littré's life and works yet known.

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Announcements

The third Congress of the International Comparative Literature Association took place at Utrecht, between August 21 and August 26, 1961. The proceedings will soon be published by Mouton and Company, The Hague. At the end of the Congress, Professor René Wellek of Yale University was elected president for America of the International Comparative Literature Association, succeeding Professor W. P. Friederich of the University of North Carolina, and Professor W. A. P. Smit of the University of Utrecht was elected president for Europe, succeeding Marcel Bataillon of the Collège de France. Four new vice-presidents were elected: Sabura Ota of Tokyo, Japan; Horst Frenz of the University of Indiana; Jacques Voisine of the University of Lille; and Mieczeslaw Brahmer of the University of Warsaw. The next Congress will take place late in August, 1964, at Fribourg, Switzerland. The parallel American Comparative Literature Association, which was formed in 1960, will have its first general meeting on September 9-10, 1962, at Columbia University. A program of lectures and panels is being organized. The officers of ACLA are: W. P. Friederich, president; René Wellek, vice-president; Haskell Block, secretary; Eugene Joliat, treasurer.

The fourth congress of the Associazione Internazionale per gli Studi di Lingua e Letteratura Italiana will be held at Magonza April 28-May 1, 1962. The program will be devoted to the eighteenth century.

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